Three Essays on Covenants Not to Compete. by Starr, Evan Penniman
Three Essays on Covenants Not to Compete
by
Evan Penniman Starr
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Economics)
in the University of Michigan
2014
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Charles Brown, Chair
Associate Professor Norman Bishara
Professor James Prescott
Professor Jeffrey Smith
c© Evan Starr 2014
DEDICATION
To my family.
ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The completion of this dissertation owes greatly to the patience, support, and help of family,
friends, and advisors. Thank you to Charlie Brown for chairing my dissertation committee
and providing invaluable feedback at all stages of these research projects. Thank you to
Norman Bishara and JJ Prescott for sharing your legal expertise and for helping me fund,
write, and implement the noncompete survey. Thank you to Jeffrey Smith for your thor-
ough editing of these essays and your assistance with survey sampling methodology and all
issues empirical. Thank you to my friends David Knapp, Ryan Monarch, Ben Niu, Reid
Dorsey-Palmateer, and Pawel Krowlikowski for comments on early drafts and for helping me
troubleshoot. Thank you to my family for your financial and emotional support throughout
this endeavor. I am particularly grateful for my wife Kelsey’s unending patience, love, and
support, without which this work would have never been completed.
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DEDICATION ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENT iii
LIST OF FIGURES viii
LIST OF TABLES xi
Chapter I. Training the Enemy? Firm-Sponsored Training and the Enforce-
ment of Covenants Not to Compete 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Non-Competes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 The Incidence of Non-Competes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.2 Non-Competes in Practice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.3 Quantifying Non-Compete Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Training Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.4 A Theory of Non-Compete Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
iv
1.4.1 Model Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.2 Solving the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.4.3 Timing of the Non-Compete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4.4 Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
1.4.5 Confidential Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.4.6 The in terrorem Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.4.7 Theoretical Prescriptions for Courts and State Legislatures . . . . . . 31
1.5 Empirical Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5.1 Training Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5.2 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.6 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.6.1 Baseline Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.6.2 The Type of Training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.6.3 Enforcement Impact Across Tenure and Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.6.4 Other Enforcement Predictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.6.5 Empirical Recommendation to Courts and State Legislatures . . . . . 50
1.6.6 Robustness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.7 Conclusion and Policy Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.8 Appendix: Training the Enemy? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
1.8.1 Legal Literature Review of Non-Competes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
1.8.2 Proofs and Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
v
1.8.3 Enforcement Indices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
1.8.4 Supporting Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Chapter II. Enforcing Covenants Not to Compete: The Lifecycle Impact on
New Firms 103
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2.2 Covenants Not to Compete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2.2.1 CNC and CNC Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2.2.2 Effects of CNC Enforcement on New Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
2.3 Data and Empirics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.3.1 Identifying within-industry spinouts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
2.3.2 Measuring CNC Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
2.3.3 Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
2.4.1 Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
Chapter III. Who Signs Noncompete? Evidence From a New Survey 142
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
3.2 Data and Survey Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
3.2.1 Representativeness and Weighting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
3.2.2 Employment Status and Worker Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
vi
3.3 Incidence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.3.1 Ever Heard of or Signed a Noncompete? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.3.2 Worker Class . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
3.3.3 Incidence by Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
3.3.4 Incidence by Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
3.3.5 Incidence by Earnings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
3.3.6 Incidence by Legitimate Business Interest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
3.3.7 Incidence by Expected Employment Duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
3.3.8 Incidence by Establishment and Firm Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
3.3.9 Incidence by Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
3.3.10 Incidence by Industry Poaching Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
3.3.11 Incidence by Noncompete Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
3.4 Multivariate Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
3.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
vii
LIST OF FIGURES
1.2.1 Factor Analysis Enforcement Index for 2009 and 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.5.1 Occupation Distribution by Litigation Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.5.2 Industry Distribution by Litigation Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.5.3 State Distribution by Litigation Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.5.4 Within-State Training versus Non-Compete Enforcement . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.6.1 Marginal Effect of Non-Compete Enforcement Across Tenure . . . . . . . . 45
1.6.2 Marginal Effect of Non-Compete Enforcement Across Age . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.8.1 Geography of Non-Compete Enforcement in 2009 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
1.8.2 Enforcement Impact on Training by Occupation and Education . . . . . . . 95
1.8.3 Enforcement Impact on Training by Occupation and Earnings . . . . . . . . 96
1.8.4 Enforcement Impact on Training by Occupation and Tenure . . . . . . . . . 97
1.8.5 Enforcement Impact on Training by Occupation and Firm-Sponsored Training 98
1.8.6 Enforcement Impact on Training by Occupation and Some OTJT . . . . . . 99
1.8.7 Enforcement Impact on Training by Occupation and Occupation-Industry
Concentration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.5.1 Factor Analysis Enforcement Index for 2009 and 1991 . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
viii
3.3.1 Proportion of Education Levels Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
3.3.2 Education vs Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
3.3.3 Occupation Distribution by Current CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
3.3.4 Proportion of Occupation Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
3.3.5 Distribution of Occupation Incidence Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
3.3.6 Earnings Distribution by Current CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
3.3.7 Earnings and Proportion Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
3.3.8 Earnings and Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
3.3.9 Distribution of Business Interests by Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
3.3.10 Proportion of Business Interest Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
3.3.11 Legitimate Business Interest vs Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
3.3.12 Expected Employment Duration vs Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
3.3.13 Establishment Size vs Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
3.3.14 Firm Size vs Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
3.3.15 Firm Level Noncompete Incidence Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
3.3.16 Firm Level Occupation Specific Noncompete Incidence Projections . . . . . 172
3.3.17 Industry Distribution by Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
3.3.18 Proportion of Industry Distribution by Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
3.3.19 Industry Noncompete Incidence Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
3.3.20 Poaching Rates vs Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
3.3.21 State Distribution by Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
ix
3.3.22 Proportion of State Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
3.3.23 State Level Noncompete Enforcement vs Signing CNC . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
x
LIST OF TABLES
1.1 Factor Analysis Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2 Mapping SOC Codes to High/Low Litigation Occupations . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.3 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.4 Baseline Training Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.5 Summary Statistics of Firm-Sponsored Training Content . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.6 Firm-Sponsored Training Content . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.7 Results and Potential Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.8 Policy Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
1.9 Skill-Related Training and Tradability Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . 54
1.10 Index and State Exclusion Robustness Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
1.11 Training and Non-Compete Enforcement over Tenure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
1.12 Training and Non-Compete Enforcement over Age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
1.13 Mapping NAICS 2 Digit Codes to Tradable and Non-Tradable Industries . . 102
2.14 Descriptive Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
2.15 Factor Analysis Index from Starr (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
2.16 The Effect of Non-compete Enforcement on New Firms: 1991 Index . . . . . 135
xi
2.17 Entry Rate Robustness Check: Different Enforcement Indices . . . . . . . . . 136
2.18 Initial Size Robustness Check: Different Enforcement Indices . . . . . . . . . 137
2.19 Employment Growth Years 0-3 Robustness Check: Different Enforcement In-
dices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 138
2.20 Employment Growth Years 3-5 Robustness Check: Different Enforcement In-
dices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
2.21 Employment Growth Years 5-7 Robustness Check: Different Enforcement In-
dices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
2.22 Survival Robustness Check: Different Enforcement Indices . . . . . . . . . . 141
3.23 Qualtrics, ACS Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
3.24 Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3.25 Ever Heard of Noncompetes? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3.26 Ever Signed vs Ever Heard of Noncompetes? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3.27 Currently Signed vs Ever Signed or Heard? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
3.28 Class of Worker and Noncompetes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
3.29 % Signed by Occupation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
3.30 Occupation Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
3.31 Expected Employment Duration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
3.32 Establishment and Firm Size Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
3.33 Currently Signed vs Firm Size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
3.34 % Signed by Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
3.35 Industry Projections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
xii
3.36 Poaching Rate Summary Statistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
3.37 Multivariate Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
xi
CHAPTER I
Training the Enemy? Firm-Sponsored Training and the
Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete
1.1 Introduction
The poaching of employees presents a challenge for firms who wish to improve the skills of
their workforce. Firms that fear a worker is likely to join a competitor may decide to provide
that worker with less training, especially if it involves the transfer of valuable information
such as client lists or trade secrets. Firms have found a contractual solution to this problem in
the form of covenants not to compete (non-competes), which prevent the worker from joining
or starting a competing firm for a fixed amount of time post separation. Non-competes are
believed to be ubiquitous today, often standard in employment contracts for both CEOs and
minimum wage workers, and represent the most litigated portion of employment contracts
(Stone 2002).1 Yet state courts vary significantly in the circumstances under which they will
enforce them. For example, some states have a per se prohibition on enforcing non-competes,
while other states enforce them even if the worker is fired.
This paper theoretically and empirically investigates the traditional argument that firms
will invest more in their workers if their non-competes are more likely to be enforced. The
1See Section 2 for more details.
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assumption underlying the presumed positive relationship between enforcement and training
is that training is not contractible. When training is chosen in equilibrium as a result of
firms competing for workers by offering contracts including both wages and training, then
an increase in non-compete enforcement can reduce the amount of firm-sponsored training.
In this scenario, non-compete enforcement intensity affects the amount of training chosen
by the worker because it affects the likelihood he will be able to move to a competitor firm
in the future. If the worker expects to move to a competitor in which his training is more
valuable, then higher non-compete enforcement reduces the likelihood of that future move-
ment, reducing the value of the training and causing the worker to select a contract with
less training and more money upfront. Without knowing which of these two processes gen-
erates observed firm-sponsored training, the relationship between non-compete enforcement
intensity and training is theoretically ambiguous.
The empirical relationship between non-compete enforcement and observed firm-sponsored
training has never before been examined because of the difficulties involved in accurately
quantifying the various dimensions of enforcement. I create an improved measure of enforce-
ment which weighs six dimensions of enforcement recently quantified by Bishara (2011) by
using confirmatory factor analysis. With this new index, I employ a difference-in-differences
identification strategy which exploits the fact that only occupations present in litigation
(high litigation) are subject to state enforcement schemes. In order to map occupations
to high litigation and low litigation groups, I use the occupation distribution reported in
two surveys of litigated non-compete cases (LaVan 2000, Whitmore 1990).2 The estimates
represent the causal, intent-to-treat effect of state non-compete enforcement, since the data
does not contain information on which workers actually signed non-competes.
I find that a one standard deviation increase in a state’s enforcement level increases the
2The high litigation group refers only to occupations which are present in litigation, regardless of whether
the non-compete was ultimately enforced.
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probability that the average high litigation occupation receives firm-sponsored training by
3% relative to low litigation occupations.3 This estimate suggests that if California were to
adopt Florida’s laws, then high litigation occupations would receive a 16% increase in the
likelihood of receiving firm-sponsored training. The relative, marginal effect rises monoton-
ically between 3% and 8% in each of the first 20 years of tenure, and is between 2 and 7%
for workers aged 22 to 42. Because training later in tenure is less likely to be contracted
upon, the fact that the largest effects of enforcement on training appear for workers with
10-20 years of tenure suggests that the relevant model of training in that stage of tenure is
the “not contractible” model. The “not-contractible” provides a clear role for non-compete
enforcement because it improves training outcomes unambiguously by reducing the tendency
of firms to underinvest in training.
Disaggregating the effect by occupation shows that relative to low litigation occupations,
higher non-compete enforcement increases firm-sponsored training for primarily high skill
and high earnings occupations such as managers, computer and mathematical occupations,
and health practitioners, though personal care and services occupations are also strongly
impacted by enforcement. I also find that the training effects coincide with an enforcement
impact on the hiring margin: for some occupations, firms in lower enforcing states tend to
hire more experienced workers, presumably because they are unwilling to bear their training
costs.
Breaking the non-compete enforcement index into its individual components reveals that
courts looking to improve training outcomes in their states should consider reducing the
burden of proof on the plaintiff, or introducing policies which enforce non-competes only
when workers are provided compensation beyond continued employment in exchange for
signing. Additionally, policies which exploit the heterogeneity of the training impact, such
3The mean probability of receiving firm-sponsored training in the last year is 0.23 for high litigation
occupations and 0.13 for low litigation occupations.
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as Colorado’s enforcement only for upper level management, are well-suited to extract the
training benefits without adversely affecting occupations which receive little or no relative
training benefits from increased enforcement.
This paper contributes to the training literature by adding non-compete enforcement to
the labor market frictions which lead to firm-sponsored training and the nascent empirical
literature on the welfare effects of non-competes. There is a growing reluctance towards the
enforcement of these agreements (Hyde 2003, Lobel 2013) because of the negative impacts on
worker mobility (Marx et al. 2009, Garmaise 2011, Lavetti et al. 2011) and on new venture
creation (Samila and Sorenson 2011), but few studies have empirically examined to what
extent firms and workers actually benefit from the protection offered by enforcement. Lavetti
et al. (2011) find that physicians who sign non-competes tend to earn 11% more because
they are allocated more clients, while Marx and Younge (2013) find that Tobin’s q increased
by 9.75% after non-competes became enforceable in Michigan. My results contribute to this
line of inquiry by estimating an important parameter necessary to understand the overall
welfare effects: at least for some high skill occupations firms are indeed responding to the
increased protection of their confidential information by providing more training to their
employees.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes non-competes and how
enforcement is quantified and Section 3 reviews the relevant training literature. Section 4
extends the classic two-period training model to include non-compete enforcement and a
poaching stage. Section 5 introduces the data and the identification strategy. Section 6
discusses the results and robustness checks, and Section 7 concludes.
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1.2 Non-Competes
1.2.1 The Incidence of Non-Competes
Legal scholars claim that non-competes are ubiquitous, but there is little evidence to justify
this claim for a broad array of occupations (Stone 2002). Previous studies find that about
80% of CEOs sign non-competes (Bishara et al. 2012, Garmaise 2011), 45% of physicians
(Lavetti et al. 2011), 40% of engineers (Marx 2011), and 70% of entrepreneurs with venture
capital contracts (Kaplan and Stromberg 2002). Galle and Koen (2000) survey practicing
human resource professionals and find that of the 123 returned surveys (12.3% response rate),
55% of firms used non-competes. The authors did not investigate which occupations within
the firm were asked to sign non-competes. While the incidence of non-competes in other,
low-skill occupations is generally unknown, Stone (2002) reports that non-compete cases
have been litigated against manicurists, carpet installers, liquor deliverymen, bartenders,
cosmetologists, pest exterminators, garbage collectors, janitors, night-watchmen, undertak-
ers, and security guards. Together this evidence shows that non-competes are an important,
potentially standard, part of employment contracts today.
1.2.2 Non-Competes in Practice
Employees tend to sign covenants not to compete on the first day of their new job, or soon
after (Marx 2011). These agreements typically stipulate that upon separation from the
employer the employee cannot work for a competitor, or start a competing business, for a
certain amount of time and in a specified geographic region. Common time restrictions are
one to three years (Bishara et al. 2012), and geographic restrictions vary by industry. In
highly localized markets, such as the market for hairdressers, the geographic region specified
in the contract may be the county, or a number of miles from the places of business. In
5
national markets, the contract may restrict the worker from working anywhere in the country.
Upon violating the terms of the contract, a number of steps must be taken by the prior
employer in order for the worker to be prevented from actually working for the competitor.
The prior employer must first learn of the violation, then it must choose to file suit in court.
When the case reaches court, the prior employer usually seeks a preliminary injunction,
which will prevent the employee from working for the competitor until the judge determines
whether or not he will enforce the employee’s non-compete. Non-competes are considered
common law and are decided by judges based on state statutes or case law precedents.4 In
2012 there were 742 reported, litigated non-compete cases (Beck 2013). This number is an
underestimate of the vastness of the impact of non-competes, however, because most cases
settle out of court, and many workers may take career detours to explicitly avoid potential
litigation (Marx 2011).
1.2.3 Quantifying Non-Compete Enforcement
While some states, such as California and North Dakota, refuse to enforce non-competes,
most states will enforce them by implementing their own version of the ‘reasonableness doc-
trine,’5 which balances the protection necessary for the firm with the injury to the worker and
society. Among enforcing states there is unanimous agreement that a necessary condition for
the enforcement of a non-compete is that the worker possesses some kind of valuable infor-
mation, called ‘protectable interests,’ in which the firm has made a significant investment it
seeks to protect, such as trade secrets, client lists, and other confidential information which
gains value from not being publicly known. Some states, such as Florida and Kentucky,
4Interjurisdictional issues regarding non-compete enforcement can be quite complex. See Glynn (2008) for
a discussion on choices of law and forum and conflict of law. See also Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic,
Inc. 59 P.3d 231, 238 (California 2002) for a complicated case.
5See Appendix 1.8.1 for a brief review of the legal literature on non-compete enforcement. See Blake
(1960) for an in-depth review of the history of non-compete enforcement.
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include extraordinary general skills training in this list of protectable interests, but tradi-
tionally it has been omitted. Regardless of whether general training is itself a protectable
interest, however, the training level a firm chooses for its employees is closely related to the
traditional protectable interests: Once an employee under an enforceable non-compete is
exposed to the firm’s secret formula, client lists, advertising strategies, or other confidential
information, the employee is bonded to the firm by the non-compete and the firm has the
same increased incentives to invest in the worker. Those further investments in training may
include learning more trade secrets and confidential information, but it is the first exposure
to confidential information that counts.6
Even after courts identify whether the worker possesses a trade secret or has access to
client lists, significant variation remains in how states perceive reasonableness or respond
to the unreasonableness of various other dimensions of the case. For example, some states
will only enforce a worker’s non-compete if the worker voluntarily quits, while others will
enforce it even if the worker is fired. State courts also vary in the manner in which they
handle unreasonably overbroad covenants. Most states will rewrite overbroad non-competes
to be more reasonable and subsequently enforce them. Other states, notably Wisconsin,
will throw out the entire contract if it is overbroad. States also have different enforcement
protocols for whether the non-compete was signed after the employment relationship began
or after a promotion. In Oregon, for example, firms have to notify prospective employees
that they will be asked to sign a non-compete two weeks before employment commences.
Colorado is particularly unique in that it will only enforce non-competes for workers in
6There exists a debate in the legal literature about whether general training should be a protectable
interest. The arguments hinge on whether or not the worker is able to stay at the firm long enough to pay
back the training costs borne by the firm. If the worker leaves too soon, the firm cannot capture enough
of the return to training to cover the cost (Lester 2001). On the other hand, if the worker leaves long
after he has repaid his training cost, it seems unfair to restrict his post-employment options by enforcing
his non-compete (Long 2005). As a result of this debate, many legal scholars advocate the use of training
recoupment contracts such that if the worker leaves too soon he must pay back damages to the firm (Von
Bergen and Mawer 2007).
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upper management. Massachusetts is currently considering a law in which it would consider
durations under 6 months reasonable, but if the worker earns over $250,000 the court might
allow longer durations.7
Malsberger tracks these and other dimensions of enforcement in his volume Covenants Not
to Compete: A State-by-State Survey. Bishara (2011) reviews Malsberger’s texts and assigns
each state a score between 0 to 10 on seven dimensions of non-compete enforcement for
2009 and 1991.8 He aggregates the individual dimensions into a single index using his own
subjective weights. I improve upon Bishara’s weighting scheme by using confirmatory factor
analysis (CFA) on his seven scores to generate weights for each dimension. The benefits
of incorporating each dimension into a single index as opposed to considering the impact
of each component individually are twofold: (1) Since the standard errors of my estimates
will be clustered at the state level, worries about micronumerosity9 increase as the number
of state-level regressors increases10 and (2) if each dimension of enforcement is considered a
measurement error ridden proxy for latent non-compete enforcement intensity, then combin-
ing the measures into a single index reduces attenuation bias.11 Due to the highly correlated
nature of the individual dimensions of enforcement, however, all weighting schemes which
give non-negative weights to each dimension result in highly correlated aggregate indices.
Confirmatory factor analysis as a reweighting tool is therefore a modest improvement.
Factor analysis postulates that each particular dimension of enforcement depends linearly
upon latent enforcement intensity. Defining xis as enforcement dimension i for state s and
7See generally Malsberger (1996) and later editions.
8A complete explanation of Bishara’s (2011) scoring method is available in Appendix 1.8.3.
9See Goldberger (1991).
10I run a specification with each dimension entered linearly in Section 6.
11Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006) show that including the individual measures in the baseline regression
specification and then using the coefficients on the individual dimensions as weights in the aggregation into
a single index is the best way to reduce measurement error. Their method generates different weights with
different dependent variables, which is unappealing in this context. Regardless, their method of aggregation
will be utilized as a robustness check.
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Enfcs as latent enforcement intensity, the model is defined by the set of equations
xis = λiEnfcs + is for i = 1, 2...6,
where is is measurement error. It is assumed that E[is] = 0, E[2is = σi], E[isjs] = 0 for
all i 6= j, E[isik] = 0 for all s 6= k. Under the assumption that λ1 = 1, the correlation
matrix identifies the other λi terms because corr(xi, xj) = λiλj. The latent enforcement
scores are generated by taking the parameter estimates and minimizing the sum of squared
deviations of the latent enforcement factor from its true value.12 The enforcement index is
normalized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one in a sample where each
state is given equal weight. Table 2.15 reports the mean, standard deviation, weight of each
dimension of enforcement for 1991 and 2009 from Bishara (2011) and the resulting weights
from the factor analysis.
Table 1.1: Factor Analysis Index
1991 2009
Question Mean SD FA Weight Mean SD FA Weight Bishara Weight
Statute of Enforceability 4.90 1.53 0.07 4.96 1.79 0.09 0.10
Protectable Interest 5.80 2.03 0.07 0.07 1.93 0.21 0.10
Plaintiff’s Burden of Proof 5.36 2.06 0.06 5.59 1.93 0.13 0.10
Consideration At Inception 8.45 2.35 0.22 8.73 2.39 0.07 0.05
Consideration Post Inception 7.04 2.78 0.09 7.15 2.86 0.05 0.05
Overbroad Contracts 5.71 3.07 0.04 5.83 2.91 0.03 0.05
Quit v. Fire 6.23 2.32 0.07 6.45 2.37 0.07 0.10
Factor analysis yields a relatively consistent picture of the dimensions which characterize a
state’s intensity of enforcement. Indeed the correlation between the 1991 and 2009 scores is
0.94 and the correlations with the initial Bishara index are greater than or equal to 0.93. In
2009, the most important factors are whether a state has a statute of enforceability, what
12See Kolenikov (2009) for CFA details, Harman (1976) for further details on exploratory factor analysis.
See Black and Smith (2006) for an example of using factor analysis to generate an index of college quality.
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constitutes a protectable interest, and the extent of the burden of proof on the plaintiff. In
1991, the dimension which receives most of the weight is whether or not non-competes are
enforceable if the worker only receives continued employment in exchange for signing.
Using the 2009 weights above, I present the non-compete enforcement score for each state in
Figure 1.2.1. As expected, California and North Dakota have the lowest scores. The highest
scores belong to Florida and Connecticut. Overall, the variation across states is large both
in levels and relative to the within-state variation over time.13 Enforcement intensity is not
correlated with a state’s political leanings (Lavetti et al. 2011) and does not appear to be
clustered geographically.14
While non-compete enforcement is relatively consistent across time, the fact that the training
data comes from 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008 raises concerns that state laws may have adjusted
between the ends of the time horizon. Indeed, the only change occurred in Louisiana, which
had an initial reversal in mid-2001 and then reverted back to pre-2001 enforcement levels in
2003. This reversal period is unlikely to affect my estimates because (1) the affected number
of workers is very small (only 104 workers in the final sample of 70,374), and (2) the survey
asks about training during the past year, while workers were surveyed only two months
into the reversal. To account for any variation in changes over time, I assign data from
1996 the 1991 enforcement scores, while the rest of the years receive the 2009 enforcement
score. Additionally, the results I present will use the 2009 weighting scheme above. The
results are robust to using the 2009 scores, the 1991 scores, the weights from the other
year’s factor analysis results, the initial Bishara index, and an index constructed using the
13There are three reasons why there might be differences between the 1991 and 2009 scores: (1) New cases
or statutes caused changes in state laws; (2) The factor analysis weights for 1991 and 2009 are different,
causing the weighted index to differ between the two years even for the same scores; (3) Many states had
not established firm policies in 1991 with regards to some of the dimensions and therefore have missing
information. These missing values are imputed based on the state’s average non-missing score. If by 2009
the court had determined an outcome, it may differ from the imputed value. I run numerous robustness
checks for different sets of years and weights to verify that these differences do not drive my results.
14See the map in Appendix 1.8.4.
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Figure 1.2.1: Factor Analysis Enforcement Index for 2009 and 1991
Lubotsky-Wittenberg method.
1.3 Training Literature
Becker’s classic theory of general human capital argues that as the sole beneficiaries of general
human capital, workers should bear the cost of its acquisition. Contrary to this theory, many
papers find that firms indeed pay for what appears to be general training (see Bishop 1991
for a survey) and workers do not take commensurate wage cuts (Barron et al. 1999 and
others) to pay for it.15 Acemoglu and Pischke (1999) show that wage compression, when
wages rise less than productivity with training, incentivizes firms to invest in general on-
the-job training. They demonstrate that many plausible market failures including general
15Endogeneity concerns remain, however, since it is difficult to control for the fact that unobservably higher
skilled workers sort into higher wage jobs that might require more training.
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and specific complementarities in production, minimum wage laws, adverse selection, and
search frictions generate wage compression and thus encourage firms to provide training.
Recent work on why firms pay for training have focused on specific market failures which
lead to monopsony power for the firm, such as technological complementarities (Acemoglu
and Pischke 1998), the “thinness” of labor markets (Muehlemann et al. 2012), asymmetric
information (Autor 2001, Stevens 1994), search frictions (Asa and Moen 2004), and moving
costs (Katz and Ziderman 1990, Benson 2013).16
One key feature of the Becker model is that when training is general and the labor market
is perfectly competitive the resulting training level is efficient. Without strong evidence
suggesting workers pay for their on-the-job training, economists and policymakers have been
concerned with the potential underprovision of employee training. To identify whether or not
there is a market failure in training, the traditional approach has been to compare training
levels across countries (Acemoglu and Pischke 1999 review this literature). For instance,
Harhoff and Kane (1997) provide evidence that the institutional structure of the German
labor market makes it less likely that workers trained within the firm will leave to work for
other employers. The mobility of US workers is one of the primary reasons firms are likely
to provide less than the efficient level of training (Bishop 1991).
This paper considers whether the enforcement of covenants not to compete, which inhibits
employee movement to competitor firms, increases the firm’s willingness to provide training.
The relationship between firm-sponsored training and non-compete enforcement was first
noted by Rubin and Shedd (1981). They argue that while non-competes have no role in
perfectly competitive labor markets where training is either perfectly general or specific, an
alternative scenario arises, when the worker is credit constrained and cannot pay for his
training, which is likely to be the case when part of the firm-sponsored training involves
16For a nice summary on monopsony in the labor market, see Manning (2003).
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sharing sensitive, confidential information. In this situation, the firm would want the worker
to sign an enforceable non-compete agreement to prevent the worker from appropriating the
value of the training, for which he did not pay, elsewhere. If the firm can prevent the worker
from leaving, then it has the proper incentives to invest in the training and the information
in the first place. Even without credit constraints, however, if workers are unable to pay for
informal or otherwise unanticipated training, then the enforcement of non-competes provides
the proper incentives for the firm to invest.
Hyde (2003) is the only legal scholar I am aware of who presents alternatives to this per-
spective. Hyde argues that if the firm wishes to limit employee turnover, it can utilize
mechanisms other than the non-compete contract, such as delayed compensation, steep wage
profiles, and vesting requirements for retirement packages. If the firm is primarily worried
about the transmission of trade secrets and confidential information for which competitors
would pay dearly, however, these other contractual mechanisms may be less useful.
In addition to the contractibility of training, which I examine in detail in section 4, I propose
two other potential reasons why non-compete enforcement may not impact training choices.
First, employees who sign non-competes are subject to the in terrorem effect, which refers
to the idea that a worker who has signed a non-compete might obey it because he believes it
to be enforceable, or because he feels ethically bound by it, despite the actual enforceability
of the contract. The magnitude of this effect is largely unknown, though Marx et al. (2011)
provides the first evidence that 30% of engineers who signed a non-compete and later quit
took career detour and wage cuts to avoid potential litigation. If employees believe their
non-compete to be enforceable, or abide by it for whatever reason, then whether or not the
courts will actually enforce it is inconsequential. As a result, firms in high enforcing and low
enforcing states are likely to invest similarly in their employee human capital.
Second, even if firms use non-competes in their employment contracts, they must actually
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choose to enforce them in order to deter workers from quitting for competitors in equilib-
rium. Choosing to enforce these agreements, however can be costly. Hyde (2003) provides
anecdotal evidence that some firms have reputations for enforcing non-competes against de-
parting employees and that experienced, potential employees are less willing to work for
them. Thus there may be an equilibrium in which firms choose not to enforce their workers’s
non-competes because of the potential for greater recruiting costs.
The theory developed in Section 4 is most similar to Posner, Triantis, and Triantis (2004),
who also present a model of non-compete enforcement that explores the tension between
human capital investment and employee mobility.17 Their focus on the contracting behav-
ior of the worker and firm leads them to consider three remedies if the contract is breached:
specific performance (forcing the worker to stay at the firm), liquidated damages (the worker
pays the firm if he leaves), and injunctive relief (preventing the worker from joining the other
firm). They consider both when the contract is renegotiable and not, finding that when the
contract is renegotiable, the firm and worker can sign a contract that will induce both ex
post and ex ante efficiency. When contracts are not renegotiable, however, non-compete en-
forcement represents a hybrid between specific enforcement for movements within its scope
and zero liquidated damages for movement outside its scope. Their suggestion to courts is
that non-competes appropriate in scope should be enforced, but in cases where renegotiation
is possible courts should be worried about the tendency to try to extract rents from new
entrants. While their model clarifies the relationship between an injunction required by a
non-compete and alternative breach remedies, their model makes two assumptions which
omit important scenarios: (1) They assume that the worker is most productive in his initial
firm, which precludes the possibility that mobility is welfare enhancing; (2) they do not
allow for the contractibility of training, but instead assume that firms make incentive com-
patible, unilateral investment decisions, which generates the commonly assumed result that
17See Leuven 2005 for a survey of classic private sector training models.
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higher non-compete enforcement increases firm-sponsored investment. The model presented
in Section 4 considers the role of these additional issues.
1.4 A Theory of Non-Compete Enforcement
The training model presented in this section is a partial equilibrium, simplified search model
that abstracts away from the many legal complications that arise in specific contexts. It is
a search model in the sense that the worker only meets a subset of firms in the first period,
but in a later period meets a firm at which he is differentially productive; in this sense,
mobility can be welfare enhancing or reducing. The model is not intended to provide a
complete welfare analysis of non-compete enforcement. The benefit of these abstractions,
however, is the clear intuition developed. The central takeaways from the model are: (1)
if training is part of the employment contract (contractible) then competition internalizes
the training externality and increases in non-compete enforcement may or may not increase
firm-sponsored training levels, (2) if training is not contractible then higher non-compete
enforcement increases the firm’s willingness to provide training, (3) training is higher in the
contractible case even when non-compete enforcement is optimally chosen, (4) workers who
carry with them valuable information that could damage a previous employer have a greater
likelihood of making an inefficient quit,18 and (5) actual enforcement policy is irrelevant if
workers believe those contracts to be enforceable or feel ethically bound to abide by them.
1.4.1 Model Setup
The goals of the model are to formalize the tension between human capital investment and
worker mobility, to understand the assumptions underlying the positive relationships between
18By inefficient quit I am referring to the case in which a worker moves to a firm in which he is less
productive but receives a higher wage.
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non-compete enforcement and firm-sponsored training, and to characterize the optimal non-
compete enforcement levels given two training generating processes. The model generally
follows the full-competition and constrained regimes laid out in the Acemoglu and Pischke
(1999) training models. The baseline assumptions are: (1) In any training that occurs, the
worker absorbs some trade secrets or other confidential information that would be defined
as a protectable interest of the firm, thereby making non-compete enforcement applicable,
(2) all training is considered general training, and (3) the worker does not at any point
renegotiate with his employer.19
The model consists of three stages, a hiring stage, a training stage, and a poaching stage. I
consider two cases in the hiring stage in which a risk neutral worker looks for employment.
In the first case, denoted the “contractible” case, training is assumed to be contractible and
identical firms compete to hire the worker by offering wage and training contracts, denoted
{W,T}, where W refers to the worker’s wage in the training stage, and T corresponds to the
amount of training the worker will receive in the training stage. In the second case, denoted
the “not contractible” case, firms compete on training period wages but cannot or do not
compete on either training or post-training wages.20 In the not contractible case, training is
unilaterally chosen by the firm to maximize profits. Whether or not training is contractible,
it is assumed that the worker signs and bargains over a non-compete at the start of the
employment relationship.21 After joining the firm but before the worker enters the poaching
19One rationale for assumption (3) is that transaction costs are high. Another, as Moscarini (2008)
suggests, is that by committing to a no-renegotiating stance, the firm perpetuates a coordination failure
among employees: If employees coordinated and all were able to procure alternative job offers, the firm
would have no choice but to renegotiate employment contracts to maintain the business. By choosing to not
renogotiate contracts, the firm discourages such coordination among its employees. There is some evidence
that upper management workers renegotiate their contracts, see Lublin (2013).
20Allowing competition on post-training wages yields equivalent results to allowing competition on training
because there is a one to one mapping between training and post-training wages. In both cases, competition
for the worker bids up wages until total expected profit from hiring the worker is zero.
21Firms of course have the option of not using non-competes. In the contractible case, the option to work
for a firm without a non-compete creates a discontinuity in the contract space, in which only workers with
an extreme preference for mobility choose to work for a firm without a non-compete. Workers who choose
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stage, the worker bargains over his post-training wage, w(T ), based on his expected outside
option from quitting, E[v(T )], with bargaining weight β.
The hiring stage is divided by the contractibility of training for four reasons: (1) As Capelli
(1999) notes, workers want their jobs to provide them with future “employability,” including
relevant experience or training. This ‘new employment relationship’ is likely to result in
training becoming either an explicit or implicit (enforceable by the reputation of the em-
ployer) part of the employment contract. (2) As noted by Barron et al. (1999), most training
is informal, and this type of training is by its very nature not contractible. (3) The not con-
tractible case reflects three important situations. First, training might not be contractible
because contracting over every conceivable contingency is infeasible. Second, it may be that
all employers are ex-ante unwilling to commit to providing (at least some) training for the
worker because of uncertainty about the worker’s ability or the match quality. Third, the
worker may already be employed by a firm and his contractible training, the level of which
any other firm would have been willing to supply, has already been provided, but the firm,
because of a positive demand shock, decides to provide additional training to the worker.
(4) Lastly, distinguishing the effects of non-compete enforcement when training is and is
not contractible may provide courts with clear policy alternatives. Oregon has passed, and
Massachusetts is currently considering, a law which require firms to notify workers that they
will ask them to sign a non-compete at least 2 weeks in advance of the commencement of the
employment relationship. To the extent that these kinds of laws encourage myopic workers
to negotiate over training that they would not have otherwise negotiated over, they will
encourage the contracting of training.
In the training period, the firm trains the worker as specified in the training contract (in the
this option receive a lower wage and less training, since non-competes generate second period rents but
competition forces firms to pass along the rents to the worker.
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contractible case) or chooses the level optimally (in the not contractible case).22 The worker’s
production function is given by y(T ), which is assumed to be increasing and concave,23 while
the cost of training, c(T ), is increasing and convex.24
In the poaching stage, the now trained worker meets another firm, or equivalently, mulls
starting his own business. He observes a wage offer equal to his productivity at the new
competitor firm, defined as ay(T ), where a is a random variable with cumulative distribution
function G(a) on [0, a¯], where a¯ represents the upper limit of the support of a. If the worker
decides to stay, then he earns w(T ) and produces y(T ) at the initial firm. If the worker
decides to quit, then the worker’s non-compete is enforced with probability λ. The worker’s
expected wage from quitting is (1 − λ)ay(T ), where the worker is assumed to earn nothing
if his non-compete is enforced.25
1.4.2 Solving the Model
I solve the model via backwards induction, starting with the worker’s quit decision. The
worker quits if his expected pay at the competitor firm exceeds his bargained wage at the
incumbent firm:
(1− λ)ay(T ) > w(T ) (1.4.1)
22While both models assume a single training period in the beginning of the worker’s tenure, in the data
training occurs throughout the life of the worker. This consideration can be incorporated into the theory
by repurposing the not contractible case. Suppose the firm “wakes up” to find it has a worker with training
level T0 and wage w0. The firm then unilaterally makes an incentive compatible decision to upgrade the
worker’s training to T1. After the worker receives the additional training, the poaching phase commences.
This scenario is identical to the not contractible case with w0 = 0 and T0 = 0.
23Formally, y(T ) satisfies y(0) = 0, y′(T ) > 0, y′(0) =∞, and y′′(T ) < 0.
24Formally, c′(T ) > 0 if T > 0, c′(0) = 0, and c′′(T ) > 0.
25There are two ways to think about non-compete enforcement in this context: (1) as mentioned above, λ
is the probability that the worker’s non-compete is enforced if he quits. (2) Alternatively, one can think of
λ as the percentage of time in the poaching period that the worker will be prevented from working for the
competitor firm. Since the goal is not to provide a complete welfare evaluation, but instead to understand the
relationship between enforcement, training choices, and labor market competition, the exact interpretation
of λ is left unspecified.
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The worker’s post-training wages, w(T ), are determined in a full information Nash bargain af-
ter the worker is hired but before he meets a firm in the poaching stage. The only uncertainty
is over the type of firm the worker will meet in the poaching stage. The worker’s expected
outside option from quitting at the time the wage is bargained is E[v(T )] = (1−λ)E[a]y(T ).
His bargained wage solves w(T ) = E[v(T )] + β(y(T )− E[v(T )]), which simplifies to:
w(T ) = y(T )
[
β + (1− β)(1− λ)E[a]
]
(1.4.2)
Condition (1.4.2) shows that non-compete enforcement causes wage compression, which Ace-
moglu and Pischke (1999) identify as the key to incentivizing the firm to pay for general
training. Formally, differentiating w(T )
y(T )
with respect to λ yields:
∂w(T )
y(T )
∂λ
= −(1− β)E[a] < 0, ∀ β ∈ [0, 1)
Increases in λ result in the worker receiving a smaller fraction of his output because the firm
does not have to fully compensate him for his outside options.26
Substituting the wage from (1.4.2) back into the quit equation from (1.4.1) gives the quit
decision as a function of exogenous variables:
a > aˆ(λ) ≡ β
1− λ + (1− β)E[a] (1.4.3)
Given the threshold value of aˆ(λ), the probability of a quit can be neatly summarized by:
P (a > aˆ(λ)) = 1−G(aˆ(λ)) (1.4.4)
26 A prerequisite condition for the initial firm employing the worker in the poaching period is that it must
make weakly positive profits by employing the worker, w(T ) ≤ y(T ). This results in a limit on how big E[a]
can be: E[a] ≤ 11−λ .
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Note that increases in enforcement increase the threshold quitting productivity and thus
make the worker less likely to quit.
Case 1: Contractible Training
In this case, firms compete for the worker by offering wage contracts of the form {W,T}
and the initial firm requires the worker to sign a non-compete. Assuming that the worker is
equally valuable to all firms in this stage, competition ensures that firms earn zero expected
profits. The set of {W,T} such that the firm earns zero profits is given by W = G(aˆ)(y(T )−
w(T )) − c(T ). Given the zero expected profits condition, the worker chooses the utility
maximizing {W,T} contract. Formally, the problem the risk neutral worker faces is:
max
T,W
U(W,T ) = W +G(aˆ)w(T ) + (1−G(aˆ))(1− λ)E[a|a > aˆ]y(T )
s.t. W = G(aˆ)(y(T )− w(T ))− c(T )
Substituting for W from the firm’s zero profit constraint into the worker’s maximization
problem gives:
max
T
U(T ) = G(aˆ)y(T ) + (1−G(aˆ))(1− λ)E[a|a > aˆ]y(T )− c(T ) (1.4.5)
The zero profit condition and resulting indifference between zero expected profit wage-
training contracts turns the worker’s optimal contract choice problem into a problem of
joint surplus maximization.27 If the worker stays, y(T ) is produced and if the worker leaves
then expected production is (1 − λ)E[a|a > aˆ]y(T ). Simplifying the objective function by
27The positive training externality is internalized to the extent that the worker earns his full marginal
product at the competitor.
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incorporating the fact that:
E[a|a > aˆ] =
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
1−G(aˆ)
and taking the derivative with respect to T from (1.4.5) yields the first order condition for
the optimal training level T ∗c (λ) of the contract selected by the worker:
y′(T ∗c (λ))
(
G(aˆ) + (1− λ)
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
)
= c′(T ∗c (λ)) (1.4.6)
Whether increases in non-compete enforcement induce more training is unclear. Totally
differentiating (1.4.6) with respect to non-compete enforcement and using Leibniz’ rule gives:
∂T ∗c (λ)
∂λ
=
y′(T ∗c (λ))
(
g(aˆ) β
(1−λ)2 (1− (1− λ)aˆ)−
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
)
c′′(T ∗c (λ))− y′′(T ∗c (λ))
(
G(aˆ) + (1− λ) ∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
) (1.4.7)
The denominator is clearly positive by the concavity and convexity of the production and cost
functions, but the numerator reflects the indeterminate nature of the relationship. Increasing
non-compete enforcement increases the probability that the worker stays at the current firm,
which increases training when the likelihood of an inefficient quit is high enough. When the
likelihood of an efficient quit is high, however, then increasing non-compete enforcement
prevents the worker from moving, which reduces the benefit from investing in training.
Intuitively, this situation arises when a worker knows he might be more productive at another
firm, and would have chosen a contract with more training if he knew he could eventually
move to the more productive firm, but due to the potential enforcement of his non-compete
he instead chooses a contract with less training and a wage increase.28
28The assumption that the worker is only trained once may appear limiting here. But note that if the
poaching firm was also allowed to train the worker then increasing non-compete enforcement may delay and
possibly prevent the move to the more productive firm in the first place.
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Sharing the Cost of Training
The first period payment W reflects the profit the firm would have gained in the second
period if competition had not forced the firm to pay it to the worker. This second period
monopsony power is derived from two sources: (1) The assumption of stochastic, productive
heterogeneity in the competitor firm in the poaching period, which remains regardless of the
non-compete enforcement level, and (2) non-compete enforcement which reduces the outside
option, compresses the wage structure, and reduces the probability of a quit. This wage is
given by the zero profit constraint evaluated at the chosen training level:
W ∗c (λ) = G(aˆ(λ))y(T
∗
c (λ))(1− β)
(
1− (1− λ)E[a]
)
− c(T ∗c (λ)) (1.4.8)
In the case where the worker will certainly leave in the poaching period, G(aˆ) = 0, the
worker is left to pay entirely for his training, W ∗c = −c(T ∗c (λ)). The worker also pays
for all the training if he starts in the average firm, E[a] = 1, and non-competes are not
enforced, λ = 0. If there is perfect non-compete enforcement, λ = 1, then the worker is paid
W ∗c = y(T
∗
c (1))(1− β)− c(T ∗c (1)).
From (1.4.8), there are three effects of increased non-compete enforcement on the firm’s
willingness to pay for training, c(T ∗c (λ)) + W ∗c (λ): (1) The increase in the probability the
worker will stay with the firm, G(aˆ(λ)), (2) the increase in profits from paying the worker
less, (1− (1− λ)E[a]),(3) the change in profitability from the amount of training the worker
receives, y(T ∗c (λ)). Whether increases in non-compete enforcement result in increases in the
amount of training paid for by the firm depends upon on the size and magnitude of the third
effect. If increases in enforcement increase training, then the firm is indeed willing to pay
more for that training. If increases in non-compete enforcement reduce the optimal training
level, then the firm will pay less for the training if the third effect dominates the other two.
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In order to see a simple example in which more enforcement reduces the willingness of the
firm to pay for training, imagine that there exist only two types of firms, a ∈ {1, 2}, where
half of the firms have productivity a = 1. Assuming that β = 0.5 and that λ = 0.5, then
E[a] = 1.5, aˆ = 1.75, and G(aˆ) = 0.5. In this case, it is straightforward to show via equation
(1.4.7) that an increase in non-compete enforcement reduces training. Intuitively, because a
marginal increase in λ will not reduce the probability of a quit and will also not reduce the
wage the firm has to pay because the distribution of potential poaching firms is unchanged,
then the only impact of the increased non-compete enforcement is to reduce the amount of
training chosen, which reduces the firm’s contribution to training.
Suppose that either the worker is credit constrained or the firm is bound by minimum wage
laws such that the starting wage must be above some lower bound, W ≥ W . If the worker
cannot pay for his portion of the training, then do increases in non-compete enforcement
increase the firm’s willingness to pay for training? The answer is yes, as long as the increase
in non-compete enforcement does not result in training falling by so much that the credit
constraint unbinds. Intuitively, as long as the worker’s first period wages are fixed at W ,
then increases in non-compete enforcement increase the firm’s second period monopsony
power, leading it to pay more for training.
Case 2: Training Not Contractible
In the case where firms do not, or cannot, compete over the training the worker will receive,
they are left to compete on first period wages.29 Because an untrained worker’s marginal
product is assumed to be zero, y(0)=0, competition forces wages to the level of the worker’s
29If firms could compete over post-training wages in addition to pre-training wages, then competition
among employers would reduce the total expected profit from hiring the worker to zero, which is identical
to the contractible case. Restricting wage competition to only the training stage results in zero profits only
in the training period.
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marginal product yielding a starting wage ofW = 0.30 With regards to paying for training, I
assume that in this case the firm must bear all the training costs. This assumption is justified
in two ways: (1) Because training is not contractible, the firm, not the worker, must choose
the incentive compatible amount of training it wishes to supply, and (2) while the worker
can offer to pay for training by taking a wage cut, as long as worker and firm contributions
to training are perfect substitutes then in the Nash equilibrium only one party will pay for
all the training (see Acemoglu and Pischke 1999).
Under these assumptions, the employer’s problem is given by:
max
T
E[pi(T )] = G(aˆ)(y(T )− w(T ))− c(T )
Plugging in for the value of w(T ) from (1.4.2) and solving for the optimal training level,
T ∗nc(λ), gives:
G(aˆ)y′(T ∗nc(λ))(1− β)(1− (1− λ)E[a]) = c′(T ∗nc(λ)) (1.4.9)
Using the implicit function theorem, the partial derivative of the optimal training choice
with respect to non-compete enforcement is given by:
∂T ∗nc(λ)
∂λ
=
g(aˆ) β
(1−λ)2y
′(T ∗nc(λ))(1− β)(1− (1− λ)E[a]) +G(aˆ)y′(T ∗nc(λ))(1− β)E[a]
c′′(T ∗nc(λ))−G(aˆ)y′′(T ∗nc(λ))(1− β)(1− (1− λ)E[a])
> 0
In this case, non-compete enforcement has an unambiguously positive effect on the amount
of training undertaken for two reasons: (1) It reduces the chance the worker quits, and (2)
it reduces the wage the firm must pay the worker because his outside options are limited.
Comparing the training outcomes from the two cases leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. For a given enforcement level, λ, optimal training levels are higher when
30Assuming y(0) > 0 does not substantively change any analysis. If this were the case, competition simply
bids up his wage to W = y(0) and does not affect any subsequent training decisions.
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training is contractible at the hiring stage, T ∗c (λ) > T ∗nc(λ).
The proof is in Appendix section 1.8.2, but the intuition is clear: In the contractible case,
training is chosen to maximize total surplus whereas in the not contractible case training
is chosen to maximize firm profits, which are less than total surplus because they exclude
worker benefits and benefits to alternative employers.
1.4.3 Timing of the Non-Compete
Marx (2011) finds that most engineers who sign non-competes do not know about them
at the time of the offer. Indeed, the typical story is that a worker accepts an offer without
knowing about the non-compete in advance, then signs the non-compete on the first day while
working through a pile of paper work. Incorporating these facts into the contractible model,
and assuming that the worker does not anticipate the non-compete, it is straightforward to
show that non-compete enforcement can only have a non-negative impact on training. In
this scenario, the worker bargains for training level T ∗c (0) and starting wage W ∗c (0). In the
second period the firm would make an incentive compatible training choice. If the the training
chosen by the contract is such that T ∗nc(λ) > T ∗c (0), then the firm will provide more training.
Alternatively, assuming that the firm cannot ‘untrain’ the employee, if T ∗nc(λ) ≤ T ∗c (0) then
the firm will leave the training level at T ∗c (0). This blend of the contractible and not-
contractible training indeed may be representative of the training received by the typical
worker.
1.4.4 Efficiency
For brevity, I summarize here the main efficiency results and refer the interested reader to the
thorough treatment of efficiency in the appendix. The primary questions of interest in this
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section are: (1) Given how firms will train their workers and workers will make quit decisions,
what is the optimal level of non-compete enforcement? And (2), given optimal enforcement
levels, how do training decisions compare to each other and the efficient outcome?
To establish the efficient outcomes, consider a social planner who chooses the non-compete
enforcement level, the training, decision, and the quit decision, all subject to the information
and timing constraints of the model. It is straightforward to show that such a social planner
would choose never to enforce non-competes, would train by maximizing expected social
surplus, and make the worker quit whenever he meets a more productive firm.
Consider next the choice of non-compete policy faced by state legislatures. In this theoretical
setup, there are two potential benefits to enforcing non-competes: (1) Preventing inefficient
quits, which occur when workers quit to join firms in which they are less productive and (2)
reducing the tendency to underinvest in training due to the external benefits which accrue to
future employers of the worker. The cost of non-compete enforcement is that it might prevent
workers from moving to firms in which they are more productive. Optimal non-compete
enforcement levels balance these costs and benefits. When training is not contractible in
the hiring stage, enforcing non-competes both incentivizes the firm to train the worker more
and reduces the chance the worker will quit for less productive jobs. When training is
contractible, on the other hand, the positive training externality is fully internalized when
the worker receives his full marginal product at his outside option, and therefore the only
benefit of increasing non-compete enforcement is to prevent workers from quitting for less
productive firms. This leads to a lower optimal level of non-compete enforcement relative to
the not contractible case.
As long as optimal non-compete enforcement is non-zero, then both the training and mobility
decisions will be inefficient. Evaluated at their respective optimal enforcement levels, training
outcomes from the contractible case are weakly greater than when training is not contractible.
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1.4.5 Confidential Information
A common rationale for enforcing non-compete agreements is that if workers have valuable
information in the form of client lists or trade secrets, which the firm has presumably tried
hard to procure and keep secret, then a departing worker could do harm to his previous
employer by stealing its business and in so doing reduce its incentive for investment. Failing
to enforce non-competes in this situation might be considered anti-competitive.
Adapting the model to address these concerns yields some interesting considerations. The
rationale from the previous model is a good guide to thinking intuitively about how this
addition to the model will work. If the worker who quits brings over confidential information
which can be exploited by the new firm, in addition to his marginal product, then the worker
is more likely to make an inefficient quit because the new firm values not only his marginal
product but also his information. To the extent that this is a zero sum game,31 so that the
added production from the worker’s knowledge at one firm results in a commensurate loss of
production at his prior firm, there is no social benefit to the worker quitting to join a firm
where his marginal product is lower. Therefore, the resulting optimal enforcement levels
should be higher in order to deter the increased propensity for inefficient quitting.
To make this explicit, suppose that when the worker quits and his non-compete is not
enforced, the worker’s marginal product at the other firm is still ay(T ), but in addition the
new competitor firm values the worker’s knowledge of his prior firm at k(T ). Assume that
this is a zero sum game, so that if the worker quits and his non-compete is not enforced then
the initial firm loses k(T ).32 The primary assumption on k(T ) is that increases in training
31This is likely to be the case when clients and client lists are the information being transported. It is
unclear to what extent other trade secrets and confidential information would justify this zero-sum assump-
tion.
32The assumption of a zero sum game is made for convenience. A more general specification would be that
the production of the worker at the competitor firm is given by f(a, y(T ), k(T )). One might imagine that a
competitor with a higher a may be able to use the worker’s knowledge better. In this case, the government
would want the worker to move to the place where both he and his information are most highly valued. This
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result in the worker knowing more and more about the firm, thereby making him more
valuable. One might think then that k(T ) and λ should be related. Consider the simplest
case, however, when λ is independent of k(T ), implying that knowing one trade secret yields
the same probability of non-compete enforcement as knowing ten trade secrets.33
Consider the worker’s quit decision and bargained second period wages. The worker quits if
his expected pay at the poaching firm exceeds his bargained wage at the old firm. Since at
the competitor firm the worker is assumed to earn his marginal product plus whatever else
he brings in, the worker’s wage if he quits successfully would be ay(T ) + k(T ). The worker
would quit when (1− λ)[ay(T ) + k(T )] > w(T ).
Next consider the worker’s wages, w(T ), if he were to stay at the initial firm. The worker has
the option to quit in the poaching period, but in the second period when he is bargaining
his wage, he does not know what kind of firm he will meet. His expected outside option is
E[v(T )] = (1−λ)(E[a]y(T )+k(T )). Given that k(T ) = zy(T ), and that each firm, regardless
of a, can use the new information equally well, his bargained wage is:
w(T ) = y(T )(β + (1− β)(1− λ)[E[a] + z])
Plugging the wage back into the quit equation gives the quit decision as a function of exoge-
nous variables:
a >
β
1− λ + (1− β)E[a]− βz
Thus relative to the initial case, increases in z increase the second period wage, but not
necessarily complicates the identification of the optimal non-compete enforcement level, but the intuition
remains valid.
33One objection to this setup is that it ignores the incentive issues for the firm to create valuable information
in the first place. While this might be true, the firm still posses valuable information such as client lists
or trade secrets including advertising strategies or other specific business information not known to its
competitors. At least some of this information is transferred to the worker throughout is training at the
firm.
28
enough to keep the quit probability constant. As shown above, the probability of quitting
still increases with z.
Consider how allowing a worker to provide valuable information about his initial firm to
a competitor firm will affect the efficient choices and the optimal non-compete level and
training choices made in the two cases distinguished above. In terms of constrained efficiency,
as long as the game is zero sum, in the sense that the knowledge part of the worker’s
production at the new firm does not add anything to the total surplus, there is no additional
gain to enforcing non-competes or training workers differently, and therefore none of the
constrained efficient choices would be changed.
In the case where competition at the hiring stage turns the profit maximization problem
into a problem of total surplus maximization, the fact that the amount of business taken
from the initial firm is equal to the amount taken by the competitor firm, k(T ), means
that the only effect of non-compete enforcement is to decrease the chance the worker will
make an inefficient quit decision, since competition over contractible training internalizes the
positive training and information externalities. Therefore, the resulting optimal non-compete
enforcement level will increase with z.
In the case where training is not contractible, there are two negative effects on the firm
because the worker has valuable information: (1) If the worker successfully quits, the firm
loses k(T ) in addition to his actual marginal product, and (2) the worker is more likely to
quit to appropriate the value of his knowledge. The result of the first effect is that the firm
will choose a lower training level, independent of the non-compete enforcement level (as long
as λ < 1). The second effect also reduces the benefit to training because the worker is more
likely to quit. In this scenario, the government should choose an optimal enforcement level
that is much higher, and increasing in z, so that firms have better incentives to invest in
human capital and workers are not encouraged to make inefficient quit decisions.
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The optimality calculations from the adjusted model follow the same methods as in the
appendix, and are therefore omitted. They lead to the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If confidential information is zero-sum, then (a) optimal non-compete en-
forcement increases when training is and is not contractible, but increases more when training
is not contractible, and (b) the chosen training level will be higher in the contractible case.
1.4.6 The in terrorem Effect
The model outlined above provides a simple setup in which to examine the in terrorem effect.
The in terrorem distinguishes between the worker’s perceived enforcement, λp, and actual
enforcement, λa. The perceived enforcement level affects the worker’s quit decision, while
the actual enforcement probability affects the actual probability the worker is allowed to
switch firms. Implicit in the worker’s perceived enforcement level is the worker’s willingness
to abide by the contract because he feels ethically obligated. Given that workers likely know
little about non-compete enforcement but that firms are likely to be keen to remind them of
their non-compete after they decide to quit, this consideration may be especially important.
With these definitions, the worker’s quit decision can be rewritten as
a > aˆp(λp) ≡ 1
1− λp + (1− β)E[a]
The worker’s contract choice problem when training is contractible is given by:
max
T
G(aˆp)y(T ) + (1−G(aˆp))(1− λa)E[a|a > aˆp]y(T )− c(T )
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The in terrorem effect suggests that if workers believe their non-compete to be enforceable,
or feel ethically bound by it, then λp = 1. Substituting yields:
max
T
y(T )− c(T )
As a result, the impact of actual non-compete enforcement on training choices is eliminated.
The same can be shown in the not contractible case. As a result of the in terrorem effect,
actual enforcement is irrelevant for training choices in either case. Intuitively, if workers
either think their non-compete is enforceable or feel bound by it, regardless of the state in
which they sign it, they will choose to obey it. As a result, firms have no differential training
incentives.
Proposition 3. If workers believe their non-competes to be enforceable or abide by them for
any reason, λp = 1, then they never quit, G(aˆ)=1, and firm-sponsored training levels are
unrelated to actual non-compete enforcement, ∂T
∗
c
∂λa
= 0 and ∂T
∗
nc
∂λa
= 0.34
1.4.7 Theoretical Prescriptions for Courts and State Legislatures
While this model does not present a full welfare analysis of non-competes, the takeaways
relevant to courts are: (1) When training is contractible, increased enforcement of non-
compete agreements does not necessarily increase firm-sponsored training. (2) When training
is not contractible, increased enforcement increases firm-sponsored training. (3) If there is a
legitimate worry that a worker is simply transporting clients or potential trade secrets from
one firm to the other, then the likelihood that the quit is inefficient is greatly enhanced and
enforcement should be higher. (4) If workers believe their non-competes to be enforceable
or adhere to them for some other reason, then actual enforcement policies are irrelevant. (5)
34The proof of this proposition is omitted.
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In light of the fact that more training occurs when it is contractible, courts may be able
to improve training outcomes by inducing workers and firms to bargain over the terms of
the contract. To the extent that early notification of their non-compete would encourage
workers to bargain for training that they would not have otherwise requested, laws such as
Oregon’s which enforce only non-competes for workers who are given two weeks notice may
encourage the contractibility of training.
1.5 Empirical Analysis
The theoretical model shows that non-compete enforcement should only necessarily be pos-
itively related to training levels if training is not contractible, or if training is contractible
but the probability of an inefficient quit is high. Additionally, the model shows how per-
ceptions of non-compete enforcement may undermine that positive relationship. Without
knowing the extent to which training is contractible in the data, the relationship between
non-compete enforcement and training as an empirical question.
1.5.1 Training Data
The training data comes from the topical module from Wave 2 of the Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP) panels from 1996, 2001, 2004, and 2008. The SIPP is
a longitudinal survey that interviews respondents once every four months for three to four
years. Because non-compete enforcement varies almost entirely in the cross-section, I pool
all of the cross-sections together and include year fixed effects in the estimation. The SIPP
tracks up to two occupations for each individual and in order to assure that I analyze the
occupation in which the training actually occurred, I restrict the sample to workers who hold
only one job. I also drop workers younger than 22 and older than 55, as well as workers
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with jobs in the non-profit sector, government, community service, education, military, and
protective services. There remain 70,374 individuals in the sample. Occupation codes are
updated to 2007 two-digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) codes and industry
codes are updated to 2007 two-digit NAICS codes.
Due to the ambiguity in defining training, I choose as the dependent variable the most blunt
instrument: an indicator equal to one if the worker answers yes to the question “During
the past year, has [the respondent] received any of kind of training intended to improve
skill in one’s current or most recent job?” and also reports that his firm has paid for the
training. It is unclear whether a worker who answers affirmatively to both of these questions
is referring to informal or formal training, and the SIPP does not make this distinction.
Only about 20% of the individuals in the sample report receiving firm-sponsored training in
the last year, which suggests that this variable reflects formal training, since workers early
in their tenures appear to receive relatively more informal training (Barron et al. 1999). If
indeed the dependent variable captures only formal training, and formal training tends to be
contractible while informal training is less often contracted upon, then the model suggests
that any effects I find may understate the actual effect of non-compete enforcement on total
training.
In order to exploit the cross-sectional state level heterogeneity in non-compete enforcement,
I compare training outcomes between occupations likely to see non-compete litigation (high
litigation) and occupations unlikely to see such litigation (low litigation) using surveys of
litigated, non-compete cases (LaVan 2000, Whitmore 1990). LaVan’s (2000) study of 104
randomly selected cases finds the following occupation distribution: 25% managerial, 31%
sales, 37% professional, 1% entertainer. Whitmore (1990) studies 105 cases from the 1960s
to the 1980s and finds that the occupation distribution is 9% skilled labor, 51% sales, 14%
middle management, 7% business executive, 2% engineers, 1% entertainers, 9% physician,
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and 5% other professional. It is unclear if this is a random sample. I include service workers
as high litigation because 44% of cases in LaVan’s study involved either retail or service
companies and it is unclear if services were considered separately from traditional sales
occupations. The mapping of two digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system
codes is presented in Table 1.2. Inclusion into low litigation occupations was defined as
having less than or equal to 1% of litigated cases or being in a legal field, since non-competes
are traditionally banned for lawyers (Stroud 2002).
Selection into low litigation can be determined by four possibilities: (1) Workers in these
occupations do not actually sign non-competes, thereby exempting them from potential
litigation, (2) firms decide not to attempt to enforce non-competes for these occupations,
presumably because the expected costs of enforcement outweigh the expected benefits, (3) the
outcome of enforcement is certain, and therefore firms and workers do not bother litigating,
and (4) the worker and firm settle outside of court. Examining the two-digit SOC occupations
in the low litigation group shows that with the exception of lawyers, most of the occupations
tend to be low skill and low earnings occupations. This evidence suggests that selection into
low litigation is primarily determined by either not signing non-competes or firms choosing
not to enforce because the occupation is a low value occupation. Summary statistics for key
variables are presented in Table 2.14, and state, industry, and occupation distributions by
high and low litigation status are shown in Figures 1.5.1 to 1.5.3.
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Table 1.2: Mapping SOC Codes to High/Low Litigation Occupations
Low Litigation High Litigation
Legal Management
Arts, Entertainment, Recreation Business, Financial
Food Prep, Serving Computer, Mathematical
Grounds Maintenance Engineering, Architecture
Office Support Life, Physical, Social Sciences
Farming, Fishing, Hunting Healthcare Practitioners, Technical
Construction, Extraction Personal Care, Services
Transportation, Materials Moving Installation, Repair
Production
Sales
Note: Education, Community Service, Protective Service, and Mili-
tary occupations have been dropped from the sample, along with all
non-profit and government workers. Service workers, such as instal-
lation and repair and personal care, are included as high litigation
because LaVan (2000) and Whitmore (1990) do not distinguish be-
tween selling a product and performing a service.
Table 1.3: Summary Statistics
Low Litigation High Litigiation T-Test
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Difference P-value
Firm-sponsored Training 0.13 0.34 0.23 0.42 -0.09 0.00
Initial Potential Experience 31.76 9.10 31.62 8.90 0.14 0.04
Tenure 5.96 6.71 7.36 7.37 -1.41 0.00
Monthly Earnings 2,655 2,555 4,344 4,407 -1,688 0.00
Bachelors 0.10 0.30 0.23 0.42 -0.13 0.00
Grad School 0.02 0.14 0.08 0.27 -0.06 0.00
Metro 0.79 0.41 0.81 0.39 -0.02 0.00
Male 0.51 0.50 0.58 0.49 -0.08 0.00
White 0.66 0.48 0.75 0.43 -0.09 0.00
Establishment Size 25-99 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.42 0.02 0.00
Establishment Size 100+ 0.35 0.48 0.45 0.50 -0.10 0.00
Firm Size 25-99 0.15 0.36 0.12 0.33 0.02 0.00
Firm Size 100+ 0.58 0.49 0.70 0.46 -0.12 0.00
Hours Per Week 38.96 10.18 41.92 9.61 -2.96 0.00
Union 0.12 0.32 0.08 0.28 0.03 0.00
Observations 30,094 40,280
Note: The T-Test is two-tailed and the corresponding p-value is the probability of getting
an estimate this large if the population difference equals zero.
Workers in high litigation occupations are very different from those in low litigation occu-
pations. For example, in this sample they report receiving seven percentage points more
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Figure 1.5.1: Occupation Distribution by Litigation Type
training than low litigation occupations. They are also more educated, earn more money
each month, tend to be in bigger firms, and are less unionized. It is especially important to
recognize that the within-state distribution of litigation types is balanced because the em-
pirical strategy I employ relies on within state differences in training between high and low
litigation occupations. Indeed in the sample as whole, 43% of workers are in low litigation
occupations. Overall, high litigation occupations look a lot like high skill occupations and
low litigation occupations look a lot like low skill occupations. Presumably this distinction
arises because high skill occupations are more valuable to the firm and firms might only be
willing to sue high value workers to prevent them from moving to a competitor.
To get a sense of the unconditional relationship between non-compete enforcement and the
within-state difference between firm-sponsored training received by high and low litigation
occupation, Figure 1.5.4 plots the average probability of receiving training in high and low
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Figure 1.5.2: Industry Distribution by Litigation Type
litigation occupations within each state against non-compete enforcement intensity. The
unconditional difference-in-differences estimate is the difference between the slopes. Impor-
tantly, note that the difference in the slopes is driven not by the ends of the enforcement
distribution, but instead by states which have an enforcement score greater than zero.
1.5.2 Identification
Due to the fact that non-compete enforcement varies primarily in the cross section, I employ a
difference-in-differences (DID) strategy with state fixed effects to identify the relative impact
of non-compete enforcement between occupations which appear frequently in non-compete
litigation (high litigation) and those which appear infrequently or not at all (low litigation).
Importantly, low litigation occupations are not necessarily unaffected by enforcement because
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Figure 1.5.3: State Distribution by Litigation Type
these workers may also sign non-competes, but the likelihood of litigation is much lower for
this group. Indeed, there is evidence that there is a positive relationship between training
and non-compete enforcement for workers in low litigation occupations, which implies that
the difference-in-difference estimates are a lower bound on the overall effect.
With this strategy, I estimate variants of the following two equations:
Tijost = β0 + β1Enfcst ∗HLo + β2Enfcst + γXijst + Ωo + θs + φt + ijost (1.5.1)
Tijost = b0 +
10∑
k=1
αkEnfcst ∗Occk,HL + b2Enfcst + γXijst + Ωo + θs + φt + νijost (1.5.2)
In equations (1.5.1) and (1.5.2), Tijost refers to an indicator for worker i at firm j in occupation
o and state s having received firm-sponsored training in year t − 1. State fixed effects are
represented by θs, Ωo are 2-digit SOC occupation dummies, φt are year fixed effects, Xijst
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Figure 1.5.4: Within-State Training versus Non-Compete Enforcement
is a set of individual, firm level, and interacted state-level controls, HL0 is a dummy for
high litigation occupations, and Enforcest is the non-compete enforcement level of state
s at time t. The variable Occk,HL is an indicator variable for occupation k conditional on
being a high litigation occupation. The errors are clustered at the state level to account for
state-level correlations in the disturbances. The coefficients of interest are β1 in equation
(1.5.1) and the ten αk terms in equation (1.5.2). They capture the causal, intention-to-treat
effect of non-compete enforcement on high litigation occupations relative to low litigation
occupations.
The set of controls, Xijst consist of potential experience, potential experience squared, tenure,
tenure squared, hours worked, and indicators for working in a metro area, bachelors degree,
graduate degree, male, white, establishment and firm size 25-99, establishment and firm size
100+, whether the worker is unionized, NAICS 2 digit industries, year, and state. State
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corporate tax rates (Seegert 2013), indicators for exceptions to at-will employment (Autor
et al. 2006), and whether the state is a right-to-work state are all interacted with the high
litigation or occupation specific main effects.
The state fixed effects account for other time invariant state characteristics which might
cause omitted variable bias. Due to the inclusion of state fixed effects, the identifying
assumption is that there are no unobserved variables which differentially affect within-state
firm-sponsored training choices for high litigation groups relative to low litigation groups that
are also correlated with non-compete enforcement. In notation, the identifying assumption
for equation (1.5.1) is
E[Enfcst ·HLo · ijost|Xijst,Ωo, θs, φt] = 0 (1.5.3)
The equivalent assumption for equation (1.5.2) follows a similar form. In the robustness
section below, I show that the training effects are not driven by reverse causality, high
training firms sorting to high enforcing states, and skill-related training being more likely in
high enforcing states.
Intent to Treat vs. Treatment on the Treated
Non-compete enforcement only matters for workers who sign non-compete agreements. Un-
fortunately, whether a worker has signed a non-compete is not contained in the data. There-
fore, the way to interpret a coefficient like β1 from equation (1.5.1) is as an intent-to-treat
effect. The state with a high intensity of enforcement is offering a treatment, but firms can
choose to opt out of treatment by not using non-competes. While identifying the treatment
on the treated effect is certainly a parameter of interest, the intent-to-treat effect is the rele-
vant parameter for state judiciaries to consider since they choose the intensity of enforcement
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but cannot force firms to use non-competes.
1.6 Results
1.6.1 Baseline Results
The results from equation (1.5.1) are reported in column (4) of Table 1.4.35 The intent
to treat effect in the full sample is 0.007. This implies that if a state were to increase
its non-compete enforcement intensity by 1 standard deviation, high occupation workers
on average would receive 0.7 percentage point increase in the probability of receiving firm-
sponsored training in the given year. This corresponds to 3% of the mean of training for
high litigation workers. Columns (1), (2) and (3) show the standard difference-in-differences
results with and without controls, and without controls but with state fixed effects. Given
that the differential effect for high litigation without state fixed effects is very similar to the
specification with state fixed effects, it appears that unobserved state level factors are not
driving the impact on the low litigation group.36
The first column of Table 1.6 shows the occupation-specific ITT estimates from equation
(1.5.2). The occupation specific impact on of enforcement on training ranges from -0.01
to 0.17 percentage points, which correspond to between 3% and 7.5% of the mean level of
workers reporting receiving training in that occupation. Management, business, financial,
computer and mathematical occupations, engineers, healthcare practitioners and technical
healthcare workers (not support), and personal care and service occupations are significantly
35Note that because the enforcement index is a generated regressor, there is error associated with the
generation process which is not captured in the estimation procedure.
36Tenure, potential experience, and firm size may be considered bad controls since greater non-compete
enforcement is likely to lengthen tenures, reduce the experience necessary to be hired, and increase the size
of the firm since workers are not quitting and firms are incentivized to invest more in R & D. Omitting these
variables from the regression does not substantially change the estimate or the standard error.
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Table 1.4: Baseline Training Results
DID DID State FE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
HighLitigation*Enforcement 0.007*** 0.006** 0.006*** 0.007**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
Enforcement 0.007** 0.003 0.069 0.007
(0.003) (0.002) (0.044) (0.013)
Observations 70,374 70,374 70,374 70,374
R-squared 0.041 0.097 0.049 0.101
State FE No No Yes Yes
Controls No Yes No Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the state level. The dependent variable is an indicator equal
to one if the worker received firm-sponsored training in the last year. The
omitted group is low litigation occupations. The set of controls consist of
potential experience, potential experience squared, tenure, tenure squared,
hours worked, and indicators for working in a metro area, bachelors degree,
graduate school degree, male, white, establishment and firm size 25-99,
establishment and firm size 100+, whether the worker is unionized, NAICS
2 digit industries, year, and state. State corporate tax rates, indicators for
exceptions to at-will employment, and whether the state is a right-to-work
state are all interacted with the high litigation or occupation specific main
effects.
affected by non-compete enforcement relative to low-litigation occupations.37 Breaking down
the effect by gender shows that women are more affected than men, but the difference is not
statistically significant (results not shown here). Figures 1.8.2 to 1.8.7 in section 1.8.4 in
the appendix plot the occupation specific estimates against occupation level averages of
schooling, monthly earnings, tenure, training, and industry concentration. They show that
the impact of non-compete enforcement on training tends to be located in occupations that
have higher earnings and higher schooling levels.
37Alternative specifications using logit and probit models find substantively similar results.
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1.6.2 The Type of Training
Since training could consist of many activities, I use the SIPP’s follow up questions regarding
the contents of the training to see which type of training is driving the results. Training is
categorized into the following non-mutually exclusive categories: basic skills, new skills, up-
grade existing skills, and introduce company policies. Summary statistics of these outcomes
by high and low litigation status are given in Table 1.5. Two-thirds of the firm-sponsored
training is upgrading skills, about half is teaching new skills, and one-third is teaching basic
skills and introducing company policies, though there is substantial overlap.
Table 1.5: Summary Statistics of Firm-Sponsored Training Content
Low Litigation High Litigiation
Variable Mean SD Mean SD
Firm-Sponsored Training 0.13 0.42 0.23 0.42
Basic Skills 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.24
New Skills 0.06 0.25 0.10 0.30
Upgrade Skills 0.09 0.29 0.17 0.37
Company Policies 0.04 0.18 0.05 0.23
Observations 30,094 40,280
To examine which type of training non-compete enforcement affects, I run the same regres-
sions using indicators for type of training received as the dependent variables. The results
in Table 1.6 show that the relative enforcement effect is driven by skill upgrading. Breaking
the effect down by occupation shows that only business and financial occupations are trained
more in basic skills in higher enforcing states. Most of the firm-sponsored training effects
are driven by training designed to upgrade worker skills. Additionally, while the overall
impact of enforcement on firm-sponsored training for business and financial occupations is
small and statistically insignificant, the 1 percentage point impact on basic skills training is
relatively large. With regards to the probability of learning new skills, non-compete enforce-
ment appears to positively affect only business, financial, and computer and mathematical
occupations.
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Table 1.6: Firm-Sponsored Training Content
Intent-to-Treat Effect Training Basic New Upgrade Policies
High Litigation 0.007** 0.002 0.002 0.005** 0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Management 0.007* 0.003 0.002 0.007** 0.001
(0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Business, Financial 0.012** 0.011*** 0.006* 0.008* 0.004*
(0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002)
Computer, Mathematical 0.010** 0.003 0.007* 0.014*** 0.003
(0.005) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002)
Engineering 0.017** -0.001 0.003 0.015*** 0.001
(0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Life, Physical, Social Sciences -0.010 -0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.004
(0.010) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
Healthcare Practitioners, Technical 0.015** -0.004 0.002 0.008* 0.000
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Personal Care, Services 0.011*** 0.004 0.006 0.009** 0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Sales 0.004 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Installation, Repair 0.008 -0.000 0.004 0.002 -0.004
(0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
Production 0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.003
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Observations 70,374 70,374 70,374 70,374 70,374
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at
the state level. The omitted group is low litigation occupations. All dependent variables are
indicator variables for the type of firm-sponsored training received. Basic refers to training
for basic skills. New refers to training to learn new skills. Upgrade refers to training that
improves existing skills. Policies refers to training that introduces company policies. The
set of controls are the same as the baseline specification discussed on page 182.
1.6.3 Enforcement Impact Across Tenure and Age
Recall that under the contractible model the effect of enforcement on training was ambiguous
and depended upon the likelihood of an efficient quit, while the effect in the not-contractible
model was unambiguously positive. Under the assumption that contractible training is more
likely to occur early in a worker’s tenure, examining the impact of non-compete enforcement
on training across tenure can distinguish between training that is contractible and not-
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contractible. To do this, I run the baseline specification for different bins of tenure levels.
The results, displayed in Figure 1.6.1,38 show that the impact of non-compete enforcement on
training rises between years 0-5 and years 15-20, before falling off. The rising impact across
tenure provides evidence that indeed the operative model of training later in tenure is the
not-contractible model. If this is the case, then there is a role for non-compete enforcement
in reducing the resulting inefficiency in investment.
Figure 1.6.1: Marginal Effect of Non-Compete Enforcement Across Tenure
The impact across tenure may also be a result of the fact that as employee’s stay longer with
the firm, they collect more and more valuable company trade secrets, client relationships, and
confidential information. As such, while the employee has demonstrated a commitment to the
firm by staying, competitor firms would pay willingly for the employee’s talent, knowledge,
and client access, which would reduce the firm’s incentive to train at all points in tenure, all
38The corresponding numbers are shown in Table 1.12 in the appendix.
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else equal. Thus the employee’s non-compete becomes an important feature of the employee-
firm relationship and gives the firm confidence in the employee’s loyalty. In this way, the
enforceability of an employee’s non-compete may increase his likelihood of promotion. Since
promotions typically come with enhanced responsibility, the firm may provide additional
training corresponding to the promotion.
Figure 1.6.2 shows the impact of non-compete enforcement by age of the worker. The results
show that the impact is positive for workers aged 22 to 42, but indistinguishable from zero
for workers older than 42. The strongest impact is for workers aged 36-42, for whom a one
standard deviation increase in non-compete enforcement increases the probability of receiving
training by 1.6 percentage points, an increase of about 7%. These results correspond to the
tenure results, showing the workers in the middle of their career benefit most from non-
compete enforcement, and are in line with the logic that the firm wants to invest more in
younger works so that they can extract the benefit of that training over the long tenure of
the worker.
1.6.4 Other Enforcement Predictions
Given the training effects documented above, I test for three alternative predictions. First,
it could be that training is not the primary margin on which non-compete enforcement
affects the firm. Instead, firms in lower enforcing states may be choosing to hire more
experienced workers in order to avoid having to pay training costs, while firms in higher
enforcing states may be more likely to hire less experienced workers. In order to explain
the observed training effects there must be a negative relationship between non-compete
enforcement and the starting experience of the worker. Instead of actual starting experience, I
use starting potential experience with the same estimation strategy from (1.5.1) and (1.5.2).39
39 The other control variables in the estimation are the main effects for high litigation occupations, hours
worked per week, indicators for working in a metro area, establishment and firm size 25-99, establishment
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Figure 1.6.2: Marginal Effect of Non-Compete Enforcement Across Age
Second, the model shows that higher non-compete enforcement leads to lower quit probabil-
ities, which in turn lead to longer tenures. The lower probability of a quit encourages the
firm to invest in their worker’s training. Ideally, I would estimate job durations, but given
the pooled cross-sectional nature of the data I estimate the effects of enforcement on tenure
using the same difference-in-differences strategy.40
Third, the model shows that higher non-compete enforcement leads to wage compression,
which encourages more training. Directly estimating whether non-compete enforcement
and firm size 100+, NAICS 2 digit industries, year and state. State corporate tax rates, indicators for
exceptions to at-will employment, and whether the state is a right-to-work state are all interacted with the
main effects for high litigation occupations.
40Other controls are main effects for high litigation occupations, starting potential experience, starting
potential experience squared, hours worker, and indicators for working in a metro area, bachelors degree,
graduate degree, male, white, establishment and firm size 25-99, establishment and firm size 100+, whether
the worker is unionized, NAICS 2 digit industries, year, and state. State corporate tax rates, indicators for
exceptions to at-will employment, and whether the state is a right-to-work state are all interacted with the
main effects for the high litigation occupations.
47
affects wage compression requires knowledge of pre-training wages and productivity and post-
training wages and productivity. Without productivity data, I cannot estimate the effect of
non-compete enforcement on wage compression because non-compete enforcement affects the
extent of labor market competitiveness and thus limits any assumptions on the relationship
between wages and productivity. Despite these limitations, however, I can still test for
evidence of wage effects. Recall equation (1.4.2). If non-compete enforcement increases
training, then there are two contrasting effects: (1) workers in higher enforcing states may
have lower wages because they are not fully compensated for their outside options, and (2)
they also receive the wage boost from the extra training they receive.41 If non-compete
enforcement causes lower wages, then the effect of non-compete enforcement through wage
compression dominates. I examine this by regressing log hourly wages on non-compete
enforcement using the same identification strategy as above.42
The results of these regressions are shown in the second through fourth columns of Table 1.7.
The results for high litigation occupations as a whole are generally in the expected direc-
tion but only the starting potential experience margin reaches canonical levels of statistical
significance. The occupation specific effects show that for computer and mathematical oc-
cupations, engineers, personal care and service occupations, and production occupations,
firms tend to hire younger workers in higher enforcing states. The occupation specific effects
on tenure are mixed in their direction, but none of them reach statistical significance. The
effects of non-compete enforcement on wages show that computer and mathematical occupa-
41They also might receive additional compensation for signing an enforceable non-compete if they were
able to bargain over it. This effect would presumably be in the first years of tenure if the worker signed the
agreement at the beginning of the employment relationship. Since most workers don’t have the opportunity
to bargain over their non-compete (Marx 2011), this effect is expected to be small. Regressions, not shown
here, confirm this is true.
42Other controls include main effects for high litigation occupations, potential experience, potential expe-
rience squared, tenure, tenure squared, hours worked per week, and indicators for working in a metro area,
bachelors degree, graduate school degree, male, white, establishment and firm size 25-99, establishment and
firm size 100+, whether the worker is unionized, NAICS 2 digit industries, year, and state. State corporate
tax rates, indicators for exceptions to at-will employment, and whether the state is a right-to-work state are
all interacted with the main effects for high litigation occupations.
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tions and engineers earn statistically significantly less in higher enforcing states, suggesting
that the wage compression effect dominates the training effect. The lack of a significant
negative sign for some of these occupations is not surprising given the contrasting impacts
of non-compete enforcement on wages. Overall, these results suggest that the training effect
can in part be explained by the effect on the hiring margin.
Table 1.7: Results and Potential Explanations
Intent-to-Treat Effect Training Initial Exp Tenure Log Wage
High Litigation 0.007** -0.116* -0.009 -0.004
(0.003) (0.066) (0.050) (0.004)
Management 0.007* -0.057 -0.006 -0.009
(0.004) (0.118) (0.063) (0.005)
Business, Financial 0.012** -0.097 0.030 -0.011*
(0.005) (0.111) (0.072) (0.006)
Computer, Mathematical 0.010** -0.513*** -0.099 -0.024***
(0.005) (0.096) (0.066) (0.007)
Engineering 0.017** -0.230* 0.114 -0.020***
(0.006) (0.126) (0.075) (0.007)
Life, Physical, Social Sciences -0.010 0.028 -0.069 -0.003
(0.010) (0.181) (0.143) (0.015)
Healthcare Practitioners, Technical 0.015** -0.139 0.062 0.004
(0.006) (0.186) (0.087) (0.006)
Personal Care, Services 0.011*** -0.551** -0.150 0.007
(0.004) (0.242) (0.113) (0.008)
Sales 0.004 0.114 -0.036 -0.012
(0.003) (0.074) (0.064) (0.007)
Installation, Repair 0.008 -0.160* 0.001 0.004
(0.006) (0.086) (0.065) (0.009)
Production 0.001 -0.207** 0.005 0.018
(0.003) (0.081) (0.066) (0.012)
Observations 70,374 70,374 70,374 66,528
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the state level. The omitted group is low litigation occupations. For
other control variables, see the footnote 39 on page 46 (for initial experience), 42
on page 48 (for log wages), and 40 on page 47 (for tenure). Tenure is in years and
log earnings are log monthly earnings.
49
1.6.5 Empirical Recommendation to Courts and State Legislatures
The enforcement index generated from factor analysis is useful because it provides relatively
objective weights for the seven underlying dimensions of non-compete enforcement intensity,
but it is less useful to courts that want to know in which way they should increase or
decrease enforcement. In order to provide direct policy relevance, in this section I break up
the enforcement index into its separate components and see which components of the index
cause the increase in firm-sponsored training. The results appear in Table 1.8.
The results from including only one dimension of enforcement in columns (1) - (7) show
that the extent of the plaintiff’s burden of proof is positively and (statistically) significantly
related to firm-sponsored training. The easier it is for the firm to prove their case, the more
likely they are to actually provide training to their worker.
The individual dimensions are positively correlated, however, and when considered individ-
ually are biased upwards because of omitted variable bias. Including each of the variables
linearly, the results in column (8) show two interesting points. First, the impact of easing the
plaintiff’s burden of proof increases training, as it did in the univariate specification. The
other notable point is that conditional on other dimensions of enforcement, enforcing non-
competes that provide less consideration post inception reduces training. While it appears
to contradict the previous findings of the paper, this finding shows that firms in states which
require some kind of compensation in order for a non-compete signed after inception to be
enforced actually provide workers with more training in exchange for signing the contract.
This effect is in fact aligned well with the contractible model since the firm is makes either
training, promotions, or some other benefits a part of the contract. Importantly, including
all of the enforcement variables into the specification is subject to the problem of micronu-
merosity, which arises because clustering at the state level reduces the effective sample size
to 48.
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1.6.6 Robustness
Threats to Identification
There are at least three threats to identification: (1) Reverse causality, (2) unobserved
confounding treatments may make skill-related training more likely in higher enforcing states,
and (3) firms in higher enforcing states may be systematically different from firms in lower
enforcing states in unobserved ways which make firms in higher enforcing states more likely
to provide training to high litigation workers. With regards to reverse causality, most states
have not changed their policies over time, suggesting that states are not changing enforcement
protocol in response to training outcomes. Indeed, California’s ban on non-competes began
when it adopted the laws written by David Dudley Field in 1872 (Gilson 1999). Some states
within my time frame have included extraordinary training as a protectable interest of the
firm. To assure that states are not responding to training, I run a robustness check using
only the 1991 enforcement weights and scores, which occur before any of the training in my
data. These and other variations of the enforcement index are shown in Table 1.10. They
show that the results are robust to all variations in the enforcement index.
Additionally, because the high litigation versus low litigation comparison is in some sense
a high skill versus low skill comparison, there may be some omitted variable which makes
training for high skill workers more likely in higher enforcing states. Such an omitted variable
would bias the coefficient on non-compete enforcement upward. To address this concern, I use
the same difference-in-differences specification to compare high litigation occupations from
the not-for-profit sector43 which are presumably less likely to be impacted by non-compete
enforcement, to for-profit low litigation occupations (the same control group). These results
43The not-for-profit sector here is all sectors that are not private sector for profit firms. It includes the
government, non-profits, and the self-employed. While there is no empirical evidence suggesting that non-
competes are less important for these sectors, I believe these organizations are either less likely to either have
competitors, use non-competes, or attempt to enforce them. I also include all lawyers in the high litigation
group here because they are a high skill group which are unaffected by non-competes.
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are presented in column (1) of Table 1.9. Additionally, because lawyers are a high skill
occupation which are unaffected by non-competes per the American Bar Association’s Model
Rule 5.6 (Stroud 2002), I perform the same difference-in-difference estimation for lawyers
versus for-profit low litigation workers. The results of this test are shown in column (2)
of Table 1.9. The intent to treat estimates from columns (1) and (2) are all small and
insignificant, providing evidence that a higher likelihood of skill-related training in higher
enforcing states is not driving these results.
The last concern relates to the fact that firms may sort into high and low enforcing states
based on some unobserved characteristic which is correlated with the training differential
between high litigation and low litigation workers. For example, if high training firms are
more likely to locate in high enforcing states and low training firms are equally likely to
locate anywhere, then a random sample of workers from all states is more likely to sample
workers from high training firms in high enforcing states. This type of sorting biases upward
the intent-to-treat estimate. In order to address the extent to which this type of sorting
is occurring, I divide the sample based on the tradability of the good sold by the worker’s
firm. Some firms, such as hairdressers or other personal service firms, sell highly non-tradable
goods because their client base and markets are local in nature. These types of firms have no
choice but to operate where their client base is located. Others, such as manufacturing and
consulting firms, can sell their product from any state and therefore can move towards higher
enforcing states. I rely on Jensen and Kletzer (2005) to divide industries into tradable and
non-tradable categories.44 The correlation between enforcement and a tradable dummy is
-0.013, which provides some evidence that this type of sorting is not happening. In columns
(3) and (4) of Table 1.9 I re-run the baseline specification for tradable and non-tradable
industries. The results show that while the impact is stronger in tradable industries, the
difference is not statistically different from the impact in non-tradable industries.
44Appendix 1.8.4 shows the tradable versus non-tradable breakdown by industry.
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Table 1.9: Skill-Related Training and Tradability Robustness Checks
Not-Profit Law Tradable Non-tradable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Enforcement*Not-Profit High Lit. -0.002
(0.005)
Enforcement*Law 0.008
(0.020)
Law 0.017
(0.102)
Enforcement*High Lit. 0.007* 0.005
(0.004) (0.003)
Observations 38,264 30,307 37,226 33,148
R-squared 0.112 0.092 0.103 0.088
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses,
clustered at the state level. The dependent variable is an indicator equal to 1 if
the worker received firm-sponsored training in the past year. High Lit. is a dummy
equal to one if the worker is a high litigation worker. Columns (1) and (2) run the
difference-in-differences specification comparing not-for-profit high litigation workers
to for-profit low litigation workers. Columns (3) and (4) compare lawyers to other
for-profit low litigation workers. Column (5) divides industries into tradable and non-
tradable based on Jensen and Kletzer (2005) and looks for heterogenous treatment
effects using a triple difference. The set of controls are the same as the baseline
specification, discussed on page 182.
Variations in the Enforcement Index and Excluding Extreme States
I next test whether the results are robust to variations of the factor analysis enforcement in-
dex, using alternative enforcement indices, discretizing the enforcement index, and excluding
states at the ends of the distribution. Unfortunately, limitations of the data preclude using
variation in enforcement over time within a state as an additional robustness check. The
Michigan reversal of 1985 studied in Marx et al. (2009) occurs well before the start of the
data, and the major changes identified by Garmaise (2011) occur in 1996 in Florida and 1994
in Texas, which do not allow for a ‘pre’ treatment period. The temporary Louisiana reversal
from June 2001 to 2003 results in 104 treated individuals in my sample, which is too small
for reliable inference. Other major changes in Oregon and New York in 2008 occur at the end
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of the data’s time frame resulting in no post-period for a difference-in-difference estimation.
Given the lack of an adequate quasi-natural experiment, the only longitudinal variation I
can use is the potentially endogenous variation that comes from the Bishara index, which
captures the enforcement landscape in 1991 and 2009. The challenge with this approach is
not knowing when the various changes occurred and appropriately dealing with imputation
for missing values. Due to this ambiguity and the limitations of my data, any longitudinal
estimates would be highly objectionable.
In order to examine whether or not my results are driven by the way I chose the factor analysis
weights and scores, I re-run the training regressions using variations of the enforcement index:
the 1991 scores and weights, the 2009 scores and weights, the index with 1991 scores assigned
to year 1996 and the 2009 scores assigned to all other years using the 1991 weights. These
results are presented in Panel A of Table 1.10. They show the results are robust to whatever
variation of the factor analysis weights I choose.
In Panel B of Table 1.10, I consider how the baseline estimates change if instead I uti-
lize Bishara’s (2011) index from 1991 and 2009, the 1992 and 2001 indices developed by
Garmaise (2011), or the method developed by Lubotsky and Wittenberg (2006).45 The
Lubotsky-Wittenberg method takes the linear regression of training on the six individual
enforcement dimension from Bishara (2011) and uses the coefficients on the dimensions as
weights in a weighted sum of the dimensions of enforcement to generate the linear factor
which best mitigates attenuation bias. In this scenario, however, factor analysis is preferable
for two reasons: (1) It is not clear how to extend the Lubotsky-Wittenberg method to a
difference-in-differences context,46 and (2) the weights on the dimensions of enforcement are
45Garmaise considers various dimensions of non-compete enforcement for each state using the same Mals-
berger text as Bishara (2011), though he assigns each dimension a binary score and simply adds them up.
See Appendix 1.8.3 for a complete description of the questions Garmaise considers.
46To generate their index, I run a regression of training on the dimensions of enforcement and other indi-
vidual characteristics without state fixed effects and no interaction of the dimensions. I take the coefficients
from the dimensions of enforcement and use them as weights in the weighted sum to generate an index of
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negative in some instances, which defeats the purpose of making an index that reflects true
‘enforceability’ within a state.
The robustness checks show that there is very little difference between the factor analysis
estimates and the Bishara indices. This is not unexpected, since the correlation between
these indices is greater than 0.93. The Garmaise index points in the expected direction but
is insignificant. These differences are not unexpected because the Garmaise index varies
less than the factor analysis index.47 Furthermore, the generated factor analysis index has
two benefits over the Garmaise index which allow it more precision: (1) It is more finely
coded, and coded by a lawyer specializing in non-compete case law, and (2) the arbitrary
weights chosen by Garmaise may overemphasize the importance of various dimensions of
non-compete enforcement, while the factor analysis generates weights which account for the
covariation in the dimensions. The differences with the Lubotsky and Wittenberg index are
also relatively small.
I next discretize enforcement into high enforcement and low enforcement, with zero as the
dividing line.48 This check allays fears that the linear specification of the enforcement index
is inappropriate. The intent-to-treat estimate from the baseline specification is 0.018 with
a standard error of 0.009 and a corresponding p-value of 0.05. This corroborating result is
not surprising given the data in Figure 1.5.4.
In addition to worries about the validity of the index, one might be concerned about the
fact that California and Florida, which represent the ends of the enforcement distribution
might be driving the results.49 To address these concerns, I re-run the baseline specification
enforcement. I then standardize this generated index by subtracting the mean and dividing by the stan-
dard deviation. The results presented in Table ?? use this index in the preferred difference-in-differences
specification.
47The Garmaise index has a standard deviation of 1.17 and the factor analysis index has a standard
deviation of 1.32.
48The index was standardized to be mean zero with standard deviation of 1 in a sample where each state
is given a weight of zero.
49Excluding North Dakota does not affect the results because it includes only 79 observations, which
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without California, Florida, or both. The results are presented in Panel C of Table 1.10.
As expected from Figure 1.5.4, the results show that the common effect for high litigation
occupations is robust to the exclusion of both California and Florida.
constitutes 0.1% of the sample.
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1.7 Conclusion and Policy Implications
The skills of the workforce are important for economic growth and productivity, and the
government has long recognized this (Heckman et al. 1999). Concerns about underinvest-
ment in firm-sponsored training are commonplace because firms do not want their workers
to leave and utilize any training they provided for another firm, especially a competitor.
The enforcement of covenants not to compete is a legal labor market friction which restricts
the flow of workers across competitors and increases firms’ incentives to provide employee
training.
To examine the impact of non-compete enforcement on firm-sponsored training, I extend the
classic on-the-job training model to incorporate non-compete enforcement and on-the-job-
search. The model shows that the common assertion that higher non-compete enforcement
increases firm-sponsored training outcomes relies upon the contractibility of training. The
model also points out that if workers adhere to their contracts because they believe them
to be enforceable or because they feel ethically bound to abide by them, then additional
non-compete enforcement should not impact firm-sponsored training.
In order to empirically examine the impact of non-compete enforcement, I first improve upon
the Bishara (2011) index of non-compete enforcement by generating weights to aggregate
his scores using factor analysis. Comparing occupations likely to experience non-compete
litigation to occupations less likely to experience such litigation, I find that a one standard
deviation increase in the non-compete enforcement index increases training for high litigation
occupations by 3% relative to low litigation occupations. This relative impact is between
3% and 8% for each of the first 20 years of tenure, and between 2 and 7% for workers aged
22 to 42. Importantly, the impact of enforcement on training rises monotonically in the first
20 years of tenure. This result provides evidence that indeed the not-contractible model
is appropriate for training later in tenure, suggesting that there is a role for non-compete
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enforcement in reducing the positive externality to training.
These positive training effects tend to be localized in high skill and high earning occupations
such as computer and mathematical occupations, healthcare practitioners, and managers,
though personal care and service occupations are also profoundly affected, presumably be-
cause of their interactions with clients. Courts that wish to improve training outcomes via
non-compete enforcement should considering reducing the burden of proof on the plaintiff,
or alternatively requiring additional consideration for non-competes signed after the incep-
tion of employment. Laws such as the one currently under consideration in Massachusetts’s
which only enforces non-competes lasting more than 6 months on employees earning more
than $250,000, and Colorado’s law enforcing non-competes only on upper-management em-
ployees, exploit the training benefits these occupations receive without hurting workers in
occupations in which there are little to no training benefits from enforcement. The training
effects coincide with an enforcement effect on the potential experience of new hires: firms in
lower enforcing states tend to hire more experienced workers, presumably because they are
unwilling to bear their training costs.
Legal scholars have recently been advocating for lower enforcement (Hyde 2003, Lobel 2013)
based on studies which focus on the negative impacts of non-competes, but these positions
are empirically premature because little is known about the ways in which firms and different
types of workers are benefitting from enforcement. While non-competes have been shown
to harm worker mobility (Marx et al. 2009, Garmaise 2011, Lavetti et al. 2011), and
reduce innovation associated with increases in venture capital (Samila and Sorenson 2011),
Lavetti et al. (2011) find that doctors who sign non-competes earn more because they are
entrusted with more clients, and Marx and Younge (2013) find that enforcement increases
Tobin’s q. Recent work by Balasubramanian et al. (2013) shows that the life-cycle effects
of non-competes on new ventures are heterogeneous based on whether the new venture is
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a within-industry spin-out or not. Specifically, while within industry spin-outs have lower
entry rates in higher enforcing states, the ones that form in higher enforcing states tend to
start larger, grow faster, and live longer than other new ventures. This paper finds that
some occupations in higher enforcing states do receive more skill upgrading paid for by the
firm. Whether or not reducing enforcement is welfare enhancing is a challenging question
because of the vastness of the impacts of these agreements. More empirical work on both
the costs and benefits of enforcement is needed.
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1.8 Appendix: Training the Enemy?
1.8.1 Legal Literature Review of Non-Competes
The enforcement of non-compete agreements has varied greatly throughout its 600 year
history, balancing the values of freedom of contract, personal economic freedom, and business
ethics. The history begins in Europe’s craft guild system in the 15th century, where master
craftsmen sought to prevent their apprentices from competing for their business (Blake 1960).
The first known legal case dealing with restrictions on the practice of a craft is the Dyer’s
Case of 1414, where a dyer reneged on his obligation to not compete with the man to
whom he sold his business. The first courts litigating covenants not to compete took an
anti-enforcement stance, primarily because it was clear that master craftsmen were seeking
to prevent product market competition from budding apprentices. Courts have long held
the belief that enforcing non-competes reduces competition both in the product market
and in the labor market, and this has been routinely cited as a rationale for not enforcing
non-competes (Anenson 2005, Blake 1960).
The Reasonableness Argument
In Mitchell vs. Reynolds in 1711, the court developed the first test of reasonability, which
would later be refined in the 1932 Restatement of Contracts and adopted by many US states.
Notably, California and North Dakota have never adopted any kind of reasonableness test
and refuse to enforce almost all non-competes. The “reasonableness criterion” holds that a
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restraint is reasonable only if it (1) is no greater than is required for the protection of the
employer, (2) does not impose undue hardship on the employee, and (3) is not injurious to
the public.
Implicit in (1) is an understanding of why firms need protection in the first place: Pro-
enforcement scholars suggest that by allowing the unfettered flow of workers who posses
valuable information courts might be dismantling current or future competition instead of
protecting it because of the reduced incentive to innovate. Of states that enforce non-
competes, most agree that confidential information, client lists, and trade secrets can serve
as a basis for the enforcement of a non-compete. To be precise, the definition of trade secrets
from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act is
... information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device,
method, technique, or process, that: (i) derives independent economic value, ac-
tual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily ascer-
tainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain economic value from
its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under
the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
This definition of a trade secret is broad enough to include even advertising and marketing
strategies.
The courts also consider the harm done to the worker in the protection of the firm’s interests.
For workers with limited opportunities, the courts have recognized the resulting lack of
ability to earn a living. Famously, the court in Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Litten
declared
The average, individual employee has little but his labor to sell or to use to make a
living. He is often in urgent need of selling it and in no position to object to boiler
70
plate restrictive covenants placed before him to sign. To him, the right-to-work
and support his family is the most important right he possesses. His individual
bargaining power is seldom equal to that of his employer.
Legal scholars on both sides of the enforcement debate (Arnow-Richman 2001, Stone 2002,
Callahan 1985) note the importance of whether or not the worker has had the chance to
bargain over the non-compete. Indeed, Malsberger’s series on non-compete enforcement
by state regards with great importance the enforcement of non-competes signed after the
employment relationship has begun, when the worker presumably has no outside option
(Malsberger 1996, Leibman and Nathan 1987).
The last consideration of the reasonableness criterion, is how injurious enforcement would
be to society. The historical view of this consideration is that if the worker’s occupation is
important enough to society, such as a doctor, then preventing that worker from employing
his craft may have significant ill effects on the society as a whole. This portion of the
reasonableness criterion is cited much less often as a reason for not enforcing the covenant:
Whitmore (1990) found that in his survey of 105 randomly selected non-compete cases, only
19 mentioned injury to the public in their decisions. Some occupations, notably lawyers,
broadcasters, and doctors have been explicitly carved out of non-compete enforcement in
some states (Stroud 2002).
The Pro-Enforcement Argument
Pro-enforcement scholars (Callahan 1985, Sterk 1993) argue that non-competes should gen-
erally be enforced because the reasonableness criteria are no longer valid. They argue that
non-competes actually enhance competition because they encourage firms to invest in re-
search and development and human capital. Furthermore, allowing parties to contract with
each other internalizes any externalities. Sterk (1993) writes:
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Standard Coasean theory would suggest that no one benefits from inalienability
rules, at least in the absence of transaction costs, because this benefit enjoyed by
persons well-endowed with human capital is offset by a loss of freedom to enter
into mutually beneficial exchanges that involve alienating human capital.
While negotiation and renegotiation provide the first best solution in a world with perfect
information, one wonders whether workers are able to correctly forecast the value their
knowledge and skills that they will develop at the firm.
In addition, Callahan (1985) compares a non-compete to a ten year exclusive supply contract
from a manufacturer to a retailer. She argues that the supply contract is not considered
anticompetitive because there is ex ante competition for such a contract. Why, she asks,
should non-compete contracts be enforced differently, especially since for the types of workers
who will likely sign non-competes there is likely such competition at the hiring stage and
these workers are sophisticated enough to be able to bargain ex ante over the terms of the
contract?
At the time of Callahan’s writing, it was unknown what types of workers signed non-
competes, but occupations as strange as manicurists, carpet installers, liquor deliverymen,
bartenders, cosmetologists, pest exterminators, garbage collectors, janitors, night-watchmen,
undertakers, and security guards have been litigated for non-compete violations. Given their
broad coverage, Callahan’s claim that only certain types of workers would be willing to sign
non-competes is unsubstantiated.
The Anti-Enforcement Argument
Hyde (1998, 2003) and Gilson (1999) argue that the restriction of labor mobility is excessively
costly because spillovers provide the necessary ingredients for growth, pointing to Silicon
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Valley as a success story. Hyde (1998) argues that even in states that do not enforce non-
competes, firms still have enough incentives to invest in human capital and research and
development so that they can be first movers in the market. Gilson (1999) cites the growth
of Silicon Valley as an argument to lessen the enforcement of non-compete laws, though with
some caveats. He argues that the lack of non-compete enforcement in California provides a
coordination mechanism which prevents a prisoner’s dilemma: if all firms would be better off
if information were shared via employee mobility, then letting workers leave is not incentive
compatible if firms can keep the worker via enforceable non-competes. He claims that the
reason Silicon Valley has been able to reinvent itself over and over again relative to Route
128 is because workers are free to move between firms.
Fallick, Fleischman, and Rebitzer (2006) consider Gilson’s propositions by analyzing mobility
decisions in the CPS. They try to answer three questions: (1) Is the interfirm mobility of
employees in the computer industry indeed higher in Silicon Valley than in other IT clusters
in states with enforceable non-competes. (2) Is there a California effect on the rate of
interfirm mobility for computer industry employees? (3) Do mobility patterns observed
in the computer industry hold for employees in the same location who are not employed
in the IT industry They restrict sample to male, 4 year college educated workers, living in
metropolitan areas having IT clusters. The sample is from 1994 to 2001 and is pooled to get a
large number of observations. They find evidence that job hopping is higher in Silicon Valley,
that controlling for California reduces the significance of Silicon Valley effect, suggesting that
there is a California effect. They find that there are also relatively high mobility rates in LA
and San Diego within the IT industry, though within-industry job changes are nearly 90%
greater in Silcon Valley than the mean. Outside of the IT sector, there is little evidence that
job changes are more likely in California; indeed they seem to be lower in California than
elsewhere in the nation. This last bit of evidence suggests that agglomeration economies are
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indeed an important part of the industrial cluster story.
Recent developments in January 2013 call into question firms’ responses to the lack of non-
compete enforcement in Silicon Valley. Specifically, there have developed “gentleman’s agree-
ments” between major tech employers in Silicon Valley whereby firms agree to not actively
recruit employees of other companies (Blagdon 2013). It is unclear if these agreements
have developed as a result of the lack of non-compete enforcement, or if they exist in areas
where non-compete agreements are more likely to be enforced. More research in this area is
warranted.
Other Trade Secret and Non-Solicitation Agreements
Non-competes are not the only method for protecting confidential information, though they
do possess certain desirable qualities. While employed, every employee has a fiduciary duty
not to compete against his employer by providing information to competitors or by recruiting
clients to join them in a new venture. This fiduciary duty ends, however, when the worker
leaves the firm. To prevent the disclosure of trade secrets and the loss of valuable clientele,
most jobs that involve signing a non-compete also involve signing a non-disclosure agreement
and also potentially a non-solicitation and/or a non-poaching agreement. The non-disclosure
agreement precludes the worker from sharing trade secrets of their previous employer with
the new employer. The difficulty with these contracts, however, is that it can be difficult
in court to prove that trade secrets have been leaked. Non-solicitation and non-poaching
agreements are meant to restrict the employee from soliciting clients or employees from the
previous employer for a certain amount of time. The difficulty with these contracts is that it
can be hard to verify which party solicited which party, for clients can choose which provider
of services they wish to use, and employees employed “at will” can leave whenever they want
for whatever reason they want. The benefit of utilizing non-compete agreements in addition
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to these alternatives is that non-competes prohibit the move to a competitor in the first
place, thus preventing the worker from sharing trade secrets or taking clientele.
Additionally, courts have employed (though seldom) the doctrine of inevitable disclosure to
prevent an employee from working for a competitor when it would not be possible for the
worker to perform his new job without disclosing confidential information learned during his
previous employment relationship. The typical criticism of inevitable disclosure is that it is
essentially a non-compete over which the employee was not allowed to bargain (Garrison and
Wendt 2008). For this reason, courts have been hesitant to use it, though the often cited
case of PepsiCo v. Redmond demonstrates how broadly it can be applied (Hyde 2003). Non-
compete enforcement may be presumed to be a better alternative to inevitable disclosure
because it has the benefit of consideration: at least the employee knowingly signed and
potentially bargained over the terms of the agreement.
1.8.2 Proofs and Efficiency
Proof Of Proposition 1
Proposition 1: For a given enforcement level, λ, optimal training levels are higher when
training is contractible at the hiring stage, T ∗c (λ) > T ∗nc(λ).
Proof. The marginal cost of training is the same in the contractible and not contractible
cases. Because c′′(T ) > 0 and y′′(T ) < 0, finding which case has a higher marginal benefit
for each level of training. The marginal benefit of training under the contractible case and
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not contractible cases are
MBc(T, λ) = y
′(T )
(
G(aˆ) + (1− λ)
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
)
MBnc(T, λ) = y
′(T )G(aˆ)(1− β)(1− (1− λ)E[a])
Proof by contradiction. Assuming that MBnc(T, λ) > MBc(T, λ), then
G(aˆ)(1− β)(1− (1− λ)E[a]) > G(aˆ) + (1− λ)
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
−G(aˆ)β(1− (1− λ)E[a]) > (1− λ)
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
which is a contradiction.
Efficiency
Two questions of great importance from the perspective of state judiciaries are, given the
worker’s quit decision and the firm’s training decision, what level of non-compete enforcement
maximizes total surplus, and how do the resulting training and movement decisions compare
to the efficient outcomes? There are two ways to think about efficient outcomes in this case:
(1) Outcomes from an unconstrained social planner, and (2) outcomes from a social planner
constrained by the informational structure of the model.
Consider first an unconstrained social planner.50 The social planner makes the worker quit as
long as the competitor firm is more productive than the incumbent firm, a > 1. In addition,
since the social planner is able to perfectly forecast the productivity of the competitor firm,
he makes the training choice at the initial firm based on maximizing either y(T ) − c(T ) if
a ≤ 1, or ay(T )− c(T ) if a > 1. With this completely unconstrained social planner it is clear
50By unconstrained, I mean the social planner has perfect foresight and is not constrained by the infor-
mational structure of the model
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any non-zero non-compete enforcement is welfare reducing.
Contrasting with these unconstrained efficient outcomes are the outcomes which occur when
the social planner is constrained by the timing and information structure of the model.
Specifically, the constrained social planner initially chooses the non-compete enforcement
level, then must make the training decision given his initial choice of non-compete enforce-
ment, without knowing the productivity of the competitor firm, and then must decide when
the worker will quit. Intuition developed from the unconstrained social planner case sug-
gests that the constrained efficient non-compete enforcement level is zero. This makes sense
because increasing non-compete enforcement reduces the ability of the worker to move, but
does not incentivize the social planner to train the worker more, or reduce inefficient quits.
I show this formally in the appendix, but present only the setup and the three choices of the
constrained social planner.
If the social planner does not know what kind of firm the worker will meet in advance,
then the problem becomes one of maximizing expected surplus by choosing the non-compete
enforcement level, the amount of training, and when to quit. In this context, given a chosen
non-compete enforcement level, the social planner will make the worker quit in the poaching
period when (1−λ)a > 1, that is when the productivity of the worker at the competitor firm
is greater than 1 in expectation, which leads to an efficient quit probability of 1 − G( 1
1−λ).
Given the previously chosen level of λ and the optimal quit probability of 1 − G( 1
1−λ), the
efficient training choice can be written as:
T ∗(λ) = argmax
T
G(
1
1− λ)y(T ) + (1−G(
1
1− λ))(1− λ)E[a|a >
1
1− λ ]y(T )− c(T )
The social planner knows he will choose training level T ∗(λ) given his initial choice of λ.
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Working backward, the optimal choice of λ is given by
λ∗ = argmax
λ
E[S(T ∗(λ), λ)]
where S(T, λ) is the total surplus function. The resulting optimal choice of λ is indeed zero
for all choices of G(a). The choices of a constrained social planner are summarized in the
following proposition:
Proposition 4. The constrained efficient non-compete enforcement level, λ∗, training level,
T ∗, and quit decision are given by:
λ∗ = 0
y′(T ∗)(G(1) +
∫ a¯
1
ag(a)da) =c′(T ∗) (1.8.1)
P (Quit) =1−G(1)
Proof. Define total surplus as:
S(T, λ) = G(
1
1− λ)y(T ) + (1−G(
1
1− λ))(1− λ)E[a|a >
1
1− λ ]y(T )− c(T ) ⇐⇒
S(T, λ) = y(T )
(
G(
1
1− λ) + (1− λ)
∫ a¯
1
1−λ
ag(a)da
)
− c(T )
The optimal choice of T solves T ∗(λ) = argmax
T
S(T, λ) and the optimal choice of λ solves
λ∗ = argmax
λ
S(T ∗(λ), λ). Using the envelope theorem and Leibniz Rule, first show that
λ∗ = 0 directly:
∂S(T ∗(λ), λ)
∂λ
=y(T ∗(λ))
(
g(
1
1− λ)
1
(1− λ)2 −
∫ a¯
1
1−λ
ag(a)da+ (1− λ)(− 1
1− λg(
1
1− λ)
1
(1− λ)2 )
)
∂S(T ∗(λ), λ)
∂λ
=− y(T ∗(λ))
∫ a¯
1
1−λ
ag(a)da ≤ 0
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The total surplus is downward sloping for all λ ∈ [0, 1], implying that the maximum occurs
where λ = λ∗ = 0. Given this, the optimal training decision is given by the first order
condition:
y′(T ∗)(G(1) +
∫ a¯
1
ag(a)da) = c′(T ∗)
Consider next the practical question facing state legislatures today: Given how firms will
train their workers and how workers will make quit decisions, what is the optimal non-
compete enforcement level? How do the resulting training and quit decisions compare to each
other and the constrained efficient choice? To distinguish between the various actors, in this
section the agent making the non-compete enforcement choice will be called the government,
from which it is implied that the state legislatures pick a particular enforcement policy, but
cannot force the firm to train a certain level or force the worker to quit.
Case 1: Contractible Training
Consider first the case where firms compete by offering {W,T} contracts in the first period.
The government chooses the optimal non-compete enforcement level taking into account the
chosen training level, denoted T ∗c (λ) from (1.4.6), and the quit probability determined by
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the worker from (1.4.3), 1−G(aˆ). The government’s problem is formally written as:
max
λ
E[S(T ∗c (λ), λ)] =G(aˆ(λ))y(T
∗
c (λ))
+ (1−G(aˆ(λ)))(1− λ)E[a|a > aˆ]y(T ∗c (λ))− c(T ∗c (λ))
s.t. c′(T ∗c (λ)) =y
′(T ∗c (λ))
(
G(aˆ(λ)) + (1−G(aˆ(λ)))(1− λ)E[a]
)
G(aˆ(λ)) =pr(a <
β
1− λ + (1− β)E[a])
Fortunately, the training condition solves T ∗c (λ) = argmax
T
E[S(T, λ)] given the worker’s
quit decision, where S(T, λ) is the total surplus function. This allows the use of the envelope
theorem when choosing the optimal enforcement level. The optimal choice of λ, denoted λ∗c
solves:
y(T ∗c (λ
∗
c))
(
β
(1− λ∗c)2
g(aˆ∗c)(1− (1− λ∗c)aˆ∗c)−
∫ a¯
aˆ∗c
ag(a)da
)
= 0 if λ∗c ∈ [0, 1] (1.8.2)
Proposition 5. Optimal non-compete enforcement levels are weakly constrained inefficient
when training is contractible, λ∗c ≥ 0.
The intuition is that non-compete enforcement balances the tendency for inefficient quits
and the inability to move to high productivity firms. If there is a high likelihood of an
inefficient quit then optimal non-compete enforcement will be greater than zero. If there is
a small likelihood of an inefficient quit then optimal enforcement will be zero.
Proof. The first order condition for optimal non-compete enforcement in the contractible
case is given by
y(T ∗c (λ
∗
c))
(
β
(1− λ∗c)2
g(aˆ∗c)(1− (1− λ∗c)aˆ∗c)−
∫ a¯
aˆ∗c
ag(a)da
)
= 0 if λ∗c ∈ [0, 1]
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Comparing this expression to the first order condition for enforcement for the constrained
social planner reveals an additional term positive term:
β
(1− λ∗c)2
g(aˆ∗c)(1− (1− λ∗c)aˆ∗c) ≥ 0
This positive term represents the marginal benefit of higher enforcement which is that it
can prevent inefficient quits. For a given g(a), if the likelihood of an inefficient quit is high
enough, then this term will be positive enough to generate a non-zero enforcement level.
In order ensure a maximum, an optimally non-zero enforcement level must yield a negative
second order condition. The second order condition is given by:
∂2S(T ∗nc(λ), λ)
∂λ2
∣∣∣∣
λ=λ∗c
=
(
g′(aˆ∗c)
β2
(1− λ∗c)4
+ g(aˆ∗c)
2β
(1− λ∗c)3
)
(1− (1− λ∗c)aˆ∗c)+ (1.8.3)
g(aˆ∗c)
(
β2
(1− λ∗c)3
+
2β(1− β)E[a]
(1− λ∗c)2
)
All terms are positive except possibly g′(aˆ). The second order condition indicates that λ∗c
identifies a maximum only if g′(aˆ) < 0 and the corresponding term is more negative than
the other positive terms.
Given the optimal selection of λ from (1.8.2), the optimal training decision solves:
c′(T ∗c (λ
∗
c)) = y
′(T ∗c (λ
∗
c))
(
G(aˆ(λ∗c)) + (1− λ∗c)
∫ a¯
aˆ∗c
ag(a)da
)
(1.8.4)
How does the training level chosen compare to the constrained efficient choice?
Proposition 6. Given training is contractible, training levels resulting from optimally chosen
non-compete enforcement, T ∗c (λ∗c), are weakly constrained inefficient, T ∗c (λ∗c) ≤ T ∗.
The intuition for this proposition starts by noting that the marginal cost functions from
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the constrained social planner and the government are the same, but the marginal benefit
functions from (1.8.4) and (1.8.1) are slightly different. Finding which marginal benefit
function is greater will determine which scenario leads to a larger amount of training. The
constrained social planner makes his training decision based on the probability the worker will
move to a more productive firm. When training is contractible and non-compete enforcement
is optimally non-zero, the chance the worker moves to a better firm is reduced relative to
the constrained efficient case and thus the corresponding training decision is weighted more
heavily towards the initial firm’s output, resulting in training levels below the constrained
efficient levels.
Proof. The proof is broken down into three levels: (1)E[a] ≥ 1, (2) E[a] <1 and λ∗c = 0, and
(3) E[a] < 1 and λ∗c > 0.
Consider first the case in which E[a] ≥ 1. In order for the firm to be willing to hire the
worker, it must be that y(T ) ≥ w(T ), which boils down to E[a] ≤ 1
1−λ .
I first show that if E[a] ≥ 1 then λ∗c = 0. To show this, I need to show that:
∂S(T ∗c (λ), λ)
∂λ
≤ 0
⇐⇒ y(T ∗c (λ))
(
β
(1− λ)2 g(aˆ)(1− (1− λ)aˆ)−
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
)
≤ 0 (1.8.5)
⇐⇒ β
(1− λ)2 g(aˆ)(1− (1− λ)aˆ) ≤
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
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If E[a] ≥ 1 then aˆ = β
1−λ + (1− β)E[a] ≥ 1 + λβ1−λ .
aˆ ≥1 + λβ
1− λ∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da ≥
∫ a¯
aˆ
(1 +
λβ
1− λ)g(a)da
=
(1− λ)2 + λβ − λ2β
(1− λ)2
∫ a¯
aˆ
g(a)da
≥ λβ
(1− λ)2
∫ a¯
aˆ
g(a)da
≥g(aˆ) λβ
(1− λ)2
≥g(aˆ) λβ
(1− λ)2 (1− aˆ(1− λ))
This completes the proof that if E[a] ≥ 1 then λ∗c = 0. In this situation, the firm will only
hire a worker if E[a] ≤ 1. Therefore the only case of interest here is where E[a] = 1, which
implies that aˆ = 1. In this situation it is straightforward to see that the marginal benefit of
training is the same as in the efficient case, leading to efficient training choice.
Next, consider the second case when E[a] < 1 and λ∗c = 0. In this case, aˆ = β+(1−β)E[a] <
1. A direct comparison of the marginal benefits of training will show that the constrained
efficient choice is weakly greater. The marginal benefit functions are given by:
MB(T, 0) =y′(T )
(
G(1) +
∫ a¯
1
ag(a)da
)
MBc(T, λ
∗
c) =y
′(T )
(
G(aˆ(λ∗c)) + (1− λ∗c)
∫ a¯
aˆ∗c
ag(a)da
)
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Given that λ∗c = 0, E[a] < 1, and aˆ < 1:
MB(T, 0) >MBc(T, λ
∗
c)
⇐⇒ G(1) +
∫ a¯
1
ag(a)da >G(aˆ) +
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
⇐⇒ G(1)−G(aˆ) >
∫ 1
aˆ
ag(a)da
⇐⇒
∫ 1
aˆ
G(a)da >G(aˆ)(1− aˆ)
where the second to last line uses integration by parts and the last line is true because G(a)
is increasing in a and aˆ < 1.
The last case to show is when E[a] < 1 and λ∗c > 0. In this situation, the first and second
order conditions hold, giving λ∗c which solves
β
(1− λ∗c)2
g(aˆ∗c)(1− (1− λ∗c)aˆ∗c) =
∫ a¯
aˆ∗c
ag(a)da
To begin, I first prove that aˆ < 1 if E[a] < 1 and λ∗c > 0 by contradiction. Taking the above
first order condition, solving for aˆ and assuming that it is greater than 1 yields:
aˆ =
1
1− λ −
1− λ
β
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
g(aˆ)
>1
⇐⇒ λβg(aˆ) >(1− λ)2
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
=⇒ λβg(aˆ) >(1− λ)aˆ
∫ a¯
aˆ
g(a)da
⇐⇒ λβg(aˆ) >β
∫ a¯
aˆ
g(a)da+ (1− β)E[a]
∫ a¯
aˆ
g(a)da
The last line is clearly a contradiction since β
∫ a¯
aˆ
g(a)da > λβ
∫ a¯
aˆ
g(a)da. Therefore aˆ < 1 if
E[a] < 1 and λ∗c > 0.
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To show that T ∗(0) > T ∗c (λ∗c) I directly compare the marginal benefit functions, given now
that aˆ < 1, λ∗c > 0, and E[a] < 1:
MB(T, 0) >MBc(T, λ
∗
c)
⇐⇒ G(1) +
∫ a¯
1
ag(a)da >G(aˆ) + (1− λ∗c)
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
⇐⇒ G(1)−G(aˆ) >
∫ 1
aˆ
ag(a)da− λ∗c
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
⇐⇒
∫ 1
aˆ
G(a)da >G(aˆ)(1− aˆ)− λ∗c
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
where the second to last line uses integration by parts and the last line is true because G(a)
is increasing in a and aˆ < 1.
This completes the proof that training is weakly constrained inefficient.
One objection to this proposition is that counteroffering and Bertrand type competition
in the poaching stage may ensue if the worker gets a better offer. If this were true, then
the worker would never leave for a less productive firm because his initial firm could always
outbid the other firm. In this situation, non-compete enforcement has no upside, the optimal
enforcement choice would be to not enforce, and the constrained efficient outcomes would
be achieved. There is little evidence suggesting that Bertrand type competition is actually
occurring for most workers. As discussed in Barron et al. (2006), only 30% of firms were
willing to make counteroffers for the most recently hired worker.
Case 2: Training Not Contractible
Consider the second case in which firms only contract on first period wages. In this situation,
because the training decision is made via profit maximization instead of total surplus max-
imization, the envelope theorem cannot be used to simplify the analysis. The firm takes as
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given the non-compete enforcement level, and chooses its training level to maximize profits,
subject to the quit condition of the worker. From above, the optimal training choice, T ∗nc(λ),
satisfies (1.4.9). The government, knowing that the firm will choose to train this amount,
faces the following maximization problem:
max
λ
E[S(T ∗nc(λ), λ)] = G(aˆ(λ))y(T
∗
nc(λ))
+(1−G(aˆ(λ)))(1− λ)E[a|a > aˆ]y(T ∗nc(λ))− c(T ∗nc(λ))
s.t. c′(T ∗nc(λ)) = G(aˆ)y
′(T ∗nc)(1− β)(1− (1− λ)E[a])
G(aˆ) = pr(a <
β
1− λ + (1− β)E[a])
Solving for the optimal λ is not as straightforward as before. The optimal non-compete
enforcement level, λ∗nc, solves:
y(T ∗nc(λ
∗
nc))
(
g(aˆ∗nc)
β
(1− λ∗nc)2
(1− (1− λ∗nc)aˆ∗nc)−
∫ a¯
aˆ∗nc
ag(a)da
)
+
∂T ∗nc(λ)
∂λ
(
y′(T ∗nc(λ
∗
nc))
(
G(aˆ∗nc) + (1− λ∗nc)
∫ a¯
aˆ∗nc
ag(a)da
)
− c′(T ∗nc(λ∗nc))
)
= 0 if λ∗nc ∈ [0, 1]
(1.8.6)
Comparing this first order condition to the first order condition in the contractible case
(1.8.2), the difference is the second term. In the not contractible case, the positive second
term reflects the fact that higher non-compete enforcement improves training outcomes which
increases social surplus. As a result of this higher marginal benefit of enforcement, the
optimal λ∗nc in this case will be weakly higher than in the contractible case.
Proposition 7. Optimal non-compete enforcement levels are weakly higher when training is
not contractible, λ∗nc ≥ λ∗c.
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Proof. The enforcement gradient of the total surplus function when training is contractible
is given by:
∂S(T ∗c (λ), λ)
∂λ
= y(T ∗c (λ))
(
β
(1− λ)2 g(aˆ)(1− (1− λ)aˆ)−
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
)
The enforcement gradient of the total surplus function when training is not contractible is
given by:
∂S(T ∗nc(λ), λ)
∂λ
=y(T ∗nc(λ))
(
g(aˆ)
β
(1− λ)2 (1− (1− λ)aˆ)−
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
)
+
∂T ∗nc(λ)
∂λ
(
y′(T ∗nc(λ))
(
G(aˆ) + (1− λ)
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
)
− c′(T ∗nc(λ))
)
Comparing the gradients at the optimal enforcement level when training is contractible
yields:
∂S(T ∗c (λ), λ)
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=λ∗c
≤ ∂S(T
∗
nc(λ), λ)
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=λ∗c
because in addition to reducing inefficient quits, in the not contractible case increased en-
forcement incentivizes to train more. Since the gradient of the total surplus function is
always greater under the not contractible case, it will yield λ∗nc > λ∗c if λ∗c > 0 and λ∗nc ≥ λ∗c
if λ∗c = 0.
Consider now the training choice chosen by the firm when the government sets λ∗nc via (1.8.6).
The firm’s training choice solves:
c′(T ∗nc(λ
∗
nc)) = G(aˆ(λ
∗
nc))y
′(T ∗nc(λ
∗
nc))(1− β)(1− (1− λ∗nc)E[a]) (1.8.7)
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Suppose now that courts decide to enforce non-competes differentially and optimally depend-
ing upon whether the parties contracted on the training level. Which enforcement scheme
leads to more training?
Proposition 8. Optimal training levels resulting from optimally chosen non-compete en-
forcement levels are weakly higher when training is contractible, T ∗c (λ∗c) ≥ T ∗nc(λ∗nc).
Proof. The proof proceeds by noting that T ∗c (λ∗c) > T ∗c (λ∗nc) and then uses Proposition 1
to show T ∗c (λ∗c) ≥ T ∗nc(λ∗nc). In the contractible case, the impact of increased non-compete
enforcement on training is given by:
∂T ∗c (λ)
∂λ
=
y′(T ∗c (λ))
(
g(aˆ) β
(1−λ)2 (1− (1− λ)aˆ)−
∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
)
c′′(T ∗c (λ))− y′′(T ∗c (λ))
(
G(aˆ) + (1− λ) ∫ a¯
aˆ
ag(a)da
) (1.8.8)
In the case where λ∗c = 0, it is also true from the first order condition that:
∂T ∗c (λ)
∂λ
∣∣∣∣
λ=λ∗c
≤ 0
Since λ∗nc ≥ λ∗c then T ∗c (λ∗c) ≥ T ∗c (λ∗nc) and by Proposition 1, T ∗c (λ∗nc) > T ∗nc(λ∗nc).
In the case where λ∗c > 0 (and the second order condition holds), since λ∗nc > λ∗c then
T ∗c (λ
∗
c) > T
∗
c (λ
∗
nc) and by Proposition 1, T ∗c (λ∗nc) > T ∗nc(λ∗nc). This completes the proof.
This last proposition is striking because it shows that the most effective way courts can
encourage training is not necessarily increasing enforcement of non-competes, but instead
encourage bargaining over training.
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1.8.3 Enforcement Indices
Bishara 2011 Index
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Garmaise Index
The following twelve questions from Malsberger (2004) are used to evaluate the level of non-
competition agreement enforceability in each state. Each state is granted one point for each
question concerning which its laws lie above the threshold.
Question 1: Is there a state statue of general application that governs the enforceability of
covenants not to compete?
Threshold 1: States that enforce non-competition agreements outside a sale-of-business
context receive a score of one.
Question 2: What is an employer’s protectable interest and how is it defined?
Threshold 2: States in which the employer can prevent the employee from future indepen-
dent dealings with all the firm’s customers, not merely with the customers with whom the
employee had direct contact, receive a score of one.
Question 3: What must the plaintiff be able to show to prove the existence of an enforceable
covenant not to compete?
Threshold 3: Laws that place greater weight on the interests of the firm relative to those
of the former employee are above the threshold. For example, a law that requires that the
contract be reasonably protective of the firm’s business interests and only meet the condition
of not being unreasonably injurious to the employee’s interests would receive a score of one.
Question 4: Does the signing of a covenant not to compete at the inception of the employ-
ment relationship provide sufficient consideration to support the covenant?
Threshold 4: States for which the answer to Question 4 is clearly "Yes" are above the
threshold.
Question 5: Will a change in the terms and conditions of employment provide sufficient
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consideration to support a covenant not to compete entered into after the employment rela-
tionship has begun?
Threshold 5: States for which the answer to Question 5 is clearly "Yes" are above the
threshold.
Question 6: Will continued employment provide sufficient consideration to support a
covenant not to compete entered into after the employment relationship has begun?
Threshold 6: States for which the answer to Question 6 is clearly "Yes" are above the
threshold.
Question 7: What factors will the court consider in determining whether time and geo-
graphic restrictions in the covenant are reasonable?
Threshold 7: Jurisdictions in which courts are instructed not to consider economic or other
hardships faced by the employee are above the threshold.
Question 8: Who has the burden of proving the reasonableness or unreasonableness of the
covenant not to compete?
Threshold 8: States in which the burden of proof is clearly placed on the employee are
above the threshold.
Question 9: What type of time or geographic restrictions has the court found to be rea-
sonable? Unreasonable?
Threshold 9: Jurisdictions in which three-year statewide restrictions have been upheld
receive a score of one.
Question 10: If the restrictions in the covenant not to compete are unenforceable because
they are overbroad, are the courts permitted to modify the covenant to make the restrictions
more narrow and to make the covenants enforceable?
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Threshold 10: States for which the answer to Question 10 is clearly "Yes" are above the
threshold.
Question 11: If the employer terminates the employment relationship, is the covenant
enforceable?
Threshold 11: States for which the answer to Question 11 is clearly "Yes" are above the
threshold.
Question 12: What damages may an employer recover and from whom for breach of a
covenant not to compete?
Threshold 12: If, in addition to lost profits, there is a potential for punitive damages
against the former employee, the state receives a score of one. States that explicitly exclude
consideration of the reasonableness of the contract from the calculation of damages are also
above the threshold.
1.8.4 Supporting Figures and Tables
Map of 2009 Enforcement
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Characterizing the Occupation Effects
Is the impact of non-compete enforcement localized in occupations with high average earn-
ings, schooling, on-the-job-training, tenure, or within-industry concentration? In Figures
1.8.2 to 1.8.7, I take the intent-to-treat estimates for each occupation of the high litigation
group, divide them by the proportion of respondents reporting receiving training in their
occupation and plot them against occupation specific averages of interesting variables. The
lines of best fit are weighted by the frequency of occupations in the SIPP data.
Figure 1.8.2: Enforcement Impact on Training by Occupation and Education
Figures 1.8.2 1.8.3 show that there is a relatively strong positive relationship between aver-
age occupation-specific earnings and the impact of non-compete enforcement. Figure 1.8.4
shows that workers in high tenure occupations tend to have about the same training impact
as workers with low average tenures. Figures 1.8.5 and 1.8.6 show an interesting contrast.
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Figure 1.8.3: Enforcement Impact on Training by Occupation and Earnings
Figure 1.8.5 plots the marginal impact of enforcement by the occupation-specific mean of
firm-sponsored training in the data. It appears that enforcement effects are stronger in oc-
cupations which report receiving more firm-sponsored training. Figure 1.8.6, on the other
hand, plots the marginal impact of enforcement by the proportion of 6-digit occupations
within the aggregated 2 digit occupation which are characterized by the BLS Occupational
Employment Statistics data as having at least some on-the-job-training. The line of best
fit slopes slightly downward, indicating that non-compete enforcement tends to reduce firm-
sponsored training in occupations with a higher proportion of sub-occupations that receive
at least some training.51 A resolution to this discrepancy arises if those 2 digit occupations
51Note that for Figure 1.8.6 the on-the-job-training measure comes from the BLS Occupational Employ-
ment Statistics data in which they assigned every Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) occupation
at the 6 digit level a level of on-the-job-training (OTJT). The categories they utilized were none, short,
moderate, long, residency, apprenticeship. In order to provide an aggregate statistic for the 2 digit SOC
code, I took the proportion of occupations within the 2 digit occupation category with at least some training.
This statistic is highly dependent on the number of 6 digit occupations within of the 2 digit categories.
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Figure 1.8.4: Enforcement Impact on Training by Occupation and Tenure
for which each of the 6 digit sub-occupations have some amount of on the job training,
such as Installation and Repair, are less likely to to report receiving firm-sponsored training.
Alternatively, employees in these occupations may receive a lot of training upfront but not
necessarily later on in tenure when the data picks them up. Figure 1.8.7 shows that the
enforcement impact is unrelated to the concentration of an occupation within an industry.
This is particularly surprising since non-compete enforcement precludes moves to competi-
tors, which are presumably in the same industry.52 The aggregation up to 2 digit occupation
and industry codes may be too blunt, however, and as a result masks significant effects at a
more disaggregated level.
Overall these plots show that non-compete enforcement has a stronger impact on occupations
52For Figure 1.8.7, the x-axis is the highest proportion of the occupation in any industry at the 2 digit
NAICS Industry level.
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Figure 1.8.5: Enforcement Impact on Training by Occupation and Firm-Sponsored Training
with more years of schooling and higher earnings. For state governments looking to improve
training outcomes for low-skill workers in the high litigation group, non-compete enforcement
does not appear to be a particularly appealing lever, except for personal care and services
occupations.
Effects Across Tenure and Age Tables
This table presents the results represented in Figure 1.6.1. It shows the intent-to-treat
estimates for subsets of tenure categories.
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Figure 1.8.6: Enforcement Impact on Training by Occupation and Some OTJT
Table 1.11: Training and Non-Compete Enforcement over Tenure
Tenure in Years
Intent-to-Treat Effect 0-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20+
High Litigation 0.007** 0.007* 0.015** 0.019* -0.007
(0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.011) (0.006)
Observations 39,176 14,226 7,191 4,422 5,359
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is an indi-
cator for receiving firm-sponsored training in the last year. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses, clustered at the state level. The set of controls
consist of an enforcement main effect, potential experience, potential experi-
ence squared, tenure main effects, hours worked, and indicators for working
in a metro area, bachelors degree, graduate school degree, male, white, es-
tablishment and firm size 25-99, establishment and firm size 100+, whether
the worker is unionized, NAICS 2 digit industries, year. State corporate
tax rates, indicators for exceptions to at-will employment, and whether the
state is a right-to-work state are all interacted with the high litigation or
occupation specific main effects.
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Figure 1.8.7: Enforcement Impact on Training by Occupation and Occupation-Industry
Concentration
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Table 1.12: Training and Non-Compete Enforcement over Age
Age in Years
Intent-to-Treat Effect 22-28 29-35 36-42 42-48 49-55
High Litigation 0.014* 0.004 0.016*** -0.004 0.001
(0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Observations 11,988 15,563 16,200 13,188 13,435
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variable is an indi-
cator for receiving firm-sponsored training in the last year. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses, clustered at the state level. The set of controls
consist of an enforcement main effect, potential experience, potential experi-
ence squared, tenure main effects, hours worked, and indicators for working
in a metro area, bachelors degree, graduate school degree, male, white, es-
tablishment and firm size 25-99, establishment and firm size 100+, whether
the worker is unionized, NAICS 2 digit industries, year. State corporate
tax rates, indicators for exceptions to at-will employment, and whether the
state is a right-to-work state are all interacted with the high litigation or
occupation specific main effects.
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Dividing Industry by Tradable Non-Tradable
Jensen and Kletzer (2005) show the share of total employment by tradable versus non-
tradable NAICS sectors. From their Table 4, I classify an industry as tradable if more
employment is observed in the tradable portion of that industry. Table 1.13 categorizes
NAICS 2 digit industries by whether they are tradable or non-tradable.
Table 1.13: Mapping NAICS 2 Digit Codes to Tradable and Non-Tradable Industries
Non Tradable Tradable
Utilities Agriculture, Forestry
Construction Mining, Quarrying, Oil Extraction
Retail Trade Manufacturing
Administrative and Support Services Transportation and Warehousing
Educational Services Information
Healthcare and Social Services Wholesale Trade
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation Finance and Insurance
Accommodation and Food Services Real Estate and Rental
Other Services (Except Public Sector) Professional, Scientific, Technical
Management of Companies
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CHAPTER II
Enforcing Covenants Not to Compete: The Lifecycle
Impact on New Firms53
2.1 Introduction
‘Noncompete agreements...can be a significant impediment to people who aspire to start their
own firms...’
-Rami Essaid, entrepreneur, in the Wall Street Journal, Aug 14, 2013
The creation of new firms and their subsequent performance are important concerns to
researchers, entrepreneurs and policy makers. An important avenue of new firm formation
is through employees of an existing firm leaving their employment to establish a new firm,
sometimes referred to as a ‘spinout’. Spinouts are of special interest because they have been
known to perform better than other types of new firms (Agarwal et al. 2004; Klepper 2007;
53Disclaimer: Any opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily
represent the views of the U.S. Census Bureau. All results have been reviewed to ensure that no confidential
information is disclosed. This research uses data from the Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer Household
Dynamics Program, which was partially supported by the following National Science Foundation Grants SES-
9978093, SES-0339191 and ITR-0427889; National Institute on Aging Grant AG018854; and grants from the
Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. The authors also thank the Kauffman Foundation, the Harold Price Center
for Entrepreneurial Studies at UCLA Anderson School of Management and the Academic Senate of the
University of California, Los Angeles for supporting this work.
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Chatterji, 2008; Klepper 2009), likely due to human capital that the founders developed at
their previous employers. However, founders of spinouts are often contractually bound to
their prior employers via agreements that place constraints on what the employees can do
after their separation. For instance, by signing covenants not to compete (CNC), employees
may be forbidden from joining or establishing a competing firm for a specified period of time
or within a stipulated geographic area.
While CNC are commonplace in all US states, there are significant inter-state variations in
the degree of enforcement. For instance, such agreements are void in California (Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code §16600) but states such as Florida only prohibit overly restrictive covenants (F.S.
§542.335). Naturally, these constraints and the degree to which they are enforced are likely
to influence the decision of individuals to engage in entrepreneurial activity, especially when
the new firms are formed as spinouts and become direct competitors with their parent firms.
Fearing possible litigation from employers, potential spinout founders might be discouraged
to leave their parent firms (Samila and Sorensen, 2011; Marx et al, 2011). In line with
this argument, Samila and Sorensen (2011) found that CNC enforcement inhibits new firm
formation. Along similar lines, Marx et al. (2009) and Fallick et al. (2006) respectively found
a link between CNC enforcement and the mobility of inventors and mobility of workers in
California’s IT cluster.
While these studies show that CNC enforcement influences the entry of new firms, we have
no empirical evidence on the impact of non-compete enforcement on new firms beyond their
entry. In particular, it is likely that CNC enforcement affects not only the entry rate of
new firms, but also their size and growth. Murphy et al. (1991) argue that when people
are free to choose, they select occupations that offer the highest return on their abilities.
If CNC enforcement acts as an entry barrier, then only founders with high-potential ideas
may risk the cost of potential CNC related lawsuits and found direct competitors to their
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parent firms. In such a case, those spinouts that do eventually form in states with strict
CNC enforcement will have higher-quality ideas, and hence have a larger initial size (Cooper
et al, 1989). CNC enforcement also affects new firm growth both directly and indirectly. By
making it harder to hire talented employees who are also bound by enforceable CNC, stricter
CNC enforcement inhibits the growth of new firms. On the other hand, by limiting employee
mobility, CNC enforcement may indirectly promote growth by protecting the dissemination
of valuable knowledge, and incentivizing firms to invest in growth-enhancing activities such
as research and development.
Aside from the limited focus on entry, there are two other gaps in our understanding of these
important economic processes. First, to our knowledge, there are no firm-level studies on
this question. While Marx et al (2011) use inventor level analyses, Samila and Sorenson
(2011) focus on aggregate new firm formation at the MSA level, identifying the relative
impact of non-compete enforcement by the amount of new venture capital in the region.
More importantly, the absence of a firm-level treatment implies that prior studies treat
all new firms uniformly even though CNC enforcement will likely have a disparate impact
depending on the type of new firm. In particular, incumbent firms are most likely to litigate
CNC against new firms formed by their employees only if those new firms compete with
them.
In this study, we use matched employer-employee data from 1991 to 2010 on about 5.5 million
new firms from 30 US states across all industries. We identify ‘within-industry spinouts’,
new firms established by employees leaving an incumbent firm and present in the same
NAICS 4-digit industry as the incumbent firm. Our baseline index of CNC enforcement is
the index developed in Starr (2013), which utilizes factor analysis to re-weight six observed
dimensions of CNC enforcement initially quantified for the year 1991 by Bishara (2011). A
major empirical challenge to identify the impact of CNC enforcement on new firms is to show
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that the estimated differences of firm behavior are not driven by other factors specific to the
states and correlated with CNC enforcement. Our identification strategy is a difference-
in-differences (DID) approach that exploits an unusual aspect of law firms that is uniform
across states: courts do not enforce any non-compete covenants between them and departing
lawyers. Using law firms as a control group allows us to use both the fullness of our data
and state fixed effects in the estimation, which significantly reduces concerns about omitted
variable bias. We further argue that any bias resulting from the comparison between law
and non-law firms is likely to bias our estimates downward. The per se prohibition on
CNC for lawyers was first suggested by the American Bar Association in 1961 and later
codified in 1983 as Rule 5.6 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Buffkin 1999). To
account for the effect of inter-industry differences in the formation and performance of new
firms, we contrast within-industry spinouts to other new firms in the same NAICS 4-digit
industry. Thus, we compare how the difference between within-industry non-law spinouts
and other new non-law firms and the corresponding difference between within-industry law
firm spinouts and other new law firms vary with the degree of non-compete enforcement.
Based on these analyses, and consistent with Samila and Sorensen (2011), we find that the
rate of entry of within-industry spinouts is negatively correlated with CNC enforcement.
However, the within-industry spinouts that are established tend to be larger and faster
growing relative to all other new firms. In particular, our specifications indicate that a
unit-change in the enforcement index is associated with about a 0.1% decrease in entry rate
of within-industry spinouts, a 1.1% increase in initial employment among within-industry
spinouts, and a 0.4% increase in employment growth over the first 3 years of their life. In
contrast, based on a difference-in-difference between law firms and non-law firms, we find that
non-compete enforcement has no effect on the entry rate of all new non-law firms, reduces the
initial size, but has no effect on their employment growth over the first 3 years. These results
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are consistent with CNC enforcement having a selection effect on within-industry spinouts.
Our results are robust to several alternative specifications and to alternative measures of
non-compete enforcement including the 1992 and 2002 indices in Garmaise (2011).
Together, our results make two substantive contributions to the literature on new ventures.
First, we show that non-compete covenants not only have an influence on the entry of
new firms but also over the entire lifecycle of such firms. Second, our study is the first
to demonstrate that such covenants have a heterogeneous effect depending on the type of
firm. By doing so, we hope to improve our understanding of the mechanisms that link CNC
enforcement to new firm formation and performance. In addition to these, by highlighting
the unique role of spinouts, our study also contributes to the broader literature on spinouts
(e.g., Agarwal, 2004; Klepper, 2001, 2007; Klepper and Sleeper 2005).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides details on both covenants not
to compete and related legal processes, and presents the potential effects of CNC enforcement
on the life-cycle of new firms. The data and empirical methodology are described in Section
III , and the results are presented in Section IV. Section V discusses and concludes.
2.2 Covenants Not to Compete
2.2.1 CNC and CNC Enforcement
Covenants not to compete are post employment restraints which prohibit employees from
either joining competitors or starting a competing firm for a specified amount of time and in
a specified geographic region. Since the departure of employees can disseminate proprietary
knowledge or technology, both valuable sources of competitive advantage (Barney, 1991;
Grant, 1996), firms use CNC to protect such trade secrets, client lists, and other intangible
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assets. CNC appear in contracts for all types of workers, ranging from CEOs to minimum
wage workers. Indeed, legal scholars believe them to be commonplace in employment con-
tracts (Stone, 2002).
The degree of CNC enforcement varies considerably among states, and often depends upon
the process by which the CNC was signed and potentially violated. Once a firm decides to
take a former employee to court over a potential violation of the employee’s CNC, judges
are bound by either state statute or state precedents in case law.54 Most states enforce CNC
according to some version of the “Rule of Reason,” which was initially developed in 1711.
The “Rule of Reason” balances the protection needed by the firm with the harm done to
the employee and society (Blake 1960). A necessary condition for the enforcement of CNC
in any state is that the employee possesses trade secrets, access to clients or client lists,
or other types of confidential information which gain value from not being publicly known.
Some states will also enforce CNC on the basis of extraordinary training expenses. Given
the possession of some kind of protectable interest, states exhibit significant variation in the
circumstances under which they consider a CNC enforceable.
2.2.2 Effects of CNC Enforcement on New Firms
By binding employees and their knowledge to one firm, the ubiquitous use of CNC in employ-
ment contracts has direct and indirect consequences for both the creation of new firms and
their subsequent growth and performance. The first direct consequence of CNC enforcement
is an additional cost to entrepreneurs who wish to start a spinout that competes with their
54Alternatively, employees who move to a state less likely to enforce a non-compete may file suit in that
state in an attempt to have their CNC annulled. Simultaneously, their former employer may file suit in
the state where the employee formerly worked. In this complicated situation, there is sometimes a race
to the decision, where the slower state can choose to abide by the other state’s judgement. Each state,
however, does not necessarily have to abide by the judgement of another state. See Advanced Bionics Corp.
v. Medtronic, Inc. 59 P.3d 231, 238 (California 2002) for a complicated case and Glynn 2008 for more on
choices of forum, law, and interjurisdictional issues.
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parent firm. In particular, stricter CNC enforcement increases the likelihood that the parent
firm may file a lawsuit against the founders for violating CNC. This, in turn, not only entails
additional litigation costs for the new firm but also may cause it to fail if the lawsuit is
decided in favor of the parent firm. Given this additional cost, only employees who identify
very good business opportunities are willing to pay the potential costs of future lawsuits.
Assuming the distribution of the quality of new business ideas is the same across states for
a given industry, stricter enforcement of CNC reduces the number of new within-industry
spinouts by making it harder for low-quality firms to enter, which increases the observed
quality of those that are created. New ventures that do not compete with their parent firm
do not face this additional cost and their creation is not affected by CNC enforcement. As a
result of this selection effect, within-industry spinouts in stricter enforcing states are, on av-
erage, of higher quality and begin at a larger size (Cooper et al., 1989) than similar spinouts
in other states.
The second direct effect of stricter CNC enforcement is reduced mobility of employees who
now face a greater likelihood of CNC-related litigation. This reduced mobility of employees
impacts the growth of new firms, irrespective of whether they are within-industry spinouts
or not, because growth depends upon the ability of the new firm to attract talented employ-
ees, which can be limited if those employees are also bound by enforceable CNC. Like the
founders, employees are not likely to join a firm at which their expected costs, including po-
tential CNC litigation from their parent firm, exceed their expected utility from joining the
new firm. Consequently, new firms in stricter enforcing states will grow slower, conditional
on the underlying idea quality.
CNC enforcement also has indirect effects on firm behavior, particularly through its effect
on employee mobility. By allowing firms to better appropriate the gains from their invest-
ments, a reduction in employee mobility increases the incentives for firms to invest in human
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capital through training, research and development and intra-firm information sharing. In
particular, if employees can move freely to a firm’s competitors, the firm may not be willing
to invest in building transferable skills (and knowledge) that are valuable to competitors
(e.g., industry-specific expertise). Similarly, they may be less willing to share sensitive infor-
mation that may be valuable to competitors or may hurt the firm if that information were
leaked to competitors. In line with these arguments, Starr (2013) shows empirically that
firms in stricter enforcing states are more likely to provide skill-upgrading training to their
employees.55 Also, Conti (2013) finds that incumbent firms in stricter enforcing states are
willing to pursue riskier R&D strategies because these firms are more likely to minimize the
leakages of the payoffs from high-risk R&D projects. The impact of such increases in human
capital and R&D investment and intra-firm information sharing may open up high quality
business opportunities that would not have otherwise existed. This indirect effect, in turn,
increases the initial size of new firms by improving the quality of new business ideas, and
also enables the new firm to grow faster by making these types of investments.56
Together, these arguments suggest that while stricter CNC enforcement reduces the entry
rate of within-industry spinouts relative to other new firms, it increases the initial size of
within-industry spinouts. The effect on growth of new firms appears to be ambiguous.
55Garmaise (2011) argues that stricter CNC enforcement reduces incentives for managers to invest in their
own human capital. However, it is not clear how investment by managers in their own, transferable human
capital will translate into firm growth.
56Reduced mobility may also impede R&D investments and consequently growth, by not only limiting
the development of firm absorptive capacity but also of an industry-wide spillover pool from which firms
can draw ideas. This may be particularly relevant when combining knowledge across firms is important.
However, employees switching jobs is only one of many possible spillover mechanisms, and it is not clear why
formal knowledge-sharing mechanisms between firms may not achieve the same objectives. Reduced mobility
may also potentially decrease employee human capital by reducing the experience they gain by working at
multiple firms.
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2.3 Data and Empirics
The data for the study come from two micro-level datasets at the U.S. Census Bureau:
the ‘Longitudinal Business Database’ (LBD) and the ‘Longitudinal Employer Household
Dynamics’ (LEHD). The LBD is the universe of all establishments in the US that have at
least one employee.57 For each year from 1976 to 2010, this dataset contains information
on employment at the establishment in addition to data on the industry, geography and
corporate ownership of the establishment. It does not contain information on revenues or on
any other expenditure.
The LEHD is a composite matched employer-employee dataset comprising multiple state-
level databases. The two relevant databases within the LEHD are (a) the ‘Employment
History File’ (EHF), which provides the employment history of all individuals that work in
establishments in states that participate in this program and (b) the ‘Employer Character-
istics File’ (ECF) which contains information on all employers (i.e. establishments) in states
that participate in this program. These databases, maintained separately for each participat-
ing state, contain quarterly information on employment and payroll for the establishment,
and wage information for the individual. In particular, for each individual, for each quarter,
the database provides the payroll they obtained from each firm they worked for (identified
by the ‘State Employer Identification Number’ or the SEIN). Like the LBD, the LEHD does
not contain information on revenues or on any other expenditure. The first year the LEHD
data are available for at least three states is 1991. The geographical coverage of the data
increases over time as more states begin to participate in this program. Our study was based
on 30 states: AR, CA, CO, FL, GA, HI, IA, ID, IL, IN, LA, MD, ME, MT, NC, NJ, NM,
57An establishment is defined as ‘An establishment is a single physical location at which business is con-
ducted and/or services are provided’ (http://www.census.gov/econ/susb/definitions.html, retrieved Sep 24,
2013). If very distinct activities are performed at a location, then they are classified as separate establish-
ments.
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NV, OK, OR, RI, SC, TN, TX, UT, VA, VT, WA, WI, and WV.
To obtain the list of new firms from the LBD, we selected all establishments that were
born in the states and during the years for which we had data from the LEHD. We then
excluded establishments belonging to multi-unit firms or to firm that were started more than
1 year prior to the start of the establishment. This sample, which represents almost all new
employers in the LEHD-relevant states and years, consisted of about 5.5 million firms. We
then identified a subset of these new firms as within-industry spinouts, the details of which
are provided below.
2.3.1 Identifying within-industry spinouts
We identified within-industry spinouts based on employee-movement data from the LEHD.
We began by identifying ‘clusters’ of one or more employees moving from one establishment
(‘the predecessor establishment’) to another (‘the successor establishment’) within the same
state during a 1-year period. We chose 1-year as many non-compete agreements last for 1
year. Of these clusters, we restricted our attention to clusters that had less than 20 employees
as potential spinouts. The reasoning for this criterion was that clusters with large numbers of
employees are more likely to be data errors or administrative problems such as name changes
rather than true spinouts. From these clusters, we excluded clusters where the predecessor
establishment was too small relative to cluster size; specifically, we imposed a condition that
the cluster size be at most 50% of employment at the predecessor establishment. We also
excluded clusters where the successor establishment was too large relative to cluster size;
specifically, we imposed a condition that the cluster size be at least 75% of employment
at the successor establishment. These conditions were aimed at reducing the likelihood of
simple ownership changes being identified as spinouts. We also excluded clusters where the
successor establishment was more than one year old at the time of the employees moving
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to the establishment. Broadly, these clusters represent groups of employees moving from an
existing firm to join a new firm.
This preliminary list was then refined by using data from the LBD to exclude SEINs owned
by firms present in multiple states. From this list, we identify ’within-industry spinouts’ as
spinouts that have the same 4-digit NAICS code as their parent firm. About 8.4% of all
new firms were classifed as within-industry spinouts. Additional descriptive statistics are
provided in Table 2.14. 58
2.3.2 Measuring CNC Enforcement
Malsberger’s series Covenants Not to Compete: A State by State Survey tracks the case
law for each state along numerous dimensions of enforcement including state statutes, what
constitutes a protectable interest, the burden of proof on the plaintiff, handling of overbroad
contracts, employee consideration, the manner of separation, and others. Bishara (2011)
and Garmaise (2011) each quantify these various dimensions of enforcement. Bishara’s in-
dex scores six dimensions from zero to ten, while Garmaise gives a binary score to twelve
dimensions. We use as a baseline the 1991 enforcement index developed in Starr (2013)
which modifies the Bishara (2011) index by performing factor analysis to re-weight the six
dimensions of enforcement.59 The Starr index has an advantage of removing the redundancy
of the six dimensions of enforcement and capturing finer granularity of the way enforcement
is construed along a spectrum of weak to strong enforcement. Table 2.15 from Starr (2013)
reports the means for the six dimensions of enforcement and the factor analysis weights,60
58It is likely that many of these within-industry spinouts are not competitors with their parent firms. Av-
eraging the effects of non-compete enforcement on competitor within-industry spinouts and non-competitor
within-industry spinouts biases the estimated effects towards zero.
59A similar procedure cannot be performed on the Garmaise index because factor analysis does not work
with binary variables.
60The highly positive correlations between the underlying dimensions suggests that any re-weighting
scheme produces highly correlated indices. Indeed, the correlation between the Starr index and the ini-
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and Figure 2.5.1 presents the result enforcement scores by state for 1991 and 2009.
The enforcement index, normalized to be mean 0, standard deviation 1, is a continuous
measure which runs from -4 to 2. California and North Dakota are unusual because of
their ban on non-competes; every other state enforces them to some extent. As Figure 2.5.1
shows, there is not much variation across time, but significant variation across states.61 Some
states have introduced some small changes over time, such as Oregon’s law that employers
notify workers in advance of their non-compete or Colorado’s law of enforcing non-competes
only on upper level management workers, but others have not changed their policies at all.
California, for example, adopted their prohibition of CNC in 1872 (Gilson 1999) and has not
touched it since.
2.3.3 Identification
A lack of longitudinal variation, an unbalanced panel across states and time, and strict disclo-
sure requirements preclude the possibility of using longitudinal variation in CNC enforcement
to identify the lifecycle impact of on new firms. Simple cross-sectional correlations between
CNC enforcement are likely biased, however, because other state specific factors that affect
the creation and performance of new firms, such as state specific tax, labor, and commercial
laws, are likely to be correlated with CNC enforcement. Therefore, to identify the impact of
CNC enforcement, we exploit the fact that among all industries, law is the only industry in
which CNC are prohibited in every state. Under the assumption that law firms are equally
affected by these state specific policies,62 differencing within a state between all new non-law
firms and new law firms cancels out the state specific factors.
tial Bishara (2011) index is 0.94.
61During our time period, only Louisiana had a significant reversal in its non-compete laws but disclosure
regulations prevent us from studying this reversal with restricted data. In all of our specifications we include
a dummy for Louisiana during this time period to partial out this effect
62We argue below that the difference between law and non-law firms is likely to be biased downward.
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The primary argument for the CNC ban on lawyers, which has recently convinced some
states to allow similar carve-outs for physicians, is that limiting a lawyer’s ability to practice
is equivalent to limiting a client’s choice of attorney (Buffkin 1999, Stroud 2002).63 All of our
main specifications utilize a difference-in-differences (DID) specification, comparing non-law
firms to law firms, and non-law within-industry spinouts to other non-law new ventures.64
The American Bar Association first wrote in Formal Opinion 300 in 1961, then in Disciplinary
Rule 2-108(A) in 1969, and finally codified in 1983 as Rule 5.6 of the ABA’s Model Rules of
Professional Conduct what has become a per se prohibition on the enforcement of covenants
not to compete (Buffkin 1999). Model Rule 5.6 states:
A lawyer shall not participate in offering or making:
(a) a partnership, shareholders, operating, employment, or other similar type of
agreement that restricts the right of a lawyer to practice after termination of the
relationship, except an agreement concerning benefits upon retirement; or
(b) an agreement in which a restriction on the lawyer’s right to practice is part
of the settlement of a client controversy.
Stroud (2002) writes, “Rule 5.6 effectively separated law firms from the group of profes-
sions included under the reasonableness analysis for covenants not to compete.” The first
challenge to this ban occurred in Dwyer v. Jung in 1975, wherein partners had signed an
agreement such that upon dissolution of the practice the clients would be equally divided
and each partner could not access another partner’s clients for five years. The judge leaned
on Disciplinary Rule 2-108(A) in his findings and invalidated the contracts, distinguishing
between general restrictive covenants and those between lawyers. While courts have gener-
ally reaffirmed Dwyer, some have enforced other indirect components of contracts between
63Other studies such as Garmaise (2011) and Conti (2013) utilize the CNC law changes in Texas in
1994, Florida in 1996, and Louisiana in 2003 to identify the impact of CNC enforcement. Census disclosure
requirements and the years for which we have the LEHD prevent us from utilizing this longitudinal variation.
For this reason, we exploit only the cross-sectional variation in enforcement.
64Law firms are identified by NAICS code 54111. The analysis is conducted at the NAICS 4 digit level,
and 54111 is treated as a separate 4 digit industry.
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lawyers such as retirement benefits65 and forfeiture of compensation clauses.66 Stroud (2002)
reviews this development of case law.
To examine the impact of enforcement on the creation of new ventures, we aggregate the
establishment level data to the state-year-industry level. The baseline creation specification
is
Y cist =γ1NLi ∗ Enfcs + λit + θs + φZijst + vijst (2.3.1)
where Y cist refers to the two creation outcomes of interest, the entry rate of new ventures and
within-industry spinouts in state s and industry i at time t, NLi refers to an industry i being
‘not law,’ Enfcs refers to the state level enforcement of non-competes, λit are industry-by-
year fixed effects, θs are state fixed effects, and Zijst are other controls.67 The coefficient γ1
represents the impact of a one standard deviation increase in non-compete enforcement on
the entry rate of new ventures and within-industry spinouts relative to the impact on law
firms.
To examine the impact of non-compete enforcement on the initial size of new ventures and
their employment growth we use the following DID specifications at the establishment level:
Yijst =α0 + α1NLi ∗ Enfcs + α2WSOijst ∗NLi + α3WSOijst + λit + θs (2.3.2)
+ φZijst + vijst
Yijst =β0 + β1NLi ∗ Enfcs ∗WSOijst + β2NLi ∗ Enfcs + β3Enfcs ∗WSO (2.3.3)
+ β4WSOijst ∗NLi + β5WSOijst + λit + θs + φZijst + vijst
65See Miller v. Foulston 790 P.2d 404 (Kan. 1990)
66See Haight. Brown & Bonesteel v. Superior Court. 285 Cal. Rptr. 845, 846.
67Entry rate here is defined as the number of new firms in a state-year-NAICS 4 digit industry divided by
the total number of establishments in the state-year-NAICS 4 digit industry.
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where Yijst refers to the outcomes of interest, initial employment and employment growth,
WSOijst refers to a dummy for firm j being a within-industry i spinout at time t in state s.
Specification (2.3.2) examines the impact of non-compete enforcement on law and non-law
new firms; the coefficient α1 estimates the change in Yijst, relative to law firms, for non-
law firms as a result of a unit change in the enforcement index. Specification (2.3.3) is a
difference-in-difference-in-difference specification, where we look for heterogeneous impacts
of enforcement based on whether the non-law new venture is a within-industry spinout. The
coefficient of interest is β1, which represents the effect of the enforcement (relative to the
corresponding difference for law firms) on non-law within-industry spinouts relative to other
new non-law firms.
For the sake of completeness, we also performed a survival analysis. This analysis follows
the same structure as (2.3.2) and (2.3.3), but is estimated using maximum likelihood under
the assumption that survival follows a Weibull distribution.68 Due to the computationally
intensive nature of this estimation procedure, we use three digit NAICS fixed effects and
separate year fixed effects (instead of four digit NAICS by year fixed effects).
Included in Zijst are firm level and industry level characteristics. At the firm level, we include
a dummy for whether the new firm is a spinout or not (irrespective of within- or outside-
industry), and the log of initial employment for the growth and duration regressions. At the
industry level, we include the log of the total number of firms and the log of total employment
at the state-industry-year level and at the state-year level. In addition, the industry share
of total number of firms and total employment are included. The reason for including these
variables is that the number of firms and total employment within an industry are strongly
correlated with the propensity for the creation of a new firm, as well as the future growth
of the firm as employment within the industry represents the pool of talent from which the
68Robustness checks using lognormal and log-logistic distributions are also run.
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new firm can recruit. In some sense, these size of industry variables may be ‘bad’ controls in
the sense that they are also affected by CNC enforcement: if industries are sorting into high
or low enforcing states then the size of an industry in a given state-industry-year may be
correlated with CNC enforcement. By controlling for industry size, we factor out this effect
from the enforcement coefficient. There is also a dummy to account for Louisiana between
2002 and 2003, which represents the only major non-compete reversal in our time frame. To
help isolate the impact of CNC enforcement, we include the following state level regressors:
exceptions to at-will employment (Autor et al., 2006), top state corporate tax rates, and
whether the state is a right to work state, all interacted with the non-law firm dummy. To
account for time varying industry trends, all specifications except the duration specification
include 4 digit NAICS by year fixed effects.
In addition to these DID estimates, we provide pooled estimates without state fixed effects,
which provide insight into the extent to which omitted state-level variables and the difference
between law and non-law new firms affect our results. The estimating equations for these
pooled OLS specifications follow the same structure as above, without the difference between
law and non-law:
Y cist =γ
′
1Enfcs + λit + φZijst + vijst (2.3.4)
Yijst =α
′
1Enfcs + α
′
2WSOijst + λit + φZijst + vijst (2.3.5)
Yijst =β
′
1Enfcs ∗WSOijst + β′2WSOijst + β′3Enfcs + λit + φZijst + vijst (2.3.6)
Equation (2.3.4) is the pooled OLS version of the DID creation regression (2.3.1), while
equations (2.3.5) and (2.3.6) are the pooled OLS versions of (2.3.2) and (2.3.3).
The advantage of using lawyers as a control group in a DID approach is not only being able
to use all the data in our sample, but also being able to use state fixed effects, which account
118
for other non-time varying state-specific effects. Thus, any other potentially confounding
variables must not only differentially affect law and non-law firms, but must also be correlated
with CNC enforcement. One such possible reason is that lawyers actually enforce non-
competes. Given that all employment disputes in 2005 made up only 2.1% (Langton and
Cohen, 2008) of all civil state court cases, this potential effect is likely to be small. A
related possibility is that law firms make indirect attempts at restricting the mobility of
their employees (e.g., by writing and litigating more complicated employment contracts).
To the extent that higher enforcing states also enforce these indirect attempts at restricting
the ability of lawyers to practice, this will also bias our estimates downward because it makes
law firms like other firms along the enforcement dimension. A third potential concern could
be the nature of the difference between law firms and other firms: law firms are primarily
focused on client relationships, whereas other firms might be focused on engineering or
some other production process. If, even though it is unlikely, courts do not treat client
relationships and trade secrets equally, and this disparity in treatment is correlated with
overall CNC enforcement, then this will bias our estimates. However, even then, the impact
of this is likely to be small since our sample covers a wide range of industries including
services, which are arguably similar to law firms. Nevertheless, we run a robustness check
comparing law firms to only a subset of similar firms in the Professional, Scientific, and
Technical (NAICS 54) industry. Finally, law firms may be different from other firms on
other dimensions, e.g., law firms tend to be smaller than other firms. However, the inclusion
of industry-year fixed effects accounts for all such differences, albeit within the limitations
of fixed effects. An alternative concern is that debates on new firm formation are driving
changes in the enforcement index. Reverse causality, however, does not appear to be an issue
here due to the longstanding nature of these laws and the lack of changes over time.
While the estimates on the enforcement index are likely biased down, the standard errors
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may also be affected because our estimation procedure does not account for two types of mea-
surement error in our enforcement index. First, each of the dimensions of CNC enforcement
are measurement error ridden proxies of latent enforcement intensity. Second, there is error
in the factor analysis process which generates the enforcement index that is not accounted
for. We corroborate our findings by re-running all our specifications using different versions
of the enforcement index, including the Garmaise (2011) indices from 1992 and 2001. If the
error is contained in the factor analysis generation process, then the Garmaise indices should
not be contaminated.
Finally, note that our estimates reflect intention to treat effects, for enforcement policies
are likely to only affect workers who have signed CNC. While identifying the impact of
the treatment on the treated would also be informative, this is the parameter that state
legislatures care about because they can only choose the enforcement policy; they cannot
force firms to use non-competes in their employment contracts.
2.4 Results
Table 2.16 presents the results of our analyses. Throughout these analyses, the aggregated
indices are normalized to be mean 0, standard deviation 1, and standard errors are clustered
at the state level. Panel A examines entry rate, defined as the ratio of the number of
within-industry spinouts to the total number of establishments in a given state-industry-year,
and provides the coefficients on the enforcement index (or its interaction with the non-law
dummy in the DID specifications) from state-industry-year level regressions. The estimates
from the pooled regressions suggest that non-compete enforcement and the entry rate for
all new ventures and within-industry spinouts are positive but not statistically significant.
The preferred DID estimates show that the entry rate for all new firms is negative but
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not statistically significant, while the estimate for within-industry spinouts is negative and
statistically significant at the 5% level. These estimates indicate that a unit increase in non-
compete enforcement reduces the entry rate of within-industry spinouts by 0.1 percentage
points.
The first row of Panel B in Table 2.16 focuses on log initial employment, defined as the
employment as observed in the first year of the firm’s appearance in the LBD when the firm
has a strictly positive employment. For all new firms, the coefficient on the enforcement
index is strongly negative in both the pooled and difference-in-difference specifications. In
contrast, the coefficients pertaining to within-industry spinouts is positive (0.0264 in the
pooled specification, and 0.0111 in the DID specification) and and significant at the 1% level.
Thus, a one standard deviation increase in CNC enforcement reduces the initial size of new
firms by 1.6% percent. Relative to other new ventures, however, a one standard deviation
increase in CNC enforcement increases initial employment in within-industry spinouts by
1.1%.
The second through fifth rows study employment growth over the first few years of the new
firm’s life. Within the first three years of a new firms life, the pooled results and DID results
indicate the same pattern: CNC enforcement reduces employment growth for new firms,
but, relative to other new ventures within-industry spinouts grow faster. The DID results
suggest that a one standard deviation increase in CNC enforcement reduces the growth rate
in employment for all new firms in the first 3 years by 0.6%. For within-industry spinouts,
the marginal effect relative to other new ventures is 0.4% and significant at the 5% level.
Thus, within-industry spinouts not only start larger but also grow faster in the first three
years in stricter enforcing states.
The effects of CNC enforcement employment growth between years 3-5 and 5-7 suggest that
within-industry spinouts grow slower than other new ventures after an initial period of fast
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growth. For new ventures overall, the pooled OLS results do not reach conventional levels of
statistical significance. The DID results for new ventures in years 3-5 do show positive but
not statistically significant effects, while years 5-7 show a positive and statistically significant
effect at the 5% level. Our estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in non-
compete enforcement increases employment growth between years 5 and 7 for all new firms
by 0.8%. 69
Finally, the last row presents the results of duration regressions with a Weibull survival
distribution curve. The reported coefficients represent the actual β coefficients. Exponen-
tiating the results allows a hazard ratio interpretation. The positive coefficient for all new
firms in the DID specification, 0.0162, suggests that a one standard deviation increase in
non-compete enforcement increases the hazard of failure to 1.02, thus reducing the lifespan
of new firms. The coefficients for all new firms switch from negative and significant in the
pooled specification to positive and significant in the DID specification. The coefficient for
within-industry spinouts is negative and significant in the pooled specification but positive
and not statistically significant in the DID specification.70
Together, these results strongly suggest that CNC enforcement has an effect on the entire
lifecycle of new firms, and differential effects for within-industry spinouts.
69In analyses not presented, we found no significant differences between within-industry spinouts and other
new firms in 5-year and 7-year growth rates.
70The cause of the sign switch between the pooled OLS and DID specifications is not the assumed survival
distribution or the particular enforcement index chosen. One interpretation of the sign switch is that there
is an omitted state-level variable correlated with non-compete enforcement and the survival of firms which is
reversing and biasing upward the estimate from the pooled specification. If this is correct, then including state
fixed effects in the DID specification provides the correct estimate. Alternatively, if the omitted variable is
correlated with non-compete enforcement and causes law firms to live longer than other new firms in stricter
enforcing states, then the DID estimates are biased downward.
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2.4.1 Robustness Checks
We repeated our analyses using alternative measures of CNC enforcement. Specifically, we
used our factor-analysis-weighted-index constructed from the 2009 data in Bishara (2011),
and the Garmaise (2011) indices from 1992 and 2001. Tables 2.17 through 2.22 present
these results for each entry, initial size, growth, and survival. Generally, the results are
qualitatively similar to those from our baseline table, 2.16.
One possible concern is that law firms are not a proper control group for all other firms in
the economy. In order to make the industry mix more comparable, we restrict the sample to
only firms in the same two digit NAICS code as law firms: NAICS 54 refers to professional,
scientific, and technical services.71 We cannot present the corresponding numerical results
because they are currently under disclosure review. Qualitatively, however, the results of this
robustness exercise do not undermine the main conclusions of the empirical work that non-
compete enforcement reduces entry of within-industry spinouts, but increases their initial
size and growth in the first 3 years.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
This study uses data on several million new firms across 30 states, and finds that CNC
enforcement reduces the initial size of new firms, but increases their growth between years
5 and 7. These results are economically significant. If California (-3.73) adopted Florida’s
71The Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services sector comprises establishments that specialize in
performing professional, scientific, and technical activities for others. These activities require a high degree
of expertise and training. The establishments in this sector specialize according to expertise and provide these
services to clients in a variety of industries and, in some cases, to households. Activities performed include:
legal advice and representation; accounting, bookkeeping, and payroll services; architectural, engineering,
and specialized design services; computer services; consulting services; research services; advertising services;
photographic services; translation and interpretation services; veterinary services; and other professional,
scientific, and technical services.
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laws (+1.33), the average initial employment of new firms in California would fall by 8%,
but the growth between year’s 5 and 7 would increase by 8%.
Importantly, CNC enforcement appears to have a large impact on the lifecycle of within-
industry spinouts. Relative to other new ventures, increases in CNC enforcement result in
fewer, but larger, faster-growing within-industry spinouts. Based on our results in Table
2.16, if California adopted Florida’s CNC laws, it would result in a 0.5% decrease in the
entry rate of within-industry spinouts in California, a 5.6% increase in their average initial
employment, and a 2.0% higher growth rate in the first 3 years of their life. Adding these,
our results imply that the difference in CNC enforcement between Florida and California is
associated with an 7.6% difference in the size of 3-year old firms.
While these results show a potentially strong link between CNC enforcement and new firm
formation and performance, we now attempt to identify which mechanisms are at work.
The generally accepted argument is that such covenants reduce the mobility of individuals
including those of entrepreneurs from their employers (Samila and Sorensen, 2011; Marx et
al, 2011), which explains the lower entry rate of within-industry spinouts relative to other
new ventures.
We then turn to the impact of CNC enforcement on the initial employment and subsequent
employment growth for new ventures and the differential effects for within-industry spinouts.
For new firms, the fact that stricter CNC enforcement reduces the initial size of new ventures
suggests that new firms struggle to hire employees, who are also likely bound by CNC,
perhaps because the underlying average quality of the firms is low. For the firms that survive,
the boost in employment growth in years 5 to 7 suggests that those firms are benefitting from
the protection that CNC enforcement offers, either by investing more in growth enhancing
activities or simply by perfecting their product without leaking its secrets. Relative to other
new ventures, the fact that within-industry spinouts start out larger and grow faster initially
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suggests that they do not have the same hiring issues that other new ventures have. A
possible way to reconcile these two sets of results is to treat the effect of CNC enforcement
as an ’entry barrier’ or an additional cost that within-industry spinouts must pay to enter the
market. Then, assuming that the quality of ideas varies across entrepreneurs, this additional
cost would result in lower entry among entrepreneurs with lower quality ideas. The higher
observed employment and growth is then a result of higher quality ideas. Thus, in this
argument, the CNC enforcement does not cause the performance of any individual firm to
be higher than it would otherwise be; rather, the measured average performance across firms
is higher because stricter enforcement increases the cut-off ‘quality’ needed for entry.
This selection argument need not be the whole story. In Table 2.17, we examine the ro-
bustness of the entry results using other variations of the CNC index. For within-industry
spinouts, the impact is always negative in the DID specification, but only statistically signifi-
cant for two of the four indices. This is not surprising because the category of within-industry
spinouts contains both spinouts that compete with their parent firm and spinouts that com-
pete in the industry but not with their parent firm. An alternative mechanism which would
increase the quality of within-industry spinouts is increased investment by parent firms to
develop the human capital of their employees. Stricter CNC enforcement buys the loyalty
of employees who sign CNC, and therefore provides firms with a higher incentive to invest
in training, R&D, and share sensitive information with their employees. These investments
may provide employees with high quality ideas to start new firms within the same industry
that need not necessarily be competitors with their parent firms.
This study has implications for the research on new venture formation and entrepreneurship,
as well as for managers concerned about new entry. Our results suggest that the effect of
CNC enforcement is not limited to its effect on the mobility of workers or the formation
of new firms, but also affects the growth of new firms. Our study also implies that in
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order to evaluate its full impact, we should examine the effect of CNC enforcement on the
whole process of new venture formation, and not just on entry. While CNC enforcement can
reduce the rate of within-industry spinout formation, the reduction might be the results of
low quality firms not entering as spinouts. This view provides new insights for incumbent
firms: strong CNC enforcement might not necessarily reduce the level of competitive threats
from spinouts.
Turning to the welfare effects of CNC enforcement, our results do not allow us to unambigu-
ously state whether they increase or decrease welfare. Note that our suggested mechanism
is not a simple story of higher entry barriers that lead to welfare losses. Here, the entry
barriers are higher only for a subset of the firms. Thus, if the mean ‘productivity’ is higher
for this subset of firms than for all other firms, then CNC enforcement would be welfare
destroying. However, if this subset of firms has a lower mean productivity than some other
subset of firms, then the welfare effect is not clear. For instance, incumbent firms very likely
have higher productivities than within-industry spinouts, and it is possible that they fill in
the gap left by within-industry spinouts in states with higher CNC enforcement. In such an
event, CNC enforcement may actually increase welfare.72 Beyond this, there may be longer
term effects of competition on innovation, which have been ignored in this discussion. The
study also does not consider the possibility that CNC enforcement could change the intensity
of industry competition. We leave a comprehensive analysis of these issues as a subject for
future research.
A natural extension of this study would be to perform additional analyses to support the
selection argument. For instance, one could study if the dispersion of productivity of within-
industry spinouts is negatively correlated with CNC enforcement, and in particular if the
72Of course, in this argument, it is not clear why spinouts would enter knowing that incumbents have
higher productivities. One way to address this would be assume that, ex-ante, firms do not know their
productivities but only know some statistic about the productivity distribution that they may draw their
productivity from.
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lower end of the productivity distribution (e.g., the 10th percentile) is higher in higher-
enforcement states. Another potentially interesting avenue for future research is to examine
the inter-industry heterogeneity in the impact of CNC enforcement. As alluded to earlier,
noncompete agreements are most effective at protecting assets that can be transferred out
through the departure of employees, and when other means to protect those assets such as
patents, copyrights, trade secrets, or the need for complementary assets are available then
this may reduce the benefits of enforcing CNC. Thus, we should expect to see significant
inter-industry variation in the effects of CNC enforcement.
To conclude, noncompete agreements do indeed appear to be a ‘significant impediment to
people who aspire to start their own firms’, especially, if they want to start a firm that
competes with their current employer.
127
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CHAPTER III
Who Signs Noncompete? Evidence From a New Survey
3.1 Introduction
Covenants not to compete (noncompetes) are contracts between employers and employees
that prohibit the employee’s movement to competitor firms for a fixed amount of time post
separation. Given the long history of noncompetes dating back to 1407 (Blake 1960), the
often presumed ubiquity of their use in employment contracts (Stone 2002), the fervent de-
bate over their enforcement (e.g., Hyde 2003, Lobel 2013), and the enormous effects scholars
claim they have on workers, firms, and the economy (Marx et al. 2009, Gilson 1999, Bala-
subramian et al. 2014), it is surprising that we know very little about how frequently and
under what circumstances noncompetes are used. Using the results from a recent large scale
survey of labor force participants, this study fills this major gap in our knowledge by charac-
terizing the types of workers who sign noncompetes and the industries which use them most
frequently.
Since noncompetes have the potential to misallocate labor across firms and states (Marx et
al. 2011a), affect investment in human capital (Starr 2014, Garmaise 2011), the functioning
of internal labor markets, firm productivity, and worker productivity, it is important to
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understand exactly what types of workers sign noncompetes. Previous work has studied
only a select group of occupations, finding that 70-80% of CEOs (Bishara et al. 2014,
Garmaise 2011), 40% of physicians (Lavetti et al. 2013), and 45% of engineers (Marx 2011)
sign noncompetes. This study greatly expands our knowledge because it not only looks at
a broad array of occupations, but also examines how noncompete incidence varies according
to many other employee level and firm level variables such as education, earnings, whether
the worker possesses a legitimate business interest, expected employment duration, firm and
establishment size, industry, poaching frequency, and state level noncompete enforcement.
The data for this study come from a new survey focusing on the use and impacts on non-
competes that we wrote and implemented using an online platform. The results suggest
that noncompetes are a common part of the employment relationship. Sixty three percent
of the sample reports knowing about noncompetes, while 40% of those who have ever heard
of noncompetes have signed one. In the last 5 years, respondents have signed a noncompete
with between 21.8% and 25.7% of their employers. In their current position, between 11.3%
and 19.6% of the respondents have signed noncompetes.
The two digit occupations with the highest incidence of noncompetes are architecture and
engineering, computer and mathematical, installation and repair, business and finance, arts
and entertainment, and management, all with at least 20% of worker signing noncompetes.
As suggested by these results, noncompetes are strongly and positively correlated with both
education and earnings. Yet even for those who earn $40k a year the incidence of noncom-
petes is still at least 15.3%. With regards to occupation specific duties, workers in those
occupations which allow the worker to learn company trade secrets are at least 12 percentage
points more likely to sign a noncompete than those who work directly with clients and have
access to client-specific information.
The industries which have the highest incidence of noncompetes are information, manage-
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ment of companies, professional, scientific, and technical services, manufacturing, finance
and insurance, and arts and entertainment. While the literature has primarily focused on
tech industries, noncompetes are prevalent in most industries, with projections suggesting
that at least 12% sign noncompetes in every industry.
While states differ widely in their noncompete enforcement policy (Bishara 2011, Garmaise
2011), the incidence of noncompetes is only weakly correlated with the noncompete enforce-
ment policy of the state. Indeed, even for California, which refuses to enforce noncompetes,
at least 11% of Californians still sign them.
There are two central takeaways from the paper: (1) the incidence of noncompetes is higher in
places where the literature suggests it would be higher; (2) but the incidence of noncompetes
in other places where we would expect it to be nonexistent, such as for the less educated and
those with lower incomes, is still surprisingly high.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the organization of the survey,
the data collection process, and the sampling frame. Section 3.3 examines the relationship
between the incidence of noncompetes and various worker and firm level variables. Section
3.4 provides a multivariate analysis explaining the utilization of noncompetes, and Section
3.5 concludes.
3.2 Data and Survey Methodology
The data comes from a large scale online survey the authors developed using Qualtrics soft-
ware. The survey has three parts: (1) lifetime experiences with noncompetes, (2) knowledge
of noncompete laws and perceptions of enforcement, and (3) experiences with noncompetes
in a current job. The project was run through Qualtrics, who outsourced the collection of
the data to their panel partners. Potential respondents to the survey had previously agreed
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to respond to online surveys and were sent the survey via an e-mail link or as part of an
online game.
The sample population are labor force participants aged 18 to 75, who are either unemployed
or employed in either the private sector or in a public healthcare system. For compensation,
the respondents were either paid $1.50, given credits in a particular online game they were
playing, or were entered into sweepstakes drawings to earn prizes or other rewards. The
median finish time for the survey was 25 minutes. Due to the length and intensive nature
of the questions, we employed the use of ‘attention filters,’ which require the respondents
to answer in a certain way or else they are discontinued from the survey. At the time of
this writing, the survey is still in the field and thus we are unable to determine exactly the
number of survey takers who were dropped in this way.
Via the use of quotas, the online survey platform gave us greater control over response rates
and sample selection bias. The target for this survey was 10,000 completed surveys with 50%
male, 60% with at least a bachelor’s degree, 50% earning at least $50,000 from their current,
highest paying job, and 30% over the age of 55. These numbers were chosen either to align
with the corresponding moments in the data for labor force participants in the 2012 American
Community Survey, or to oversample certain groups of the population for further subgroup
comparisons. In addition, to examine smaller states with particularly unique noncompete
laws, we oversampled respondents from Colorado, Oregon, Massachusetts, and Florida.
3.2.1 Representativeness and Weighting
The nonrandom sample selection process, both from the quotas and the online survey plat-
form, suggests that final Qualtrics sample is not representative of labor force participants
aged 18 to 75. To understand the extent of the bias, we compare observable outcomes from
the Qualtrics sample to a nationally representative sample of labor force participants from
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the 2011 American Community Survey (ACS). Columns (1) and (2) of Table 3.23 shows
that the two samples are clearly different. In particular the unweighted Qualtrics sample
shows particularly different education levels and proportion female relative to the ACS. For
example, only 19.7% of individuals receive a bachelors degree in the ACS, while 31.1% in
the Qualtrics sample received a bachelors. This particular difference arises directly because
of the quota that 50% of the sample have a bachelors degree.73. The Qualtrics sample is also
over 60% female, while the proportion in the ACS is 47.4%.
To weight the Qualtrics sample to make it comparable to the nationally representative sam-
ple, we first estimate a logit model in which the outcome is a dummy variable equal to
one for being in the ACS sample. The covariates include age, hours worked per week, sex,
education, race, class of the worker, and state. We construct weights equal to pˆ/(1 − pˆ),
where pˆ is the propensity score corresponding to the predicted values of the logit regression,
and apply them to the Qualtrics sample. The intuition behind the weighting scheme is that
observations likely to be observed in a nationally representative sample are given a high
weight, while observations unlikely to be seen are given lower weight. The weights range
from 0.013 to 342391.2, with a mean of 21608.9 and a standard deviation of 20795.2. The
huge range of weights likely arises from some of the spurious inputs of respondents on the
survey.
Column (3) of Table 3.23 shows that the inclusion of these weights dramatically changes
the mean outcomes in the Qualtrics sample, much more closely resembling the nationally
representative sample. For example, the proportion with a bachelors degree in the weighted
Qualtrics sample becomes 20.8%, much closer to the 19.7% in the ACS than the 31.1% in the
unweighted sample. With regards to sex, the weighted sample almost identically matches
the population gender distribution. The weighting similarly improves the balance for each
73Recall that at this point the sample is still being collected.
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of the observable characteristics.
3.2.2 Employment Status and Worker Class
Table 3.24 tabulates the employment status and worker class for the weighted Qualtrics sam-
ple. Overall, 75% of the sample holds one job, while about 17% are currently unemployed.
Those who are unemployed answer the questions regarding their previous employment re-
lationship. The workers are primarily in the private sector, though 4% are employed by a
public healthcare system. Within the private sector, 88.4% of the respondents work for a for
profit firm.
3.3 Incidence
3.3.1 Ever Heard of or Signed a Noncompete?
A primary challenging in quantifying the incidence of noncompetes is that respondents may
not know what noncompetes are, or may not know that they have signed them. Therefore, to
begin our analysis of the incidence of noncompetes, we first ask respondents if they have ever
heard of noncompetes, giving them a written explanation of what they are. Table 3.25 shows
that 63.02% of the weighted sample claims to have heard of noncompetes, while 36.98% have
not heard of them.
Table 3.26 shows the cross tabulation of whether respondents report ever signing a noncom-
pete against whether or not they have heard of it. Overall, 24.7% of the total weighted sample
has signed a noncompete. Of those who have heard of noncompetes, 39.2% report having
signed a noncompete at some point in their life. The respondents also provide information
on the number of employers in the past 5 years with which they have signed noncompetes
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Table 3.23: Qualtrics, ACS Comparison
ACS Unweighted Weighted
Education (1) (2) (3)
Did not complete high school 10.1 1.3 9.3
High school grad 27.2 14.8 26.2
<1 year of college 6.7 9.5 6.9
>1 years of college, no degree 18.3 17.5 18.4
Associates (2 yr) degree 8.9 13.3 9.2
Bachelors degree 19.7 31.1 20.8
Masters degree 6.3 9.9 6.4
Professional degree 1.7 1.5 1.7
Doctoral degree 1.0 1.1 1.1
Race ACS Unweighted Weighted
White alone 76.2 80.4 79.3
Black alone 10.7 5.4 9.4
Asian alone 5.4 4.7 5.4
Some other race alone 5.7 3.5 4.1
More than one race 1.9 6.0 1.7
Sex ACS Unweighted Weighted
Male 52.6 38.5 52.2
Female 47.4 61.5 47.8
Class of Worker ACS Unweighted Weighted
Private for profit 89.2 83.8 87.9
Private non-profit 10.8 16.2 12.1
Hours Worked Per Week ACS Unweighted Weighted
Mean 39.0 41.6 38.2
Standard deviation (11.6 ) (107.8) (13.2)
Age ACS Unweighted Weighted
Mean 40.5 41.1 40.7
Standard deviation (13.4) (12.9) (12.8)
Observations ACS Unweighted Weighted
Unweighted Sample 950,547 4,630
Weighted Sample 101,833,586 100,633,025
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Table 3.24: Summary Statistics
% Cum.
Current job situation
One job 75.14 75.14
More than one job 7.91 83.05
Unemployed 16.95 100
Type of Employer
Private For Profit 87.93 87.93
Private Non-Profit 7.91 95.9
Public Health-care System 4.15 100
Table 3.25: Ever Heard of Noncompetes?
Heard of Noncompetes?
Yes 63.02%
No 36.98%
(table not shown). Assuming that those who have never heard of a noncompete did not
sign one, or those who cannot remember if they did or not, then respondents report signing
a noncompete with 21.8% of their employers in the last 5 years. Those who have heard of
noncompetes report signing a noncompete with 25.7% of their employers in the last 5 years.
Table 3.26: Ever Signed vs Ever Heard of Noncompetes?
Heard of Noncompetes?
No(%) Yes(%) Total(%)
Ever signed a noncompete?
Yes 0 39.2 24.7
No 0 57.7 36.4
Don’t know if ever signed 0 3.1 2.0
Never heard of noncompetes 100 0 37.0
Total 100 100 100
Table 3.27 considers what percentage of those who have ever signed or have heard of non-
competes have also currently signed a noncompete in their job. Of those who have ever
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signed a noncompete, 45.8% report having signed one in their current or most recent posi-
tion. Of those who have definitely said that they have or have not signed a noncompete,
19.3% report signing a noncompete. Of those who have heard of noncompetes, 17.9% report
having signed one currently. In the overall sample, including those who say they don’t know
if they have ever signed a noncompete, those who cannot remember if they have signed one
currently, those who don’t want to say they have signed, and those who have never heard of
noncompetes, 11.3% report signing a noncompete in their current occupation.
Table 3.27: Currently Signed vs Ever Signed or Heard?
Ever Signed? Ever Heard?
Yes(%) No(%) Heard(%) Never heard(%) Total(%)
Currently signed a noncompete?
Yes 45.8 0 17.9 0 11.3
No 44.8 100 75.3 0 47.4
Cannot remember 7.7 0 3 0 1.9
Don’t want to say 1.6 0 0.6 0 0.4
Don’t know if ever signed 0 0 3.1 0 2.0
Never heard 0 0 0 100 37.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Due to the innate challenge in identifying the incidence of noncompetes when workers them-
selves are unaware of the noncompetes they might have signed, we asked respondents who
had ever signed a noncompete if they had ever unknowingly signed and later became aware
of their noncompete. The responses indicate that 9.4% of workers experienced this phe-
nomenon. The point of this exercise is to gain some insight into the extent to which workers
who had not heard of noncompetes may have potentially signed them.
Throughout the rest of the paper, the incidence numbers will be presented two ways: (1) as
a percentage of all respondents, assuming those who have not heard of noncompetes, those
who cannot remember if they signed one, and those who do not want to say did not in fact
sign one, and (2) as a percentage of those who have either replied “yes” or “no” that they
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have signed a noncompete in their occupation. While the first calculation should be seen as
an underestimate because at least some of those respondents we assume did not sign likely
did, while the second calculation likely overestimates the proportion who sign because those
who have not heard of noncompetes may be less likely to have actually signed them. We
prefer the conservative estimates of (1).
Next we break down the incidence of noncompetes by the worker’s class, education level,
occupation, annual compensation, expected employment duration, and job characteristics.
Then we turn to firm characteristics such as industry, firm size, and poaching rates.
3.3.2 Worker Class
There has been no literature on the utilization of noncompetes in private for-profit, private
non-profit, or public non-profits such as public healthcare systems. Anecdotes exists of
unpaid interns or volunteers signing noncompetes, but there is no empirical evidence. To
provide the first estimates, Table 3.28 cross tabulates worker class with noncompete status.
Table 3.28: Class of Worker and Noncompetes
Private Private Public
for profit (%) non-profit (%) healthcare (%)
Currently signed a noncompete?
Yes 12.2 4.1 7.2
No 48.4 47.9 30.1
Cannot remember 2 0.8 2.5
Don’t want to say 0.4 0.1 0.6
Don’t know if ever signed 2 1.3 2.3
Never heard 35 45.6 57.3
Total 100 100 100
Table 3.28 shows that 12.2% of those in private for profit companies sign noncompetes,
whereas 7.2% in public healthcare systems sign and 4.1% in private non-profits sign. These
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numbers are upper bounds because they assume that all those who can’t remember, don’t
want to say, don’t know if they signed, or never heard of noncompetes, did not in fact sign.
An upper bound is given by dividing the proportion who signed by the sum of those who
signed and those who definitively did not sign. These upper bounds are 24.1% for private for
profit firms, 7.9% for private non-profits, and 19% for those in a public healthcare system.
3.3.3 Incidence by Education
Figure 3.3.1 shows the proportion of each education bin that signs, doesn’t sign, doesn’t
know, or hasn’t heard about noncompetes. In order to understand the precision of these
estimates, the underlying number of observations in the unweighted sample is in parentheses
next to the education level. Interestingly, the proportion of those who never heard shrinks
monotonically from 66.1% for those who did not complete high school to 11.8% for those
with a professional degree. Receiving more education is positively correlated with having
heard of noncompetes.
To better examine the proportion of those that sign noncompetes, Figure 3.3.2 plots the
proportion of those that sign as both a percentage of those who have heard, and as a
percentage assuming all others have not signed. The data show that the proportion of
those who sign noncompetes increases substantially with education. The navy line shows
that at least 6.2% of high school grads sign noncompetes, while at least 24.4% of those with
a professional degree sign. More surprising, however, is incidence for those with less than a
bachelor’s degree. Often presumed only to be used with workers with professional degrees
such as physicians, the conservative estimate of the incidence for those with just a bachelors
degree is 17%.
The key takeaway from this section is that noncompetes are not only for highly educated
workers. For the lowest incidence education category, high school graduates, the incidence
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Figure 3.3.1: Proportion of Education Levels Signing CNC
is still between 6.2% and 12.5%.
3.3.4 Incidence by Occupation
This section characterizes the incidence of noncompetes by occupation category, which the
respondents self-selected from a list in the survey. The occupation categories in this section
represent the 2 digit Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) system codes. Detailed
information on job titles and job duties were also collected in order to pursue a finer oc-
cupational analysis, but have yet to be coded. Figure 3.3.3 shows the weighted occupation
distribution in the data. The most frequent occupations are management, sales, office sup-
port, and food preparation and serving.
Figure 3.3.4 looks at the proportion of each occupation in the weighted sample that signs a
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Figure 3.3.2: Education vs Signing CNC
noncompete. The number in the parentheses is the number of observations in the unweighted
sample which correspond to that occupation. The occupations which are least likely to have
heard of noncompetes’ are architecture and engineering, legal occupations, business and
finance, and computer and mathematical occupations. The fact that more people in these
high skill, high earnings occupations suggests that regardless of whether they have currently
signed a noncompete, they are more frequent in their line of work. The occupations which
appear to sign noncompetes most frequently are management, computer and mathematical
occupations, arts and entertainment, and architecture and engineering.
Table 3.29 gives the incidence by occupation assuming all others had not signed and as a
percentage of those who definitely said yes they have signed or not. Occupations which have
the highest rates of noncompete utilization are computer and mathematical occupations,
with between 28.4% and 37.8%, architecture and engineering occupations with between
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Figure 3.3.3: Occupation Distribution by Current CNC
19.6% and 23.4%, and management occupations with between 18.2% and 26.7%. A few
of the more surprising occupations with high incidence rates are arts and entertainment,
with between 19.7% and 30.1%, installation and repair, with between 13.2% and 21%, and
production occupations with 12.3% to 25.9%. The occupations with the lowest utilization
of noncompetes are food prep and serving (2.1%), farming, fishing, and forestry (3.2%),
construction and extraction (3.4%) grounds maintenance (3.5%), healthcare support (6%),
community and social services (6.2%), and life, physical, and social sciences (6.6%).
To sharpen our understanding of the incidence of noncompetes with each of these occu-
pations, we asked the respondents what proportion of employees in their occupation and
industry would sign a noncompete. The idea behind this question is that while the worker’s
experience is only one data point, his knowledge about the industry as a whole represents
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Figure 3.3.4: Proportion of Occupation Signing CNC
many data points.74
Table 3.30 takes the average proportion that the weighted respondents suggest sign non-
competes within each occupation and across industries. These averages are displayed by the
noncompete status of the respondent. Not surprisingly, those who sign noncompetes have
drastically different views on their incidence in their occupation than people who have heard
of them. Averaging together the projections from all the respondents, regardless of whether
they had heard of noncompetes before or not, is comparable to the proportions from column
(2) above, indeed even higher. The average projected incidence across all occupations is
21.8%, notably higher than the 11.4% in the weighted sample.
Figure 3.3.5 which shows histograms of the distribution of occupation projections by whether
or not the respondent had currently signed a noncompete, provides a potential explanation
74See Rothschild and Wolfers 2013 for an example of this method in a voting context.
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Table 3.29: % Signed by Occupation
% Signed, assuming all others didn’t sign % Signed if sign==1|0
Occupation (1) (2)
Architecture, Engineering 19.6 23.4
Arts, Entertainment 19.7 30.1
Business, Finance 14.6 18.0
Community, Social Services 6.2 10.8
Computer, Mathematical 28.4 37.8
Construction, Extraction 3.4 6.1
Education, Training 8.6 14.9
Farm, Fish, Forestry 3.2 51.6
Food Prep, Serving 2.1 5.1
Grounds Maintenance 3.6 7.7
Healthcare Support 6.0 15.8
Installation, Repair 13.2 21.0
Legal Occupations 11.8 13.8
Life, Physical, Social Sci. 6.6 11.2
Management 18.2 26.7
Office, Support 7.1 10.9
Personal Care, Services 8.4 16.7
Physician, Technical 10.3 17.6
Production Occupations 12.3 25.9
Protective Service 5.0 12.1
Sales, Related 10.4 19.2
Transport, Mat. Moving 6.5 11.9
Total 11.4 19.3
for this upward bias in the projections. To provide a basis for comparison, note that the
mean incidence projections would equal the incidence in the sample if all workers reported
that everybody in their occupation and industry shared their same noncompete experience.
If workers who did not sign a noncompete report that they believe other workers in their oc-
cupation and industry do sign, then this will increase the projected incidence of noncompetes
relative to observed incidence in the sample. Similarly, if workers who did sign a noncompete
suggest that less than 100% of their occupation and industry sign noncompetes, then this
will bias downward the results. Since the noncompete signers make up only 11% of the
sample, however, this downward bias is likely to be overshadowed by the higher projected
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Table 3.30: Occupation Projections
Currently Signed Ever Signed Heard All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Architecture, Engineering 72.5 45.5 31.6 33.2
Arts, Entertainment, 75.4 54.9 35.6 28.4
Business, Finance 53.4 37.2 27.9 27.6
Community, Social Services 83.5 36.8 21.5 16.1
Computer, Mathematical 60.9 45.0 36.7 33.6
Construction, Extraction 54.0 25.2 15.9 14.2
Education, Training 58.6 33.0 20.3 16.4
Farm, Fish, Forestry 10.0 10.0 5.2 12.0
Food Prep, Serving 36.8 25.0 15.6 17.2
Grounds Maintenance 77.5 37.9 22.6 19.4
Healthcare Support 62.1 43.0 26.8 21.4
Installation, Repair 58.0 43.3 25.5 22.8
Legal Occupations 52.1 32.9 23.0 21.4
Life, Physical, Social Sci. 51.8 28.2 23.0 24.0
Management 55.5 38.3 29.1 25.1
Office, Support 69.8 36.2 24.7 20.9
Personal Care, Services 55.7 37.8 21.5 20.5
Physician, Technical 52.8 37.1 25.3 20.9
Production Occupations 64.5 44.9 28.4 21.6
Protective Services 32.5 19.1 19.8 14.0
Sales, Related 59.2 41.5 25.7 20.6
Transport, Mat. Moving 61.4 36.1 18.6 15.0
Total 59.4 39.2 25.9 21.8
Note: These numbers represent averages of percentages from weighted
respondents within the occupation row and column heading.
incidences of the non-signers.
Of those who have not currently signed a noncompete, 44.25% believe that they are not
used in their occupation and industry at all. Correspondingly, of those who have signed
a noncompete, 23.78% believe that 100% of workers in their occupation and industry sign
them. Interestingly, while 19% of those who signed a noncompete say that 50% of workers
in their occupation and industry sign noncompetes, the corresponding percentage of those
who did not sign is 6.7%. This clustering at 50% may reflect uncertainty as respondents
have no idea of the actual proportion and just guess 50%. It is clear from Figure 3.3.5 that
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the increase in the bias is coming from those who have not signed reporting that people in
their occupation and industry have signed.
Figure 3.3.5: Distribution of Occupation Incidence Projections
This section provides strong evidence that noncompetes are a regular feature in most occupa-
tions. LaVan (2000) and Whitmore (1990) both survey litigated noncompete cases and find
that primarily salesmen, managers, and professionals go to court over their noncompetes.
This new evidence shows that while the other workers may end up less in court, many of
them are signing noncompetes just as often.
3.3.5 Incidence by Earnings
Next we consider how the incidence of noncompetes vary with earnings. The unweighted
wage distribution is skewed to the right, with the modal respondent receiving less than $15k
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in annual compensation. The mean wage for the unweighted sample is $44k. Reweighting
the sample to be nationally representative, the wage distribution is still skewed to the right,
as can be seen in Figure 3.3.6.
Figure 3.3.6: Earnings Distribution by Current CNC
Figure 3.3.7 shows the proportion of noncompete by annual compensation level. The propor-
tion that have never heard of noncompetes falls markedly from almost 50% for those earning
less than $15k to 2% for those earning $110k. This progression indicates that those earning
more money are more aware of noncompetes. With regards to the incidence of noncompetes,
this figure shows that the proportion of noncompete signers among all respondents generally
increases with annual income.
Figure 3.3.8 shows the proportion of those who signed noncompetes as a fraction of the
total weighted sample, and as a proportion of only those who have definitely signed or
not. The figure shows that the proportion of noncompete signers rises rapidly from at
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Figure 3.3.7: Earnings and Proportion Signing CNC
least 7.8% for those earning less than $15k per year to at least 47.35% for those earning
$140k per year. While there is less data for the higher income levels, the trend is strongly
positive. Importantly, however, the lower income respondents continue to sign noncompetes
at relatively high rates. For example, the conservative estimate suggests that 15.3% of those
earning $40k per year sign noncompetes.
This section bears out the traditionally assumed association between the incidence of non-
competes and high paying jobs, but does not find evidence that lower paying jobs are entirely
unaffected. Indeed, lower paying jobs continue to sign noncompetes at reasonably high rates.
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Figure 3.3.8: Earnings and Signing CNC
3.3.6 Incidence by Legitimate Business Interest
The ‘reasonableness criterion’ stipulates that a necessary condition for the enforcement an
employee’s noncompete is that the employee’s departure will harm the employer’s legitimate
business interests. Courts have traditionally defined these protectable interests as clients,
trade secrets, and other sensitive information which is not generally known. With regard
to clients, courts have often differentiated between their handling of cases in which the
defendant works directly with clients and when the defendant has access to client lists or
other client information (Malsberger 1996, Garmaise 2011). With this in mind, we asked
respondents if they worked directly with clients, had access to client lists or client-specific
information, or had knowledge or access to trade secrets.
Figure 3.3.9 shows the distribution of these characteristics of the job in the weighted sample.
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Working directly with clients is the largest category, representing 33% of the sample, while
25% of the sample has none of the characteristics. A significant portion of the weighted
sample, 13%, works with clients, have access to client lists, and know trade secrets.
Figure 3.3.9: Distribution of Business Interests by Signing CNC
Figure 3.3.10 shows for each set of business interests the proportion of respondents according
to their noncompete status. Expectedly, the lowest proportion of respondents who sign
noncompetes is in the none category. As proportion of the total, those who know at least
trade secrets are more likely to sign noncompetes. Those who only work with clients or do
not have any of the job characteristics are the least likely to have heard of noncompetes,
with 46.73% and 49.16% respectively. That proportion is is at least 16% higher than the
closest business interest, access to client info with 30.73% not hearing of noncompetes.
Figure 3.3.11 plots the proportions of noncompete signers by whether in their position they
work directly with clients, have access to client lists or client specific information, or know
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Figure 3.3.10: Proportion of Business Interest Signing CNC
trade secrets. As was apparent from Figure 3.3.10, the proportion of those who sign non-
competes increases dramatically if the job includes knowing trade secrets. The incidence of
noncompetes for respondents who at least know a trade secret lies between 18.7% (WC, TS)
and 25.85 (WC, TS, CI)%. The highest incidence for a non-trade secret knowing position is
9.74%.
Are businesses more likely to use noncompetes in occupations which they share more valuable
information or assets? Yes. Yet even for those who do not claim to have legitimate business
interest worth protecting, between 4.4% and 9.3% still sign noncompetes.
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Figure 3.3.11: Legitimate Business Interest vs Signing CNC
3.3.7 Incidence by Expected Employment Duration
The goal of this section is to examine to what extent the incidence of noncompetes varies by
the expected employment duration. Firms and workers both face interesting incentives to
offer and sign noncompetes based on the expected duration of the employment relationship.
Employees deciding whether or not to sign a noncompete may only be willing to sign a
noncompete if they intend to stay at the firm for a long time. Alternatively, if firms can
appropriately identify the short term stayers, firms may be more likely to ask them to sign
noncompetes because they know that they will be a potential threat in the near future.
Table 3.31 shows the cross tabulation of expected employment duration from the start of
the employment relationship and noncompete status. Looking at the total number of obser-
vations across the bottom shows that the distribution of expected employment duration is
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highly skewed. The proportion of workers in the sample who expected to remain employed
indefinitely is 73%. With regards to which type of employees have heard of noncompetes,
48% of those expecting to work less than one year have not heard of them while 36% of those
who plan to work indefinitely have not heard of them.
Table 3.31: Expected Employment Duration
Expected to work
<1 year 1-2 yrs 2-4 yrs 4-10 yrs 10+ yrs Indefinitely
% % % % % %
Currently signed noncompete?
Yes 9.7 10.2 9.0 10.7 12.6 11.8
No 40.2 41.5 46.5 49.4 47.4 48.3
Do not want to say 0 1.3 0.2 0.3 0 0.4
Cannot remember 0.8 3.3 3.1 2.1 1.7 1.9
Don’t know if ever signed 1.7 3.1 2.7 2.1 4.9 1.8
Never heard 47.8 40.6 38.6 35.4 33.4 35.9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Unweighted Proportion 5.3 4.7 5.5 10.3 1.8 72.4
Weighted Proportion 5.6 4.5 5.7 9.6 1.7 73.1
Figure 3.3.12 plots the percentage of noncompete signers both relative to all others and to
all those who explicitly said they have or have not signed a noncompete. The results show
that overall the proportion of noncompete signers does not vary with the expected duration.
Between 9.7% and 19.4% of those who expect to work for less than one year sign noncompetes
whereas the range goes from 11.8% to 19.6% for those who work indefinitely.
Overall, the data do not indicate a strong relationship between the expected length of work
and the incidence of noncompetes. This could be the result of either the competing incentives
of the firm and the worker, or it could be that firms which use noncompetes use them for all
employees regardless of how long they expect them to be there.
166
Figure 3.3.12: Expected Employment Duration vs Signing CNC
3.3.8 Incidence by Establishment and Firm Size
Do firms vary in their use of noncompetes simply based on the size of their workforce?
The theoretical prediction is ambiguous. While large firms by their nature are more likely
to have standardized employment contracts to manage their workforce, their size mitigates
the adverse effects from the departure of a key employee to a competitor. Smaller firms,
on the other hand, are more likely have informal employee contracts, but also face severe
consequences if a key employee were to be poached.
The distribution of employees across establishment and firm size is given by Table 3.32.
While only 3.35% of the sample are employed in establishments with over 5,000 employees,
23.1% of the sample is employed by a firm with more than 5,000 employees. On the other
side of the distribution, 34.5% of workers report working in an establishment with less than
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25 employees, while 21.3% report working in a firm of that size. Outside of the bunching at
the ends of the size distributions, the respondents are evenly distributed across the rest of
the establishment and firm size categories.
Table 3.32: Establishment and Firm Size Distribution
Establishment Size (%) Firm Size(%)
Number of Employees
<25 employees 35.35 21.74
25-100 employees 25.81 15.57
101-250 employees 14.90 8.97
251-500 employees 9.21 7.97
501-1000 employees 5.38 7.56
1001-2500 employees 4.09 6.87
2501-5000 employees 2.23 7.38
>5000 employees 3.03 23.94
Total 100 100
We begin our analysis of the incidence of noncompetes and firm size by providing cross
tabulations of noncompete signing status and both multiunit and multi-state firms. Table
3.33 shows that 62.8% of the weighted sample work in a multi-unit firm, while 47.2% work
in a firm with establishments or operations in another state. Of those in multi-unit firms,
12.8% sign noncompetes, while only 8.9% sign in single unit firms. Similarly, 14.1% of those
in multi-state firms report signing noncompetes while only 8.9% of those in single state firms
report signing noncompetes. Workers in multi-state or multi-unit firms are also almost 6
percentage points more likely to have heard about noncompetes.
Next we examine how the incidence of noncompetes varies by both establishment size and
overall firm size. The respondents were asked separately to place their establishment size
and firm size (if they indicated it was a multiple establishment firm) into pre-established
size categories. They were later asked what proportion of workers in their establishment,
in their occupation at their establishment, and in their firm across all establishments, sign
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Table 3.33: Currently Signed vs Firm Size
Multi-Unit Firm? Multi-State Firm
Yes(%) No(%) Yes(%) No(%)
Currently signed a noncompete?
Yes 12.8 8.9 14.1 8.9
No 47.1 48.3 46.7 48.4
Do not want to say 0.5 0.1 0.7 0.1
Cannot remember 2.7 0.9 2.9 1.1
Don’t know if ever signed 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.9
Never heard 34.9 40.1 33.7 39.6
Total 100 100 100 100
Proportion of N 62.8 37.2 47.2 52.8
noncompetes. Figures 3.3.13 and 3.3.14 plot both the projected incidence by whether or
not the respondent has currently signed a noncompete, the average projected incidence from
those who have and have not signed, and the actual incidences reported in the data..
Figure 3.3.13: Establishment Size vs Signing CNC
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Figure 3.3.14: Firm Size vs Signing CNC
The data show a few interesting patterns. For both establishment and firm level, the differ-
ence in the incidence projections between those who sign noncompetes and those who do not
is striking. For example, those who sign noncompetes project that the proportion of those
who sign within their firm is between 60% and 70%, regardless of the firm’s actual size. Al-
ternatively, the incidences projected by those who currently did not sign a noncompete run
between 8% for firms with less than 25 employees and 17% for firms with between 251 and
500 employees. The difference between these projections suggests that firms are not entirely
selective in who they ask to sign noncompetes. Either the firms does not ask anybody to
sign a noncompete, or the firm asks almost everybody to sign them.
Despite the scale of the graph, larger establishments and firms appear to use noncompetes
slightly more frequently. The averaged projections shows that 13.4% of firms with less than
25 employees use noncompetes, compared to 22.6% for firms with over 5,000 employees. The
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corresponding numbers for establishment size are 16.1% and 22.6%.
The actual incidences bear out the same slight upward trend: 8.7% of those in firms with
less than 25 employees sign noncompetes, whereas 11.5% sign them in firms with over 5,000
employees. The corresponding numbers for establishment size are 9.9% and 11.5%. Com-
paring the projected incidences across firms to the actual incidences observed in the data
shows that again the projections are higher by between 4 and 11 percentage points.
Figure 3.3.15: Firm Level Noncompete Incidence Projections
To examine the source of the differential between the projections and the actual incidence,
Figure 3.3.15 shows the distribution of incidence projections within the firm by whether the
worker has signed a noncompete. The histogram indicates the same pattern as before: most
who do not sign project that nobody signs, while most who do sign project that everybody
signs. In this instance, however, more than 40% of those who did not sign projected that a
positive amount would have signed. Since the non-signers make up such a large proportion
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of the sample, these non-zero projections boost the average projection above the actual
incidence in the sample. The same holds true for the establishment level projections.
Since the incidence of noncompetes may be hard to observe across the firm or even the
establishment, we ask coworkers their projections for the incidence of noncompetes in their
occupation at their establishment. Presumably, they know much more about the incidence
of noncompetes among their coworkers in their same position than their firm in general. The
results of the projections are plotted in Figure 3.3.16.
Figure 3.3.16: Firm Level Occupation Specific Noncompete Incidence Projections
Relative to the other projection distributions, the projections of the incidence of noncom-
petes among coworkers in the same occupation are the most polarized. Sixty six percent
of noncompete signers report that 100% of their coworkers sign, while 70% of non-signers
report that 100% of their coworkers do not sign. The other most frequent choices are 10%,
20% and 50%. We interpret the polarization in these projections to reflect actual knowledge
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of the incidence.
3.3.9 Incidence by Industry
We next turn to analyzing the incidence of noncompetes based on the industry of the respon-
dent. We ascertain the industry of the respondent’s current or most recent (if unemployed)
job by asking the respondent to describe what their employer does or produces and to place
their industry within the 2 digit NAICS codes. The results presented below correspond to
the self-selected NAICS 2 digit industry, while a finer industry-level analysis is pending the
coding of the data.
Figure 3.3.17 shows the industry distribution in the data by noncompete status. The most
represented industries are other services, retail trade, healthcare and social assistance, and
manufacturing. Utilities, mining and extraction, management of companies, support and
waste management, and public administration are the least represented industries. Figure
3.3.18 shows the proportion of noncompete status by industry. The finance and insurance
industry are least likely to be unaware of noncompetes while agriculture and hunting and
public administration are the most likely to be unaware of noncompetes. In this weighted
sample, information and professional, scientific, and technical services are the most likely to
use noncompetes.
The exact proportion of noncompete signers is given in Table 3.34. The industries which
exhibit the most frequent CNC usage are the information industry, with between 25.5% and
34.1% signing, and professional, scientific, and technical service companies, with between
20.9% and 28.6% of employees signing. Many of the industries the literature has focused
on do show relatively high rates of noncompete utilization including, manufacturing with
between 15.4% and 26.6%, and finance and insurance with between 19.1% and 24.9%. Among
the more surprising industries with high incidence rates, between 12% and 20.3% of employees
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Figure 3.3.17: Industry Distribution by Signing CNC
in the arts, entertainment, and recreation industry sign noncompetes, between 17.4% and
27.9% sign in real estate, and between 10% and 15.2% sign in education services. Perhaps
most surprising is the number of respondents who report signing a noncompete in a public
administration position, between 13.2% and 33.9%. A quick examination of Figure 3.3.17
suggests that this public administration result is likely due to a tiny sample size, which comes
about because publicly employed workers were intentionally filtered out of the survey.
While a respondent’s report on whether he signed a noncompete is just one data point, we
recognize that the respondent may have better information on who signs noncompetes in their
industry. To corroborate the incidence of noncompetes in the data, we ask the respondents
to report the incidence of noncompetes in their industry. The results are reported in Table
3.35 by whether or not the respondent has currently signed a noncompete, ever signed a
noncompete, heard of noncompetes, or all averaged together. The table shows the same
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Figure 3.3.18: Proportion of Industry Distribution by Signing CNC
trend as in the occupation projects: those who have currently signed think that others in
their industry are also more likely to sign while those who have never signed bring down
the average. The percentage in column (1) should be seen as an upper bound, since those
who have signed are likely to assume that others sign, while the percentages in column
(4) are likely to be a lower bound since the inclusion of those who have never heard of
noncompetes does not incorporate the fact that some of them may have in fact signed
one. We prefer the conservative estimates of column (4). The industry with the highest
incidence of noncompetes is, surprisingly, mining and extraction with 39.6%, followed by
Information with 33.1%. The industries with the lowest incidence of noncompetes are public
administration (12.8%) and agriculture and hunting (13.6%).
Comparing column (4) of Table 3.35 to column (1) of Table 3.34 shows that for each industry
the projections of noncompete incidence are greater than the observed incidence. To examine
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Table 3.34: % Signed by Industry
Industry % Signed, all others not sign % Signed if sign==1|0
(1) (2)
Accomodation, Food Services 3.4 7.2
Admin, Support, Waste Man. 19 25.1
Agriculture, Hunting 1.3 4.3
Arts, Enterntainment, Rec. 12 20.3
Construction 7.4 12.0
Educational Services 10 15.2
Finance, Insurance 19.1 24.9
Health Care, Social Assistance 8.3 15.1
Information 25.5 34.1
Management of Companies 13.8 25.9
Manufacturing 15.4 26.6
Mining, Extraction 11.5 25.8
Other Services 11.2 19.4
Prof., Scientific, Technical 20.9 28.6
Public Admin. 13.2 33.9
Real Estate 17.4 27.9
Retail Trade 9.2 17.1
Transportation, Warehousing 4.9 8.6
Utilities 6.3 8.5
Wholesale Trade 10.5 15.2
Total 11.4 19.3
the source of the difference, Figure 3.3.19 presents the histogram of projections by whether
or not the respondent currently signed a noncompete. The source of the difference is clearly
from over 60% of non-signers indicating that some positive percentage of workers do sign in
their industry. Their responses tend to cluster at 10, 20, 30, and 50, which boosts up the
average of the industry. This upward boost is countered by the fact that 20% of those who
sign noncompetes report that 50% of employees in their industry sign them. Because signers
make up only 11% of this sample, the downward pressure is dominated by the non-signers
indicating non-zero incidences within their industry.
Due to the importance of technological innovation, the noncompete debate has been focused
on technology industries, comparing outcomes in Silicon Valley to outcomes in Route 128
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Table 3.35: Industry Projections
Currently Signed Ever Signed Heard All
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Accomodation, Food Services 46.6 24.7 17.9 15.5
Admin, Support, Waste Man. 45.5 33.2 22.9 19.8
Agriculture, Hunting 95.0 48.6 24.7 13.6
Arts, Enterntainment, Rec. 65.3 44.2 26.8 21.7
Construction 22.2 19.5 16.6 14.6
Educational Services 50.8 28.2 21.8 20.8
Finance, Insurance 51.0 38.9 28.3 26.7
Health Care, Social Assistance 52.1 40.4 24.9 21.8
Information 65.5 51.0 38.8 33.1
Management of Companies 43.3 34.3 31.1 29.3
Manufacturing 53.7 43.6 29.2 26.9
Mining, Extraction 50.2 39.2 31.8 39.6
Other Services 52.9 36.6 24.4 19.2
Prof., Scientific, Technical 51.0 40.4 31.8 30.9
Public Admin. 27.0 19.0 16.2 12.8
Real Estate 80.6 45.4 33.1 26.0
Retail Trade 56.8 36.5 22.2 18.5
Transportation, Warehousing 39.4 24.6 19.4 14.7
Utilities 60.6 35.4 23.7 21.7
Wholesale Trade 46.0 34.5 23.6 18.4
Total 52.7 37.7 25.5 21.8
Note: These numbers represent averages of percentages from respondents
within the industry row and column heading.
(Gilson 1999, Hyde 2003). While the tech industry is rather important, the particular focus
on tech obscures the fact that noncompetes are being used in everything other industry in
relatively equal measure.
3.3.10 Incidence by Industry Poaching Rates
Since noncompetes are used to prevent movement between competitors, this section tracks
how likely a noncompete is corresponding to the frequency of poaching in the industry.
Poaching was gauged by three questions asking how often the respondent’s employer poaches,
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Figure 3.3.19: Industry Noncompete Incidence Projections
how often employees leave the employer for a competitor, and how frequently employees move
between competitors in the industry in general. Table 3.36 shows summary statistics for the
three poaching measures. About half of the sample report that poaching occurs less than or
equal to once a year. About 10% of the sample reports being in an industry in high poaching
industry where poaching occurs a few times a month or more.
Figure 3.3.20 plots the proportion of noncompete signers by their poaching frequency. Each
of the poaching measures show roughly the same trend: Noncompete incidence does not
strongly covary with poaching frequency. For example, in industries where employers poach
other employees less than once a year, the incidence of noncompetes is 10.9%, while in
industries where employees poach other employees once a week of more, the incidence is
11.3%. The numbers are similar for employees leaving for a competitor and industry poaching
rates in general.
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Table 3.36: Poaching Rate Summary Statistics
Employer Poaches (%) Employee Poached (%) Industry Poaching (%)
Frequency
Less than once a year 45 40.1 39.6
Once a year 10.9 13.3 12.6
A few times a year 28.6 29.7 28.5
Once a month 6.3 6.8 8.1
A few times a month 6.2 7.3 7.7
Once a week or more 2.9 2.8 3.5
Total 100 100 100
Figure 3.3.20: Poaching Rates vs Signing CNC
If noncompetes are truly meant to protect valuable information from leaking to competitors,
then their incidence should be higher in industries characterized by high frequency poaching.
The fact that the data does not indicate this suggests that firms have other, more dominant
motives for using noncompetes.
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3.3.11 Incidence by Noncompete Enforcement
States vary substantially in their noncompete enforcement policies (Bishara 2011, Garmaise
2011, Malsberger 2011). To the extent that firms may actually want to take advantage of
their state’s noncompete enforcement policy, higher enforcement policies should be correlated
with the incidence of noncompete utilization.
The distribution of states in the data is given by Figure 3.3.21. California, New York,
Pennsylvania, and Florida represent the highest proportion of the sample. The corresponding
table of proportions signing noncompetes is given in Figure 3.3.22, where states are sorted
by their noncompete enforcement level. The figure shows that the proportion of people who
have never heard of noncompetes is not impacted by state enforcement policy.
Figure 3.3.21: State Distribution by Signing CNC
The proportions signing from Figure 3.3.22 are plotted in Figure 3.3.23, where the x-axis
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Figure 3.3.22: Proportion of State Signing CNC
reflects the noncompete enforcement score of the state from Starr (2014). The evidence
supporting a positive relationship between overall incidence and state policy is relatively
weak. The correlation between the incidence of noncompete enforcement in a state and
the state’s enforcement policy is 0.25. Of course there could within state differences by
occupation and industry, but overall incidence only rises slightly with state enforcement.
A last important point in this section is that at least 11% of those in California and at least
13% of those in North Dakota report signing noncompetes. These states are particularly
interesting because of their refusal to enforce noncompetes. The data show that the lack of
enforcement in those states does not appear to deter firms from requiring their works to sign
them.
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Figure 3.3.23: State Level Noncompete Enforcement vs Signing CNC
3.4 Multivariate Analysis
Having looked at the bivariate relationship between the incidence of noncompetes and many
firm level and employee level characteristics, we turn to a multivariate analysis. Table 3.37
reports the results from a linear probability model in which the dependent variable is a
dummy equal to 1 if the respondent reports signing a noncompete, and 0 otherwise. Note
that because those who cannot remember or have not heard of noncompetes are assumed
to have not signed, the estimates may be biased. Due to space constraints the table only
presents the variables of greatest interest, though often other controls were used. The results
are all weighted using the propensity score transformation discussed in Section 3.2.1, and
the errors are clustered at the state level.
In column (1), the only covariates are dummies for the highest completed education level.
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Table 3.37: Multivariate Analysis
Linear Probability Model: Signed a Noncompete?
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log Earnings 0.007*** 0.006** 0.004* 0.004* 0.003
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
CNC Enforcement 0.011*** 0.010***
(0.003) (0.003)
Private non-profit -0.068*** -0.069*** -0.067***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.014)
Public healthcare -0.024 -0.027 -0.010
(0.020) (0.020) (0.027)
Bachelors Degree 0.080* 0.045 0.041 0.042 0.043 0.028
(0.047) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.047)
Masters Degree 0.079* 0.040 0.033 0.041 0.041 0.022
(0.044) (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.046) (0.044)
Professional Degree 0.154*** 0.090 0.090 0.086 0.087 0.110**
(0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Works with clients (WC) 0.025* 0.028** 0.031** 0.029** 0.026*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Has client list/info (CI) 0.035* 0.036* 0.036* 0.034 0.035
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Knows trade secrets (TS) 0.163*** 0.163*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.138***
(0.037) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
WC, CI 0.031** 0.035** 0.040*** 0.038** 0.036**
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
WC, TS 0.127*** 0.129*** 0.125*** 0.126*** 0.126***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
CI, TS 0.167*** 0.168*** 0.163*** 0.163*** 0.138***
(0.042) (0.043) (0.043) (0.041) (0.044)
WC, TS, CI 0.195*** 0.200*** 0.196*** 0.194*** 0.175***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.029)
501-1000 employees 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.058**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
1001-2500 employees 0.052** 0.047** 0.047** 0.042**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.019)
2501-5000 employees 0.039** 0.036* 0.034 0.028
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
5000+ employees 0.032* 0.026 0.027 0.021
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Observations 100.6 m 100.6 m 100.6 m 100.6 m 100.6 m 100.6 m
R-squared 0.020 0.073 0.077 0.082 0.084 0.111
Occ, Industry FE No No No No No Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the state level.
The dependent variable is a dummy for signing a noncompete. ‘WC’ stands for works directly with clients,
‘TS’ stands for knows trade secrets, ‘CI’ stands for has access to client lists or client-specific information.
The set of controls and omitted categories are described in Section 3.4.
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The omitted category is having never completed high school. The estimates show exactly
what we would have surmised from the education plots. Those who receive bachelors and
masters degrees are 8 percentage points more likely to have signed a noncompete than those
who have not finished high school, while those with a professional degree are 15 percentage
points more likely. Dummies for an associates degree, doctoral degree, and less than a college
degree are used but the coefficients are omitted from the table. The relationship between
signing a noncompete and obtaining a bachelors and masters degree loses significance as
more covariates are added, as can be seen in columns (2)-(6).
In addition to the education dummies, column (2) includes log of annual earnings and
whether the worker possesses any protectable business interest of the firm. The estimates
suggest that a 1% increase in log earnings increases the probability of signing a noncompete
by 0.7 percentage points. The business interests results are striking. Relative to a worker
who does not work with clients, does not have access to client lists or client-specific infor-
mation, and does not know any trade secrets, workers who report knowing trade secrets are
at least 12 percentage points more likely to have signed a noncompete. Workers who do
not know any trade secrets but work with clients or have access to client lists are about 3
percentage points more likely to have signed a noncompete. These results hold regardless of
the controls.
Column (3) has the same set of controls except that it adds dummies for firm size, where the
omitted category is firms with less than 25 employees (25-100, 100-250, 250-500 employees
are not shown in the results table). The results show that relative to firms with less than 25
employees, employees in firms with 501-1000 employees are about 7 percentage points more
likely to sign noncompetes, while employees in firms with between 1001 and 2500 employees
are about 5 percentage points more likely to sign. The results for larger firms are smaller
around 3 percentage points and tend to be statistically insignificant in smaller samples.
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Column (4) includes the same set of controls as (3) and includes dummies for the class of
the worker, hours worked per week, and tenure. The omitted category for the class of the
worker is private for profit sector. The results for the class of the worker show that private
non-profit workers are about 7 percentage points less likely to sign noncompetes, while public
healthcare employees are about 2 percentage points less likely to sign, but the difference is
statistically insignificant. The results for tenure and hours worked per week (not shown in
table) show that a 1 unit increase increases the probability of signing a noncompete by 0.1
percentage points, but the estimate is statistically insignificant.
Column (5) adds state level noncompete enforcement from Starr (2014), number of years of
experience in the occupation, and demographics including gender, and race. Aside from the
the level of noncompete enforcement, the estimates of the demographics and experience are
all small and statistically insignificant (not shown in table). A one unit increase in state-level
noncompete enforcement, however, increases the probability of signing a noncompete by 1
percentage point. This estimate suggests that workers in Florida are 5.3 percentage points
more likely to sign noncompetes than workers in California.
In addition to the controls from column (5), column (6) includes age of the worker and
separate occupation and industry fixed effects at the 2 digit level (coefficients for age, oc-
cupation and industry not shown). The addition of occupation and industry fixed effects
reduces the statistical significance of log earnings, but increases the size of the professional
degree dummy, causing it to regain statistical significance. Aside from these changes, all of
the main results noted above still go through with these additional controls.
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3.5 Discussion
Legal scholars have long held that noncompetes are ubiquitous (Stone 2002), but only in the
last few years have we begun to study their use and impacts. Previous work has studied
the use of noncompetes for only a select group of occupations: CEOs (Bishara et al. 2013,
Garmaise 2011), physicians (Lavetti et al. 2013), and engineers (Marx 2011). This paper
expands our knowledge of the incidence of noncompetes by considering the incidence of
noncompetes in a broad array of occupations and industries, and further examines how
noncompete incidence varies with other firm level and employee level variables.
About 63% of the weighted sample reports knowing of noncompetes, while 40% of those re-
port having ever signed. Of the 40% who have ever signed, 45.8% had currently signed, which
represents 17.9% of those who had heard of noncompetes and 11.3% of the overall sample.
The incidence of noncompetes is higher in higher earning and higher skilled occupations and
industries, but even for those earning less $40k or those without a college education the in-
cidence of noncompetes is still high. Noncompetes are not related to the poaching frequency
of the industry or the expected duration of employement. Workers who know trade secrets
are at least 12 percentage points more likely to have signed a noncompete. Evidence from
the multivariate analysis suggests that private for-profit firms are 7 percentage points more
likely to sign non competes than private non-profits, while those with a professional degree
are 11 percentage points more likely to sign a noncompete than those who have not finished
high school.
Given the pervasiveness of these contracts, more work needs to be done on the contents and
potential effects of signing these contracts to understand how they are impacting workers,
firms, and the economy as a whole.
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